REMAKING EUROPE, REMAKING THE WORLD: ANALYZING SOVIET POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE, 1985-1990

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A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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May, 1991





Abstract

The thesis of this study is that Moscow radically altered its policy toward Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1980's due to the confluence of three major developments: the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the dissatisfaction of the Soviet populace with the performance of the CPSU, and the declining value to Moscow of Soviet relationships with the bloc states. Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to improve the flawed social contract between the rulers and the ruled within the Soviet Union led to a series of internal reforms which vitiated the rationale for Moscow's previous foreign policy. The Kremlin's positive reaction to the process of cautious democratization within Poland in early 1989 confirmed the new thinking in Moscow and undermined the authority of the other East European Communist parties, thus clearing the way for the autumn revolutions.

The second purpose of this examination is to illustrate the advantages of a particular approach to analyzing foreign policy. This approach is based on the conception of foreign policy formation as a process consisting of different stages which can each be best explained by a separate theory or model. The study comprises three distinct models which form a larger, integrated model. The first model is a variation of the rational actor model; it explains the rationality of abandoning the Brezhnev doctrine. The second model is a mixture of elite-conflict and bureaucratic politics models; it explains how the psychology of the Soviet leaders and the political process affected the Soviet Union's East European policy. The third model is an ideological change model; it shows how the political and ideological changes which resulted from learning and political struggle shaped the transformation of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.

Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction: Models of Analysis and Methodology

Moscow radically altered its foreign policy in the second half of the 1980's due to the confluence of three major developments: the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the dissatisfaction of the Soviet populace with the performance of the CPSU, and the declining value to Moscow of Soviet relationships with other states. Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to improve the flawed social contract between the rulers and the ruled within the Soviet Union led to a series of internal reforms which vitiated the rationale for Moscow's previous foreign policy. Nowhere was the Soviet metamorphosis more dramatic or definitive than in its East European policy.[1] The Kremlin's positive reaction to the process of cautious democratization within Poland in early 1989 confirmed the new thinking in Moscow and undermined the authority of the other East European Communist parties, thus clearing the way for the autumn revolutions.

Purpose

This dissertation has two purposes. The first is to explain why the Soviet Union abandoned its long-term policy toward Eastern Europe: specifically, why the Gorbachev regime abandoned the policy most explicitly articulated in the Brezhnev Doctrine. This doctrine, formulated in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, arrogated to the Soviet Union the right and the duty to prevent the introduction of policies within Eastern Europe which posed a danger to socialism.[2] Essentially, this study is searching for the causes for the Soviet acceptance of the anti-Communist revolutions which took place in all six of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states in 1989,

and this includes the acceptance of East European demands for the removal of the Soviet military from their respective territories.

The second purpose of this examination is to illustrate the advantages of a particular approach to analyzing foreign policy. This approach, like those used by Andrew Moravcsik and Matthew Evangelista, is based on the conception of foreign policy formation as a process consisting of different stages which can each be best explained by a separate theory or model.[3] Because simple observation of the world around us cannot support the argument that state behavior is totally random, scholars begin their analyses with the premise that foreign policy can be characterized by patterns that can be described. Indeed, all people, including policy makers form at least implicit models of how the world works. Models are tools for explaining the reasons for our actions. By making them explicit we can understand better both the actions we study and how accurately our models function.

Most models, however, suffer the deficiency of explaining international phenomena on the basis of only one theory. As Andrew Moravcsik noted, there are three difficulties encountered when using single-theory models: "Although employing more than one theory involves a loss of parsimony, there are compelling reasons--empirical, logical, and methodological--for conceding this disadvantage in order to avoid monocausal explanation."[4]

The Advantages of Complex Models

Empirical Advantages

Empirically, no monocausal theory of foreign policy behavior has ever proven to be successful over more than a few cases. Though there exist a number of very elegant attempts to develop a general theory of foreign policy but they fall short in that they are too narrow in scope and simple to be valid. For example, William Zimmerman's work on

isolating issue areas as the most important independent variable in foreign policy was a significant contribution toward the goal of a general theory but it fell short because it cannot be applied to a case like the one under examination here.[5] If the task of the analyst is to find the main cause of change in a foreign policy toward a specific state or region, as it is here, then issue area variation becomes an insurmountable hurdle because it is empirically impossible to analyze policy according to one issue--be it physical security, economic growth, political legitimation, etc.--because states are not as a rule presented with foreign policy problems in just one issue area.[6]

The Logical Advantages

There are two logical reasons for not choosing any one of the above theories over any of the others: first, the available evidence can support all these theories to some extent; and second, none of the existing theories of state behavior measures precisely the same thing. To paraphrase Moravcsik, foreign policy "is not a discrete dependent variable: it is a bundle of interrelated variables."[7] Different theories measure different phases in the formation of foreign policy. The formation of policy comprises three stages: inputs; process; and implementation.[8] The inputs of a policy can be broken down further into the following: consideration of the goals of the decision-makers, and how those goals are influenced by leadership values, beliefs, assumptions, and information. The process by which decisions are reached may be the rational pursuit of a goal; it may be characterized by bureaucratic conflict, debate and compromise, or it may be something different, i.e. leadership fiat based on emotional response. Implementation of a decision may be as complex as the mobilization of an armored division for invasion, or as simple as instructing one's diplomats to object no longer to certain policies. Both the

process and implementation phases can be influenced by various constraints, e.g. time, money, or ability.

The Methodological Advantage

As Stephen M. Meyer pointed out, each model offers certain strengths, in that it emphasizes one phase or component of the process of policy formation particularly well.[9] The strategic, or rational actor model assumes that goals and values are constant and that policy is the result of action designed to maximize utility in the context of a unitary set of values.[10] The emphasis is on the goal. The interest group model emphasizes the process of decision and does not assume a unitary actor and rational action. Other models may emphasize constraints on decision.[11] Therefore it makes no sense to compare an explanation of Soviet foreign policy based on the rational actor model with one based on an interest group model; instead, it is more logical to apply different models where they are best suited. It may be prudent to begin with an analysis employing the rational actor model in order to determine the costs and benefits to the Soviet Union of its policies, and then switch to the bureaucratic bargaining model to find out how Soviet leaders decided among themselves which goals to pursue and how best to pursue them. The resulting multi-stage model can be thought of as a complex filtering apparatus. By pouring evidence of Soviet acts and intentions through several different analytical filters it is possible to determine which factors were relevant in the development of Soviet policy. Different levels of analysis serve to catch differently configured factors of the overall explanation, with each level accounting for different stages in the policy process: defining and examining interests, establishing goals, deciding on means, and implementing the policy.

Those causal factors which are supported by the most evidence are the heaviest and most important. The final explanation can be thought of as a structure. The foundation comprises the weightiest factors. Less important elements of the explanation constitute the superstructure. They are part of the structure, but the explanation can stand without them. Superstructural factors do not alter the fundamental outcome of an explanation; they simply clarify and improve upon it.

Existing Explanations and their Theoretical Foundations

Enough contradictory evidence exists to support a number of different conclusions about the cause of the Soviet foreign policy about-face, and each one of these conclusions is grounded for the most part in one theory or model. A survey of the scholarly literature at the time of this writing yields few attempts to explain the specific policy change. One author, Mark Kramer, wrote an article before the direction of Soviet policy became clear to the rest of the world in he posited five main sources for the apparent shift in the Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.[12] The first factor cited was Gorbachev's leadership. Other scholars who maintained that Gorbachev himself was the main agent of change in the Soviet Union's broader foreign policy have either explicitly or implicitly subscribed to the theory that the preferences of leaders are the determining factors of foreign policy.[13] Such theories fit into Kenneth Waltz's first image of analysis.[14] Gallagher and Spielmann's analysis of Soviet defense policy is a country-specific version of the leadership approach.[15]

Two other factors cited by Kramer were the continuation of unstable, problematic regimes within Eastern Europe and a general relaxation of East-West tensions. These factors are undergirded by a class of theories which finds the sources of state conduct in the nature of the international system. Adherents of this kind of theory, explained by Waltz in his third image of analysis, include Western conservatives, like

Richard Pipes and Paul Nitze, who asserted that the military build-up of the late 1970's and early 1980's induced the Kremlin to quit the Cold War and pull back the Iron Curtain.[16] The claims of Pipes and Nitze are grounded in the action-reaction model, which is itself a variation of the rational actor approach to analyzing foreign policy.[17]

A second variation within the third-image category of explanations is that a changing world economy and the growth of international economic interdependence led Moscow to seek integration with the West. Eastern Europe had become a liability; letting go was the price of admission into the world economy.[18] According to this perspective the Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe was the fulfillment of Nixon's and Kissingers' linkage theory gone beyond their wildest dreams.[19]

Kramer also found sources of change in shifting Soviet economic and political priorities. These factors fall primarily within Waltz's second image of analysis which postulates the domestic structure and resulting politics of particular states as the predominant source of foreign policy behavior. Seweryn Bialer and George Breslauer cite the failure of the Soviet system which began to manifest itself in the 1970's as a significant factor leading to Moscow's new tolerance of diversity. They also cite the existence of reform-oriented thinking before the 1980's.[20] The Soviet leaders' own recognition of their system's failing attributes, and their attempts to abandon them vitiated the need to legitimate their moribund system externally. No longer was there a need to export revolution to the Third World or maintain one in the East European colonies. Theirs is a Waltz second image argument.

The Configuration of the Multi-Stage Model

This study is configured like the complex filter described above, with each chapter acting as a stage. The second chapter can be thought of as the control panel: it

describes how each model works to explain or catch certain determinants of state behavior better than others. The third chapter provides the context for understanding previous Soviet policy; it lays out the historical interests of the Soviet state in four dimensions: political, military, economic, and ideological. It emphasizes the importance of ideology in framing options for action and introduces the importance of noting ideological change within the context of a model which is usually applied to events which move too quickly to witness a fundamental value change within the actor in question. Finally this chapter explains Eastern Europe's role in the context of larger Soviet interests. Within the sequence of policy formation this chapter belongs in the first stage, inputs.

The third chapter also belongs in the input stage because the postwar history of Moscow's relationship with Eastern Europe served as the prime source of information used by the Soviet leadership in formulating new policy toward Eastern Europe. Using the principle of rational action the analysis seeks the answer to the question, what did Moscow want from Eastern Europe and what did it receive? By examining both the advantages and disadvantages of Moscow's relationship with Eastern Europe the model reveals that the Kremlin's dominance of Eastern Europe was a mixed blessing dating from the beginning of the Red Army occupation in 1945. Moreover, it illustrates how the Soviets as well as outside observers recognized through word and deed how the region developed into more and more of a liability to Moscow's political, economic, and military interests as time passed. Nevertheless, such rational considerations were not powerful enough to sway the Soviet leadership from its conviction that full sovereignty for the six non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states was not an acceptable option until Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power because previous generations of leaders had a greater stake in avoiding internal structural reform than did Gorbachev.

Chapter 4 explains the cognitive changes that induced the Gorbachev regime to respond to the same kind of challenges from Eastern Europe with a completely different policy. This chapter relies on three theories. First, using motivated bias, I argue that in general the Gorbachev generation lacked the same bias against fundamental reform of the Soviet internal economic and political system as the Brezhnev generation. This lack of bias expanded the range of what the reformers were willing to entertain as possible in comparison to the previous generation of leaders. The second theory, complex learning, complemented motivated bias: because of the the reformers relative absence of bias they were able to derive lessons about the negative consequences of long-standing policies that their predecessor simply could not learn. Finally, in the context of the bureaucratic politics model I show how Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, *et. al.* either persuaded or tossed aside individual and institutional actors who objected (in part due to their own biases) to both his internal democratization and external concessions. I pay particular attention to the role played by the military, the academic institutes, the KGB, and the even the public in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. The public was relevant because, as I argue in chapter 3 the elite believed that maintaining the authority and power of the CPSU required that at some level the population's material and psychological needs be fulfilled.

Chapter 5 illuminates the specific internal ideological changes that resulted from the cognitive and political changes described in the previous chapter and how the new policies were the prerequisite for changes in the Kremlin's foreign policy. The description of the internal ideological changes and logical links between Soviet domestic and foreign policy completes the picture of the policy process leading to the emancipation of Eastern Europe.

In chapter 6 I conclude by examining point by point precisely how Moscow redefined its foreign policy interests with regard to Eastern Europe in accordance with

the values of the new Soviet political system. Attention is given to Moscow's new understanding of its political/ideological, security, and economic requirements, and to the significance of the changes in other areas of Soviet foreign policy.

A Note on the Data

To examine Soviet foreign policy one must look at what the Soviet say, what they do, and how the latter compares to the former. Certain actions like troop movements and treaty negotiations are not difficult to follow because they are reported in the Soviet and the world press. Other Soviet actions are less overt because in asymmetrical relationships like that which exists between the USSR and Eastern Europe a few words can carry the same effect as action because they suffice to secure the desired response. Traditionally the Soviet leadership has used its press to signal its views to East European leaders and populations. In this case words can be viewed as action.

Determining the leadership motives and politics behind these words is more difficult. Until very recently the Soviets kept differences of opinion within the leadership secret, especially in regard to the development of foreign policy. The difficulty of following internal policy debates without being present, and without having access to transcripts brings up the question: how does one examine the development of a Soviet policy? What sources should a scholar consult? Given the lack of direct access to all the relevant policy-making actors, it is necessary to draw inferences from the printed evidence of the three stages of the policy process: information; debate and decision; and implementation.[21]

Recent Soviet scholarly literature contains a continually widening spectrum of political viewpoints under consideration and debate by policy-makers. The Soviet and foreign press serve as source material for learning about policy direction and debate.

One should not, of course accept as Party gospel any article or news story that appears in print in the Soviet Union, particularly today as *glasnost* permits an ever widening range of opinion to be expressed. Moreover, now that the Communist Party is not the only actor on the political stage, the scope of relevant materials is significantly broader, especially when considering the domestic implications of foreign policy, such as the need for military conscription, or economic stringency. Yet despite the increase in popular participation in Soviet government during the period under investigation, 1985-1990, the CPSU comprised most of the main political actors in the Soviet Union, especially in the area of foreign policy. Therefore the traditional methods of examining policy still obtain.

The quantity and frequency of material on certain subjects, the forum in which it appears, the position of the authors and the location of articles are often indicative of policy trends. The fact that many more articles supporting one particular point of view over another are published in authoritative arenas for policy expression, such as *Kommunist*, *Pravda*, and *Izvestia* will most likely indicate a strong trend in the direction of the debate.[22] In some cases, publication within *Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* may represent the distinct institutional interests of the armed forces, and sometimes, it may restate Party material. Different views expressed in different fora may indicate institutional conflict; different views expressed within the same journal often indicate continuing debate within the same institution..

Two other journals deserve attention, *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, and *SShA (World Economy and International Relations* and *USA).* They are the publications of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and the Institute of USA and Canada Studies respectively. Both are in the USSR Academy of Sciences and have very strong policy-formulation and advising roles.[23] Both journals

are widely read in the policy-making elite. Georgi Arbatov, the head of the USA and Canada Institute, has been an advisor to Soviet leaders on U.S.-Soviet relations since the Brezhnev era; two of Gorbachev's closest domestic and foreign policy advisors, Evgeniy Primakov and Aleksandr Yakovlev both previously headed the Institute World Economy and International Relations.

The publications I have listed certainly are not exhaustive. Specialized journals such as *Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy), Voprosy Ekonomiki (Problems of Economics), Voprosy Istorii KPSS (Problems of the History of the USSR)* and others in different subject realms offer clues to the development of expert and official thinking on a variety of subjects as well.

The position of an article in a journal tells something about its effect on policy. Is it a headline article or is it under the rubric, "For Discussion"? If the latter, the author's viewpoint is controversial, and not likely to be settled policy. The author's position indicates his influence in policy-making. Obviously, if it is the General secretary of the CPSU, it is influential on any given issue. The opinion of a General in the Red Army or the head of a trade union does not hold the same weight, but it may be representative of an institutional interest. Similarly, the opinions of the highest leaders such as Gorbachev and Ligachev can be gleaned by proxy from the voices of lower-placed figures known to be political allies.

The frequency in which a particular author appears in different journals may indicate more than just productivity; it may be that the author has a powerful patron who wants to subject a point of view to discussion without taking responsibility. In the area of Eastern Europe, Oleg Bogomolov's name appears quite frequently. He is the director of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, and an advisor to Gorbachev in that area. Similarly, one of Bogomolov's department heads, Andranik

Migranyan also appears often. On defense issues, the names of two scholars appear more frequently than do others. Andrey Kokoshin and Andrey Kortunov are advocates of ideas of reasonable sufficiency and defensive sufficiency.

One also learns about the implementation of policy through the speeches and actions of Soviet leaders. The Documents and Resolutions of Party Congresses and Conferences, which include reports by the general secretaries usually indicate settled policy or doctrine. As the Soviet government exhibited greater and greater openness it created new forums for disseminating policy information. In this vein *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR (Bulletin of Foreign Ministry of the USSR)* which resumed publication in 1987, proved to be a valuable resource for locating important speeches, meetings, and announcements. Most policy decisions have been and continue to be printed in the press. The ultimate confirmation of Soviet policy comes through the actions of the state which are conducted through its leaders, diplomats, and soldiers. Soviet policy of withdrawal from Afghanistan, for example, was confirmed when Soviet troops began to leave that country. Moscow's acceptance of change in Eastern Europe was confirmed by Soviet inaction.

The actual decision of the leaders is obviously more of a mystery than either the policy debate or its implementation. One can deduce the decision from its implementation if it is an action, but what if the implementation of a policy is not an event, but a process, and what if the action is signaled by words as opposed to deeds? An event like an invasion, or the breaking of diplomatic relations can be witnessed. A functional and/or geographic policy change by nature is so complex and replete with ambiguities, contradictions, and adjustments, that it is extremely difficult to determine precisely how and when it occurred, and who supported or opposed it among the relevant policy-makers. It is reasonable to assume that published accounts of leaders' speeches which

differ in viewpoint reflect acknowledged disagreement on the issue in question. Also, the timing of a publication can indicate the timing of a decision. Only participants and eyewitnesses, however, can be completely sure of who made a particular decision, and the precise views of the different actors. Some scholars have greater faith than others that analysis of arcane details of comings and goings in the Kremlin can reveal Moscow's bureaucratic in-fighting.[24] Even if true, many interpretations of that data are possible. In my analysis of the change of Moscow's policy toward Eastern Europe I attempt to establish the reliability of printed sources as a gauge of leadership views and try to corroborate evidence with multiple sources when possible.

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[1]Eastern Europe for the purposes of this study comprises the six non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization: Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

[2]For an explication of what came to be known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Sergei Kovalev, "Suverenitet i international'nye obyazannosti sotsialisticheskikh stran," *Pravda*, September 26, 1968, p. 1. See also Brezhnev's speech in *Pravda,* November 13, 1968, p 2.

[3]Andrew M. Moravscik, "Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement," *International Organization* Vol. 43, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 173-205; and Matthew Evangeslista, *Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

[4]Moravcsik, *op. cit.,* p. 174.

[5]William Zimmerman, "Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of General Theory," *American Political Science Review,* No. 67 (December, 1973), pp. 1204-1212.

[6]See Raymond Aron, *Peace and War,* translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Kreiger Publishing Company, 1981). Aron systematically picks apart the flaws of most, if not all the monocausal theories of international behavior.

[7]Moravcsik, *op. cit.,* p. 175.

[8]See Alexander J. Motyl, "'Sovietology in One Country' or Comparative Nationality Studies?" *Slavic Review*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring, 1989).

[9]Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Decision Making for National Security: What Do We Know and What Do We Understand?" in Jiri Valenta and William C. Potter, eds., *Soviet Decision Making for National Security* (London and Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984). Other works which analyze the uses of different approaches include William Welch and Jan Triska, "Soviet Foreign Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Models," *World Politics,* Vol. 23, No. 4 (July, 1971), pp. 704-734; and Arnold Horelick, A.R. Johnson, and John Steinbrunner, *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: Decision-Theory-Related Approaches* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1975).

[10]See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 14-28.

[11]*Ibid.*

[12]Mark Kramer, "Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 46-38.

[13]See for example, William G. Hyland, *The Cold War is Over* (New York: Times Books, 1990); Philip Tetlock, Irving Janis, and Jerrold Post, in *The Washington Post,* December 17, 1989; Jerry F. Hough also emphasizes the role of Gorbachev's leadership in "Gorbachev's Politics." *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 69. No. 1 (Winter, 1989/1990), pp. 26-41.

[14]Kenneth H. Waltz divided the causes of war into three levels of analysis, which he called images: individual, domestic, and systemic, in *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1959.

[15]Matthew Gallagher and Karl Spielmann, *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).

[16]Paul Nitze claimed that the militarization of containment produced the internal mellowing of the Soviet Union which was responsible for Moscow's increased tolerance for democratic movements in Eastern Europe: lecture at the University of Virginia, October 12, 1989; Richard Pipes asserted that the hard line taken by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan caused the collapse of Communism, "Gorbachev's Russia: Breakdown or Crackdown," *Commentary*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (March, 1990); and Francis Fukuyama argued that the Soviet transformation was significantly motivated by the American superiority in military technology, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, No. 16, Summer, 1989, pp. 7-8.

[17]Jan Triska, and David Finley, "Soviet-American Relations: a Multiple Symmetry Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 9, No. 1 (March, 1965), pp. 37-53.

[18]Jerry F. Hough, *op. cit.* For arguments that Eastern Europe developed into a liability for the Soviet Union see Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: the Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability," *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter, 1985), pp. 2-46; Paul Marer, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union: (II) The Economic Aspect," in Charles Gati, ed., *The International Politics of Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 59-81; and Peter Summerscale, "Is Eastern Europe a Liability to the Soviet Union," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 57, No. 4 (Autumn, 1981), pp. 585-598.

[19]For an articulation of Nixon-Kissinger strategy toward the Soviet Union, see the Annual foreign policy report, February 9, 1972, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1972*, pp. 204-205.

[20]Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects," *Journal of International Affairs.* Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring, 1989); and George H. Breslauer, "Linking Gorbachev's Domestic and Foreign Policies, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring, 1989).

[21]See Alexander J. Motyl, *op. cit.*

[22]The fact that Gorbachev replaced the less enthusiastic supporter of reform, Victor Afanasyev, with Ivan Frolov, as editor of *Pravda* indicates *Pravda's* continued utility as a gauge of leadership opinion. See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Vesti otkrytiy dialog c lyudmi," *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1989.

[23]For a detailed discussion of the policy making role of think tanks, see Eberhard Schneider, "Soviet Foreign-Policy Think Tanks," *The Washington Quarterly,* Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring, 1988).

[24]See for example Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia: Anatomy of a Decision* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

Chapter 2: Underlying Theories

Introduction

It is the nature of scholarship to try to explain, and it is the nature of scholars to try to explain better. They strive to develop and apply theories and models which can be used to explain entire classes of events, whether it be why humans fall ill or why states go to war. A theory is useful when it can capture as many observable phenomena as possible without sacrificing simplicity. It is hoped that this model will serve to explain Soviet foreign policy more accurately than others that have gone before, and that it will contribute to a better understanding of international relations as a larger whole. In order to understand the theories which support the construction of a new model, it is necessary to understand the features and capabilities of the different models which comprise it. Because this analysis employs aspects of the composite model developed by Graham Allison it would be both useful and logical to describe Allison's approach and how it differs from this one.

Graham Allison and Decision-Making

Allison examined three different models of national security decision-making in a distinct attempt to synthesize a single approach: they were the rational-actor model, the organizational process model, and the bureaucratic politics model. Each model contributed a different dimension of understanding to the overall explanation of US and (to a lesser degree) Soviet decision-making. By demonstrating the explanatory power of different models in that particular case Allison showed that it was impossible to understand US national security decision-making in the context of just one simple

approach. Because the core of this study depends on Allison's method and the models he used, it is important to define how each model is configured.

The first model, or paradigm, employed by Allison, the rational actor model, is the most common formulation of propositions, concepts, and basic assumptions regarding foreign policy decision-making in a state. Most analysts implicitly use the rational actor model to explain foreign policy.[1] The basic unit of analysis (the actor) in this paradigm is the state, or the national government. Occurrences in international relations are thought of in terms of actions which are chosen by a government. Given certain problems, and having certain values, governments choose actions which will maximize their goals and objectives. The government is a unitary, rational decision-maker which chooses one set of articulated goals, perceives one set of options, and provides one estimate of the consequences that each alternative entails. This model fits into Kenneth Waltz's third image level of analysis because the anarchical character of the international system is assumed to be predominant causal factor in state behavior.

In the application of the rational actor paradigm to Soviet East European policy the Soviet Union is the actor. In this model Mikhail Gorbachev can also be referred to as the actor because, as the head of state he represents the Soviet Union most visibly in its interactions with the outside world. (Reference to Gorbachev in this paradigm does not suggest that his personal political opinion is controversial, because the state is assumed to be a unitary, rational actor, and its decisions are not the result of irrational political compromise, but of the discovery of the most rational course of action) in pursuit of given goals.

In seeking to understand Gorbachev's policy toward Eastern Europe in the latter half of the 1980's in the context of the rational actor paradigm, the model assumes that policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole was developed as a "calculated solution to a strategic problem."[2] Its explanation of the development of the Soviet East European policy consists of pointing out Moscow's objective as it reformulated policy toward Eastern Europe and how that policy was a reasonable option, in view of the nation's goal. In essence an adherent to this model would argue that the Soviet Union followed four steps in its reformulation of Soviet policy in this area. First, it identified a problem; the costs of the old political, economic, and military arrangements with Eastern Europe exceeded the benefits. Second, it calculated a solution to the problem; tilt the balance of the relationship in favor of the USSR. Third, it calculated the probable consequences of the available options for solving the problem. There existed a number of solutions ranging from full-scale military action to isolation from the internal and external concerns of the six East European Warsaw Pact states. Fourth, upon consideration of all the alternatives the Soviet Union chose to grant greater freedom of action to its East European neighbors, including the right to determine their own forms of government.[3]

Allison pointed out that analysts employing the rational actor paradigm operated according to two faulty assumptions. First, governments behave rationally in all cases. History's counter examples to this proposition can fill libraries. Second, the state is monolithic. Allison showed that states are not monolithic, they are governed by different individuals, groups, and organizations having their own values, interests, influence, and agendas in determining and executing foreign policy. Though very close to being monolithic during the Stalin era, even the USSR's foreign policy was the result of competing interests, values, and agendas.[4]

Allison's second approach, the bureaucratic (intra-governmental) politics model differs from the rational actor paradigm in that the actors are not unitary states but individuals or institutions which occupy positions having influence on the nation's priorities and policies:

> The decisions and actions of governments are international political resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining among individual members of the government.[5]

In the Soviet Union in 1985 the actors were the members of the Politburo, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, the head of the KGB, Central Committee Secretaries with responsibility for foreign policy and related problems and assorted other subordinates and personnel who had some impact on interpreting, deciding, or implementing policy. They even included scholars and analysts from certain institutes which developed policy options and analyses, such as the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System.

By Autumn 1989, however, by virtue of Gorbachev's structural transformation of the Soviet government the influence of the Communist Party and its different organs on the formulation and development of policy, while still preeminent, had diminished. In their place Gorbachev substituted more democratic bodies such as the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet and its relevant committees, the Presidential Council, and to a certain extent, raw public opinion. To some extent the transfer of political power complicated the task of evaluating the relative influences of different domestic actors on Soviet foreign policy, but in another sense the task was simplified

because during the confusion of the transfer Gorbachev himself, quite readily wielded almost dictatorial power in foreign affairs. It could be argued that the confusion regarding political authority and power is a different model altogether, but because this kind of confusion is rare short of civil war, it seems logical to place the analysis of the foreign policy that results within the context of the bureaucratic politics paradigm.

Analysis was further complicated by the fact that Soviet-East European relations were not strictly foreign relations in the sense that Soviet-US relations, for example were. Domestic actors concerned over the possible spillover from liberalization in Eastern Europe had played a role in the formulation of Soviet policy in the past. They had not disappeared, but they were countered by domestic reform advocates who saw no need to continue repressive policies in Eastern Europe which the Soviets were themselves abandoning, and also probably saw the spillover from East European liberalization to be a useful engine for even greater democratization within the Soviet Union. The methodological problem created by the domestic implications of East European policy will be addressed below

Despite the methodological confusion, there were a number of institutional and individual actors with their own goals and values, as well as their own ability to influence policy, if only through the capacity to influence Gorbachev. Gorbachev himself, as the General secretary of the CPSU, President of the Supreme Soviet, and Chairman of the Defense Council exerted the greatest degree of power on foreign policy, but other Presidential Council and Politburo members, Secretaries, and Ministers exerted influence as well. The political give and take which occurred among these politicians with different interests and agendas may have resulted in compromise which may or not be purely rational in its outcome. Unlike in the rational model actor model, the units of analysis are institutions, bureaucracies, groups, and individuals, rather than states.

According to this approach, the predominant factors of foreign policy are found not in the character of the state system, but in the nature of the state itself. Internal political dynamics, rather than a search for the most rational policy alternative, was the main determinant of policy according to this paradigm.

According to the third model, the organizational process paradigm, actors are neither monolithic states, nor influential individuals representing institutions but an array of governmental organizations which perform different routines in perceiving problems and executing policy:

> The happenings of international politics are, in three critical senses, outputs of organizational processes. First, actual occurrences are organizational outputs....The decisions of government leaders trigger organizational routines. Government leaders can trim the edges of this output and can exercise some choice in combining outputs. But most of the behavior is determined by previously established procedures....
>
> Second, existing organizational routines for employing present physical capabilities constitute the range of effective choice open to government leaders confronted with any problem....
>
> Third, organizational outputs structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must make their 'decisions' about an issue. Outputs raise the problem, provide the information, and take the initial steps that color the face of the issue that is turned to the leaders....
>
> Analysis of formal government choice centers on the information provided and the options defined by organizations, the existing organizational capabilities that exhaust the effective choices open to the leaders, and the outputs of relevant organizations that fix the location of pieces on the chess board and shade the appearance of the issue. Analysis of actual government behavior focuses on executionary outputs of individual organizations as well as on organizational capabilities and organizational positioning of the pieces on the chess board.[6]

In a case such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, organizational inputs and outputs played a significant role in the ultimate decision because the leaders responsible for making the decision were dependent upon specific organizations for receiving

information, developing contingencies, and executing orders. The CIA's surveillance routine determined when the President and other individuals involved discovered that a problem existed. The Air Force's reluctance or perceived inability to develop a surgical bombing strike narrowed the range of options for dealing with the problem, and the routine procedures of the Navy and the CIA impinged on the execution of the decision and the final outcome of the US-Soviet confrontation.[7] There is a temporal distinction between the case which Allison examined and the one under review in this study, which makes the organizational process model more difficult to apply, however.

Allison analyzed a decision taken in response to a concrete occurrence of acute interest to the United States government; the decision process could be analyzed over the course of thirteen days. Soviet foreign policy toward Eastern Europe was developed over the course of years. There was no immediate pressure for a decision. (There were moments of considerable pressure, particularly during Wojtech Jaruzelski's negotiations with Solidarity at the beginning of 1989, and during the upheaval in East Germany in November 1989, but by that time the Soviet leadership had already decided not to intervene in its allies' internal affairs). The organizational routines which are so significant for action in an emergency are less obvious when tamed to the needs of the leadership over the course of time, because the leaders who make decisions and policies can avail themselves of multiple sources of information, representing a wider spectrum of inputs and possible options. Furthermore, strong leaders can shape and change the organizations which are responsible for implementing their policies. In Communist countries, the tradition of 'democratic centralism' in policy making contributes to leaders' abilities to control the influence of subordinate institutions on policy.
Thus, to a greater degree the leadership was able to subordinate routines of the relevant organizations to its own preferences and preconceptions.

When in 1962 the Soviet Union broke a promise to the United States not to send strategic missiles to Cuba, the Kennedy administration was forced to make a decision regarding the installation of Soviet missiles before the warheads arrived and the missiles became operational. Once this occurred, the danger of possible outcomes of the crisis increased and the scope of options available for dealing with the problem decreased, because of the obvious unacceptability of certain outcomes. The timing of the discovery of the missiles was critical to the decision. The timing of the U-2 flight which discovered the missiles was determined by the standard operating procedures and routines of the American intelligence community.[8]

Organizational process played a role in the range of options and the execution of the quarantine in the decision as well. The Air Force's standard operating procedures convinced the decision-makers that a surgical air strike was not a viable option.[9] The Navy's enshrined routines determined to a certain extent that execution of the decision to quarantine Cuba was performed the Navy's way and not in the way they were directed by President Kennedy.[10]

In contrast, the Soviet decision-makers faced neither temporal constraints nor procedural problems in the recognition of their problem; similarly, these constraints and problems applied neither to the development of options to deal with the problem, nor to the implementation of the chosen policy. Soviet organizations did, however, play a role in conveying information and presenting options to policy-makers, if only existentially. In accordance with the organizational model, the Foreign Ministry, through its diplomats, and the KGB, through its spies, probably communicated the problematic nature of the Soviet-East European relationship, i.e. the high level of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist resentment in the different Warsaw Pact states. Though intelligence agencies are known to be reluctant to report information which they know

their superiors are loathe to hear, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze made a point of soliciting such information, i.e., Shevardnadze said at a conference of the Foreign Ministry, "First, our responsibility for timely and accurate assessments of the international world, is sharply increasing."[11] And though the recognition of the existence of a problem in this relationship was more a matter of reading history than intelligence reports, the leadership still required reliable data in order either to formulate new opinions, or to back up existing preconceptions. The Soviet Trade Ministry and representatives to the CMEA just as certainly provided the leadership with unfavorable data. To be sure, the time constraint was not as great as that given the Kennedy administration in 1962, but the accelerating deterioration of the Soviet economy and the unhealthy character of Soviet-East European relations (particularly in Poland) required some action.

Moreover, Gorbachev's range of options for dealing with the problem was constrained by the procedures of at least one organization. There were compelling reasons mitigating against the use of the Soviet armed forces to quell anti-Communist insurrections in Eastern Europe. First, the army was already engaged in an attempt to conquer a nationalist rebellion in Afghanistan. Open ended operations on a second front would strain military resources further. Second, even though there are significant tactical and strategic differences between the army's failure to subdue the Mujahadeen and combat in Eastern Europe (the experiences of 1956 and 1968 notwithstanding), the army may have been sufficiently demoralized by its failure in Afghanistan to stand against an invasion of Poland in 1981 (evidence is scanty on this point).[12] The military option remained available for Gorbachev, but the Red Army's apparent opposition to a mission of internal Warsaw Pact repression in 1981, and its continued entanglement on another front were sound organizational constraints to its employment at that time. (In general, as will be shown in chapter 6, the military as an institution

opposed ending the Brezhnev Doctrine). Finally, unlike providing information and defining options, the organizational process paradigm does not apply well to the implementation phase of Gorbachev's policy toward Eastern Europe, simply because the policy manifested itself as inaction.

Still, there is no evidence to suggest that Gorbachev ever considered using the military option in Eastern Europe at any time in his tenure. Given Gorbachev's preconceptions and biases, it seems that an examination of other influences on the leadership's range of options would yield a better explanation for the development of new policy. For perfectly legitimate reasons Allison ignored the role of ideology in the Kennedy Administration's decision to blockade Cuba, but aside from capability, the values and assumptions of governments or individuals condition more than any other factor which options they will consider when presented with a problem. Hostility to Soviet expansion and anti-communism to some degree or another characterized every US administration since the Russian Revolution, so it was natural that Allison would not consider ideological change as a suitable level of analysis, but the Soviet Union was a cauldron of change between the time of Gorbachev's succession and the East European revolutions. Internal ideological change therefore merits attention as a major influence on how the Soviet leadership viewed events in Eastern Europe.

The ideological transformation that occurred within the Soviet Union during the period under examination, and the important internal domestic implications of the Soviet Union's relations with Eastern Europe combined to form an interesting methodological problem. Fundamental to the problem is the assumption that the three basic interests of any given state are: (1) the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state and the

physical security of its citizens; (2) the economic welfare of the state and its citizens; (3) the preservation of the sovereignty of the state, specifically defined as the right to govern itself according to a political system of its own choosing. Because the internal ideological foundation for rule within Eastern Europe was so closely tied to the ideological basis for rule within the Soviet Union, the Soviet regime viewed any attempt to alter the internal political systems of East Europe as a threat to Soviet sovereignty. This perception on the part of the Soviet rulers manifested itself in the expression of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, but it was a fundamental dimension to the Soviet government's East European policy dating back to the imposition of Soviet control over the region in the 1940's. Between 1985 and 1989, however, the political and ideological basis upon which the Soviet Union was governed changed.

An examination of the effects of internal ideological change on a given state's foreign policy does not properly belong in the application of the rational actor model because that model assumes internal structure and values to be constant, and with good reason; the model is usually applied to crises or other short-term policy problems where guiding values cannot possibly change. Neither, however, does a discussion of ideological transformation properly belong to the bureaucratic politics model: interest group models examine how differences over the means for achieving certain goals among subsets of a policy-making elite--who share the same core values--influence foreign policy. Because the fundamental core values of the elite changed, the entire polity changed. The fundamentally new and different political system, although guided by many of the old political leaders, altered the rational calculation of advantage and disadvantage for the regime as a whole.

The discussion of ideology's role in the Soviet regime's policy formation does not fit nicely into any one model, so I have placed it into three. First, because the ideological

state of affairs within Eastern Europe was so closely tied to Soviet internal politics, the internal implications of Soviet external policies toward Eastern Europe will merit consideration in the context of the rational actor model. This requires a modification of the model as it has traditionally been used, but the fact that the internal ideological effects of foreign policy were of paramount concern to the Soviet Union as a unitary, rational actor on the international stage is undeniable. Second, because ideological disputes did occur within the leadership as domestic and foreign policy developed, some discussion of ideology's role belongs in the bureaucratic politics model. Finally, the specific effects of ideological change on Soviet interests in Eastern Europe merits its own separate discussion. Both that discussion, and the examination of the internal political conflicts rely on cognitive theories to explain change.

Cognitive Theories

Theories of complex learning and motivational bias, two approaches borrowed from the field of cognitive psychology, can be used to investigate changes in policy from the perspective of perceptual or schema change. A cognitive schema is the interpretive prism through which people observe events in the world around them. According to theories of schema change, individuals attempt to understand the phenomena in their environment by matching events before them to that which they have previously observed.[13] It is impossible for individuals and organizations to account for all the subtleties and complexities of the vast amounts of information which they receive without organizing and ordering it in some way. During this process of organizing and ordering our thoughts, we distort the reality we perceive in subtle and sometimes not-so-subtle ways. Language itself is a type of distortion. The word 'bureaucracy', for example contains many different connotations for different people, some positive and

some negative. No one who hears that word conjures up all of its possible meanings, uses, and contexts. To go through that kind of exercise would require an extraordinary amount of time and effort. Instead, individuals unconsciously associate words with their own experiences and values, even if they distort the intended meaning of the word in the process.

In politics, a schema can be defined as the ideological prism through which individuals and organizations see their environment. Because it is impossible to make decisions, or even to think, without benefit of an ideological context, people avoid adjusting that context unless the compulsion to do so overwhelms all the means at their disposal to preserve it.[14] Everybody, regardless of schema or ideology, is subjected to information which conflicts with their outlook. The same body of evidence can support more than one perspective, and no point of view is ever supported by all the evidence, yet for reasons which cannot be completely explained, some people are more resistant than others to facts or groups of facts which do not conform to their preconceived notions of reality.

Age, experience, upbringing, and levels of familiarity and expertise with a particular subject are some of the explanatory features of this phenomenon. Interest and the importance of a topic are also relevant; someone who has built a career based on the belief that the death penalty deters murder will not want to believe evidence to the contrary, and may distort or ignore such evidence. Psychologists call this discomfort "cognitive dissonance."[15]

People in general often seek to eliminate the dissonance they suffer by changing their thinking, and consequently their actions, though much of the time this effort is not conscious. For some people the discomfort involved in admitting that previously held beliefs were wrong is far greater than the dissonance created by the availability of

evidence which undermines those beliefs. The need to believe is very often more powerful than the facts supporting a belief, for whatever reason. Robert Jervis notes that human beings require both the stability and order that attitude and ideology provide, as well as the creativity and flexibility that an open mind supplies, "The balance between flexibility and stability that is essential for effectiveness would seem to require revision of attitudes in the light of some preponderance of evidence, rather than the ready influence by the isolated fact." Jervis continues, "This conflict is also present at the level of organizations. Like individuals, they must develop standard operating procedures to deal with recurring problems, but must try to maintain the openness necessary to recognize and handle creatively new issues."[16]

Learning

Learning is one approach to analyzing political change which is based on the study of how the belief systems of leaders and organizations change. Robert Legvold defined learning as "the process by which opinions change in response to a compelling experience or communication."[17] The process of learning, as Lloyd Etheredge noted, "can be observed as a shift from too simple and too confident generalizations--often boldly asserted and staunchly defended--to complex, integrated understandings grounded in realistic attention to detail."[18] Such a conception is consistent with a decrease in the influence of rigid ideological adherence in favor of more flexible approaches to interpretation of events and prescription for action. As Ernst Haas argued, "If learning does not imply 'the end of ideology,' it certainly means that the prevailing dogmas are being relaxed sufficiently to allow for new information considered relevant by the proponents of many ideologies."[19] He further showed that learning involved the

adjustment of ideologies in order to serve a new understanding of reality and consequently new interests:

> Actors who seek to use new knowledge to link issues substantively cannot be said to act contrary to their national interests. There is no need to assume the sudden victory of dispassionate wisdom over selfish interest. But why assume the contrary--that actors will continue to cut off their noses to spite their faces when it is within their power to enjoy both wisdom and self interest? New knowledge, then, is used to redefine the content of the national interest. Awareness of newly unwanted effects usually results in the adoption of different, and more effective, means to attain one's ends. A more complex understanding of what causes the malaise of industrial and developing societies usually results in the adoption of more ambitious and demanding governmental programs with new objectives. In making use of this knowledge--however fragmentary the carry-over into action may be--interests take on a different form.[20]

Moscow learned a number of lessons from its long experience in Eastern Europe. From the beginning of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe there were four main benefits, which eroded over the course of time and contributed to the lessons taken by the Gorbachev regime (they will be discussed in greater detail below in chapter 3): (1) control of territory afforded a level of physical security which diminished as the United States, France and Great Britain acquired more and more weapons of mass destruction and the means to guarantee their almost certain, accurate delivery; (2) the destruction and subordination of local politics in the six Warsaw Treaty states to Soviet interests eliminated an historical birthplace of conflict and danger to the Soviet Union, but created strong resentments against Soviet power and all things Russian which manifested themselves in periodic rebellions against Communist rule and the Soviet Union; (3) the forced alliance of the East European states provided Moscow with trading partners, of which some (East Germany and Czechoslovakia especially) could provide the Soviet Union with higher quality technology and consumer goods, though over time the crude

application of the Soviet system to those countries degraded the quality and quantity of their usefulness as trading partners; and (4) the export and expansion of Communism to Eastern Europe helped to legitimate the ideology within the Soviet Union itself, but the demonstrated failure of the system to satisfy the East European peoples over the course of time had the opposite effect.

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan example demonstrated the distinction between simple and complex learning.[21] Simple learning involves merely a behavioral adaptation in reaction to failure without a change in basic values and goals. Had Afghanistan been an example of simple learning the Soviet leadership would have responded to the experience by drawing no larger lesson than recognizing the improbability of defeating the Mujahadeen. Had Vietnam been an example of only simple learning for the US government, the commitment of US combat troops to Angola and Central America would have been more likely. Before Gorbachev, Soviet regimes demonstrated simple learning; they adapted to failures in Eastern Europe by making minor adjustments in policy, but without reevaluating basic values and goals. Only the Gorbachev regime was able to make the leap to complex learning.

Complex learning involves an awareness of dissonance among goals and values and leads to an adjustment to eliminate the dissonance.[22] When the second type of learning occurs in nation-states, national interests and ideologies are adjusted. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a complex learning experience partially responsible for the transformation of Soviet national interests. It contributed to a revision of Soviet interests in the Third World and of Soviet doctrine on the use of military force.

Another distinction in the definition relates to the pace of learning, between incremental and discontinuous learning:

> As the term implies, incremental learning is the slow, step-by-step adjustment of ideas or attitudes, propelled by the gradual accumulation of experience or

insight. Discontinuous learning is the great leap, when under the impact of one dramatic development or event, the mind changes. Discontinuous learning is the rarer of the two, but the more interesting, because when it occurs it is often also accompanied by complex learning.[23]

As an example, Robert Legvold cited the effect nuclear weapons on Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet leadership abandoned its belief in war's inevitability, and its usefulness as an spur to revolution. Moreover the Kremlin decided that nuclear war's potential consequences made cooperation with the West necessary, rather than simply expedient.[24]

It will be argued that the Soviets learned incrementally in Eastern Europe as well. The forty years of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe gave Moscow ample experience for trying to fine-tune their level of control. The sum of negative experiences over the course of that period taught Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and other like-minded leaders that Soviet domination could not be fined-tuned. It should be noted as well that governmental learning may require or involve persuasion. It can be assumed that not all of the Soviet policy-makers who wield some influence on foreign policy draw the same lessons from the failures of certain policies. Human beings hold different values born of different experience. Soviet leaders are no different. The existence of disagreement across issue and ideological lines is well documented, therefore, if learning has explanatory power, the process by which those decision-makers who have learned persuade those who have not, will pertain directly to how policy was made. This process is closely related to the elite conflict model.

Motivated Bias

Motivated bias is another approach to policy-change which borrows from cognitive psychology and it is also closely related to the bureaucratic politics model. It

is used to explain why one group of leaders is predisposed to think in a certain way, i.e. why one generation of leaders is less resistant to reform than another, or why different leaders with different institutional experiences think in different ways. Jack Snyder defines bias as "a nonrandom deviation from rationality, both in terms of the decision-making process and in terms of its substantive outcome."[25] The motivation for bias can be found practically anywhere, "rooted in specific interests, preconceptions, and circumstances."[26] Snyder finds two prime motivations of bias: first, those rooted in the parochial interests of decision makers; and second, those coming from decision makers attempts to simplify and place a structure on the complex analytical tasks:

> Both groups of bias can be viewed as cognitive phenomena, skewing the perceptions and choices of individual decision makers; they can also be considered organizational phenomena, shaping the structure, ideology, and standard operating procedure of institutions.
>
> Sometimes decision makers prefer policies because of motives they would not rather admit, even to themselves. In such cases, the need to find an acceptable justification for the policy they prefer will skew perceptions and analysis. 'Decision making' will be a process of rationalization rather than rationality.[27]

In the context of the first kind of bias, an institutional bias can obscure rational decision making, i.e. the traditional position of the Soviet military (indeed, most militaries) has been to oppose arms control and arms reduction agreements on the ground that such agreements reduce the security of the state; but the ulterior motive of the military is often a desire to preserve higher budgets and greater political influence.

With regard to the second kind of bias, I argue that the younger generation of Soviet leaders, represented by Gorbachev, was less inclined to think in the rigid, ideological terms of the Brezhnev and Khrushchev generations because the younger group had different formative experiences. Specifically, those leaders within Gorbachev's age group entered political life after Stalin's death: unlike the previous generation, the

younger leaders, in general, did not fight in the Second World War; they did not owe their first political positions to Stalin's purges; they had the benefit of university educations; and they possessed little of the bias against innovation and reform.

To determine how leaders form their biases, how they change, and their impact on policy, Robert Jervis asks the following three questions: what events in the experience of the current leaders' lives and careers conditioned them to think as they do? What is their motivation to examine and alter long-held tenets of policy? What specifically about their environment shaped their predisposition to change their schemata?[28] As Jervis wrote, "...understanding the general predispositions held by decision-makers is an important step in explaining their specific perceptions. We therefore need to learn about the predispositions that are frequently held by whole classes of decision-makers and about how the general predispositions held by an individual decision-maker relate to each other."[29]

Richard Ned LeBow divided studies of leadership motivation or predisposition into three levels.[30] The first level, contained in the writings of Alexander George and Nathan Leites, seeks to show how the personal and historical experiences of leaders mold their philosophical outlook, and therefore, their subsequent political behavior. Ole Holsti, Klauss Knorr, and Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing represent a second, less fundamental level of analysis. They target their analyses more directly on policy-makers' propositions, expectations, and images of international politics and international actors. Even more specifically, the third level of motivation analysis concentrates on policy-makers' ideas about the strategic environment in which they operate, and on how these ideas are developed and used to make decisions. Examples include George Kennan's study of Lenin's removal of Russia from World War I, and George Liska's examination of the effect of Henry Kissinger's world view on Nixon's foreign policy.[31]

According to the motivation approach, a scholar investigating the changes in Moscow's East European policy would have to begin with an examination of the lives and careers of the pertinent Kremlin policy-makers. One possible interpretation of the Gorbachev regime's flexibility is that Gorbachev and the other leaders of his generation shared experiences which inclined them toward reform in general. For example, radical economist Nikolai Shmelev; commentator and Gorbachev advisor Fyodor Burlatsky, Georgi Smirnov, former personal aide to Gorbachev for ideology; editor Yegor Yakovlev; commentator Alexander Bovin; Georgi Arbatov, head of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies; and Gorbachev's closest political ally, Aleksandr Yakovlev, all describe themselves as children of the Twentieth Party Congress. It appears that Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's crimes and the atmosphere of the thaw profoundly affected the careers and mindsets of the current Soviet leadership.[32] In contrast, Brezhnev, Suslov, Ustinov, and most of the other members of the Brezhnev regimes were shaped professionally and historically in the crucible of Stalin's repressive leadership.

According to another variation, the writings and speeches of and about individual leaders yield their views and images of politics, specific actors, and history. When and if these men and women reach high office they implement the views they have professed. Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* is a frightening example of this process. More subtly, Gorbachev's willingness to send heretical suggestions for the improvement of Soviet agriculture to the Central Committee while he was a regional Party First secretary in 1978, indicated that he was a daring and unorthodox problem solver.[33] Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Len Karpinski, who both knew Gorbachev before his rise, said that he held radical views long before he assumed the top position in the leadership.[34]

Both learning and motivated bias are useful for understanding how the ideological transformation took place within the Soviet Union. Second, they help to answer the

questions: when did the Soviet leadership decide that the relationship with Eastern Europe was problematic, i.e, that it required change, and how did the discovery take place? Did Gorbachev and his allies recognize that the Soviet-East European relationship required major overhaul before he became General secretary or did he learn while in office that the relationship was detrimental to Soviet interests? Did the entire Soviet leadership come to power with the same biases? Did all the leaders learn the same lessons at the same pace, and how were differentials in learning resolved?

Just as no single analytical approach explains Soviet foreign policy, neither motivational bias nor learning can explain completely the attitudinal transformation which occurred in the Soviet leadership. They are not mutually exclusive theories; they both apply in different measure. It is likely that Gorbachev and his close associates were predisposed to change by reason of previous experience and mindset, and that learning occurred under the preceding regimes, as well as under Gorbachev's leadership. Had Brezhnev failed to learn anything, it is doubtful that he would have brought Gorbachev into the Politburo in 1979, because Gorbachev did not completely conceal his reformist impulses. If Gorbachev came to office with an agenda set in stone, then explanations for disagreements among his appointees and his frequent improvisations and course changes become extremely problematic. If mindset is determined by generation, then how is disagreement among those sharing the same experiences explained?

There are, of course, exceptions to every rule, and the fact that the behavior of some of the individuals and institutions under examination does not always strictly conform to theoretical propositions, is not surprising. Some degree of deviation from a given model does not invalidate the usefulness of the model; rather the high degree of

comformity confirms the model's utility. To review then the thesis using the complex model described above, the Soviet government's decision to abandon the Brezhnev Doctrine in its relations with Eastern Europe can be viewed as a process of five steps, with each step best explained by one or more simple models. (The steps, however, are not strictly sequential, but rather are interactive).

First, both governmental learning and motivated bias explain to some degree why Gorbachev came to power as General secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There existed a widespread recognition within the Soviet leadership that some degree of internal economic and political reform would be necessary in order to combat the moral, political, economic pre-crisis situation of the country. The foreign relations of the Soviet Union did not escape the attention the reformers in their search for solutions to the more general problems of the country and relations with Eastern Europe had always been problematic. Examination of the historical record showed that Eastern Europe increasingly soaked up Soviet economic resources, and required political attention in excess of the benefits it provided.

Second, in the process of articulating concrete goals for solving the Soviet Union's larger problems, the regime rationally decided to try to improve the Soviet-East European relationship in order to provide more political, economic, and security benefits for the USSR at a reduced cost.

Third, according to the rational actor model, the regime examined the means available for achieving that goal within the context of the principles which guided their use (ideology). There were financial and temporal constraints on action, as well as a constraint exogenous to the rational actor model: the opposition of certain elites within the regime, including older generation Communist Party officials and high-ranking military officers. Elite conflict falls into the rubric of the bureaucratic politics model.

The reason for different actors opposition to certain policies can be explained by motivated bias and/or learning.

Fourth, Gorbachev and his political allies increased public participation in the internal political process in order to increase the authority of the regime *vis a' vis* the population, but also to strengthen their own political positions with regard to their opponents. In order to succeed in reorganizing the political system for their purposes, the reformers revised and rejected obsolete elements of the guiding ideological principles of the Soviet system. The willingness of the reformers to embrace ideological revisions can be explained by three factors: (1) a lack of bias against structural political reform; (2) a desire to use the Soviet public's support against political opponents; (3) a degree of learning as to what was necessary in order to enlist public support for painful economic choices.

Fifth, previous decision-produced results impelled the regime to make further decisions, one of which was to re-evaluate the ideological constraints on the range of available foreign policy options. The need for Western cooperation with internal reform plans, combined with the acceptance of some degree of political pluralism within the Soviet Union, vitiated the need to enforce a prohibition against the introduction of pluralism in Eastern Europe. Though the revolutions which followed in Eastern Europe surprised the Soviet regime, rational, logical, and ideological factors impelled inaction.

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[1] Allison demonstrates the pervasive use of this model pp. 14-28. Variations of the same model include John Steinbrunner, *A Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) and Jan Triska and David Finley, "Soviet-American Relations: A Multiple Symmetry Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March, 1965). For additional treatment of the rational actor model see John Harsanyi, "Some Social Science Implications of a New Approach to Game Theory," in Kathleen Archibald, ed., *Strategic Interaction and Conflict* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1966).

[2]Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[3]The framework belongs to Allison, p. 13-21.

[4]See for example, Jiri Valenta, *op. cit.*

[5]Allison, p. 162; Also see Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *op. cit.*; and Valenta, *op. cit.* for this approach.

[6]Allison, pp. 78-79.

[7]See Allison's application of the organizational process paradigm, pp. 101-143.

[8]*Ibid.*, pp. 117-123.

[9]*Ibid.*, pp. 123-126.

[10]*Ibid.*, pp. 127-132.

[11]Eduard A. Shevardnadze, "Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiia MID SSSR," *Vestnik MID SSSR*, No. 15 (August 15), 1988, p. 29.

[12]Oleg Bogomolov, the Director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System reported that some Soviet military leaders, including Marshal V.G. Kulikov threatened to resign rather than invade Poland, because they felt that the Red Army was doomed to long hard combat against Poland with little guarantee of a positive result: lecture by Bogomolov at the University of California, April 22, 1989.

[13]Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Approach* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 50-57.

[14]Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[15]Jervis' work contains a review of the relevant psychological literature (p. 290) as well as as excellent treatment of psychology's applications to the study of international politics.

[16]*Ibid.*, p. 155.

[17]Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum eds., *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), p. 120.

[18]Lloyd S. Etheredge, *Can Governments Learn?* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), p. 143.

[19]Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics*, Vol. 32 , No. 3 (April, 1980), p. 390.

[20]*Ibid.*

[21]For the distinction beteen simple and complex learning, see Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon, *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective*, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 1-6.

[22]*Ibid.*

[23]Legvold, p. 121. He in turn borrowed this idea from Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Nuclear learning and US-Soviet security regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer, 1987).

[24]*Ibid.*

[25]Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 217.

[26]*Ibid., p. 16.*

[27]*Ibid., p. 18.*

[28]Those questions are distilled from Jervis' discussion, p. 236.

[29]*Ibid.*, p. 146.

[30]Richard Ned LeBow, pp. 229-231.

[31]Cited in LeBow., 230-231: Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': a Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June, 1989), pp. 191-222; Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of Enemy," in David Finlay, Ole Holsti, and Richard Fagen, eds., *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 25-96; Klauss Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April, 1964), pp. 454-467; George F. Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War* (New York: Atheneum, 1967); and George Liska, *Beyond Kissinger: Ways of Conservative Statecraft* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

[32]Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel, eds., interviewers, *Voices of Glasnost* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), pp. 40-41, 99, 143, 200,

215, 308; see also Timothy J. Colton, "Gorbachev and the Politics of System Renewal," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 151-186.

[33]M.S. Gorbachev, "O Nekotorykh Merakh Posledovatel'nogo Osushchestvleniya Agrarnoy Politiki KPSS na Sovremennom Etape," in M. S. Gorbachev, *Izbrannie Rechi i Stat'i*, Tome 1, (Moscow: Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU, Political Literature Publishing, 1987), pp. 180-200.

[34]Cohen and Vanden Heuvel, pp. 119, 144.

Chapter 3: Soviet Interests, Eastern Europe and the Pursuit of Rational Policy

Introduction

According to rational actor theory, the Soviet government behaved as a unified, rational actor confronted with a problem; its relationship with its East European allies ceased serving Soviet interests. Following consideration of a range of options for solving the problem, the government chose a course of action which it believed maximized those interests. A cost-benefit framework can be used to show how the development and implementation of Gorbachev's new thinking about Eastern Europe was designed to accomplish this goal.

In order to evaluate the rationality of "new thinking" we need to establish two reference points as bases of comparison. First, we need to articulate, at least in a broad sense, Moscow's conception of its national interest. Second, we must compare Gorbachev's policies to those of his predecessors; does the foreign policy of the present leadership serve the interests of the Soviet Union better than past foreign policies?

Thomas Schelling defined rational behavior as, "behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system."[1] Before beginning the calculation of costs and benefits of Moscow's East European policies a discussion of Soviet interests and the values underlying those interests will be useful. The national interest of any given state, unlike some national characteristics is neither immutable nor immediately recognizable. Like Rousseau's concept of the general will, it is impossible to define exactly, because it is amorphous, changeable, and subject to interpretation based on the

values of a society and its leaders at a given point in time. It is the consensus of many about what is best for the whole, relative to its foreign neighbors and the rest of the international community. Consensus both defines, and is defined by the national interest. At times society can reach no consensus, or leaders and society differ. In extreme cases, such as the United States in 1861 and Russia in 1918, the failure to resolve major questions of policy can lead to civil war.

Nevertheless, in most states, leaders are charged with the execution of foreign policy, and they interpret their duties similarly: first, to assure the physical security of the state and its citizens; second, to promote the welfare of the populace through the creation and maintenance of a vigorous national economy; and third, to ensure the preservation of the political system. In the case of single-party political systems, the preservation of the one party's power is synonymous with the preservation of the political system. Though undoubtedly individual parties within multi-party systems do try to preserve their own power, preservation of the system as a whole is ideally the higher interest. The three duties are interrelated: the preservation of political power, or more generally, a political system, depends on the physical security of the state and the strength of the economy; and national security and economic vigor are mutually dependent.

Both before and after Gorbachev took power, Soviet leaders defined their interests much in the same way: first, to assure the physical security of the Soviet state and its people; second, to promote the vigor of the national economy, as determined by the strength and growth of GNP and *per capita* income in comparison to both previous performance and Western measures; and third, to maintain the power and authority of the CPSU.[2]

In the past three centuries the leaders in the Kremlin, both Russian and Soviet, defined the state's security with regard to Eastern Europe quite broadly, though not without reason. The Soviet Union's apparently obsessive concern for its western border and desire to expand it can be explained partly in reference to the litany of invasions from France and Germany that is embedded in the historical psyche of the Soviet people. Connected to the physical sense of the security are the political and economic interests in Eastern Europe. In the postwar period, the Soviet political interest in Eastern Europe largely has been tied to the regime's desire to protect the Soviet politcal system, more specifically the desire on the part of the CPSU to maintain and expand its power. In order to understand this interest a brief discussion of the Communist ideology is necessary.

Though the writings of Marx and Lenin are dishearteningly voluminous it is possible to reduce crux of the Communist ideology to four basic tenets.[3] First, Communism claims itself to be universal: the main determining factor of all human behavior everywhere is the individual's relationship to the means of economic production. Class interests therefore supersede national, ethnic, religious, and all others interests. The universal interest of all workers regardless of nationality is known as pro.etarian internationalism.

Second, the capitalist system is pernicious and leads to the exploitation of the working class. Third, capitalism, because of its inherent defects, will inevitably, like feudalism before it, give way through violent revolution to the power of the working class. This claim, according to Marx and Lenin is based on historic, scientifically verifiable truth. The failure of proletarian internationalsim to prevent the First World

War led to the fourth tenet: imperialism, the final phase of capitalism leads to war and revolution. The failure of the universal proletarian revolution to materialize at the same time as the Russian Revolution at the conclusion of First World War led to a corallary: international relations are a reflection of the class struggle in which socialist countries represent the working class and capitialist countries represent the exploiting class. Socialist internationalism refers to the common class interests of all socialist states; these blocked out differences in nationality, ethnicity, or history.

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was able to introduce Communism to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Soviet leaders used this expansion of Communism to confirm to the world and to their own population the validity of the ideological claims upon which their own rule was based. Because of the universality of the ideology, any question of its validity in Eastern Europe was a question of its validity in the Soviet Union and therefore a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Soviet political system. Threats to Communism in Eastern Europe became a fundamental interest of the Soviet government.

The long-term failure of the Kremlin's East European policy to capture desired and expected rewards for the Soviet Union contributed in part to the sea change in values within the Soviet Union that led to the sweeping transformation of Moscow's foreign policy. In essence I am arguing that political, ideological, economic, and technological forces in the international environment contributed to the domestic political metamorphosis which was a prerequisite for a new foreign policy.[4] The utility of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union began to erode almost as soon as Moscow consolidated its grasp. This erosion continued unabated, though at times recognized by the Soviet

leaders, until Gorbachev decided to alter the relationship. In the 1940's and 1950's the split and reconciliation with Yugoslavia drained Eastern Europe of some of its ideological value to Moscow because the split drew into question the doctrine of socialist internationalism, and the reconciliation legitimated differences of opinion with the Kremlin on matters of internal development. That Khrushchev later reconciled with Tito following the split not only legitimated dissent from Moscow in Eastern Europe, it subjected the Kremlin's previous ideological infallibility at home to question as well.

Additionally, the development of thermonuclear weapons in the 1950's and the means to deliver them accurately and assuredly vitiated Eastern Europe's military utility. In the 1970's the economic costs of empire far exceeded its benefits. Finally, the power of nationalism to endure and thrive throughout the entire period of Soviet domination thwarted the Kremlin goal of making Eastern Europe into a permanently compliant zone for Soviet exploitation. The loss which Moscow was taking on its East European investment was a factor in Soviet internal change and ultimately Gorbachev's decision to discontinue interference in East European domestic politics because the failure of the Soviet system to take root in Eastern Europe opened questions about the system's suitability to the Soviet Union.[5]

While it would be an exaggeration to characterize the Soviet-East European relationship as master-to-slave, the analogy is useful. If the master exerts too much control, the slave becomes unproductive, or he is provoked and must be subdued, which requires energy from the master and renders the slave unproductive. If the master exerts too little control the slave runs away, which also is unproductive. In the long run, only the emancipation of the slave and his willingness to work for his former master on the basis of mutual advantage can yield the optimal level of productivity. It might be countered that examples like Rome's 700 hundred-year domination of the

civilized world render such claims idealistic, but 2000 years ago slavery was the norm, even in the areas conquered by Rome, while in the 20th century, many East Europeans could see examples of a better life across their borders to the West.

The cost of Moscow's excessively tight grip was domestic instability in the satellite; a loss of usefulness was the price of holding on too loosely. The history of Moscow's East European policy was the Kremlin's search for the most productive degree of control.[6] A review of this history reveals which policies yielded gains and which caused setbacks for 'the budget of the nation's well being'.[7] It also reveals how the ever increasing inability of Gorbachev's predecessors to harvest advantage from its Warsaw Pact allies contributed to the Soviet reappraisal and redefinition of the relationship.

By dividing the Soviet post war era into periods roughly coincident with changes in leadership, a survey of policy changes can be mapped out which illustrates Moscow's attempts to find the elusive middle ground which might combine optimum control of its neighbors with their political stability. Changes in the international system, as well as changes in the Soviet leadership were occasions for a reversal in the swing of the pendulum toward greater or lesser degrees of control, though the Soviets did differentiate among political, economic, and military areas of dominance. For example, while an increase in tensions with the West resulted in Soviet efforts to show a unified foreign policy front, Moscow was not averse to ideologically deviant economic experimentation within the satellites, especially if it promoted internal stability, and so long as the individual Parties met four basic conditions: that they maintain the monopoly on power; that they alone control the media; that their leaders be trusted by the Kremlin; and that they continue their formal international commitments.[8]

Making and Consolidating Empire, 1945-1953

The first priority of the U.S.S.R. upon the establishment of its empire at the conclusion of World War II was national security. The Red Army's possession of East European territory provided the Soviet Union with a defensive buffer which afforded it a degree of security it had never known. Given the amount of blood spilled and treasure spent in driving Hitler's armies out of the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe, Moscow's desire to hold onto that territory, even at the cost of increasing East-West tension, was understandable. Considering the experience of Hitler's surprise attack and Stalin's manifestly paranoid mindset, it was also logical that he ensured that there could be no repeat of June 22, 1941, either by a rearmed Germany or the United States.

Economically, the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe proved beneficial, especially in the short-term. The U.S.S.R. emerged from the war economically exhausted and devastated. Stalin distrusted the United States far too much to accept the conditions stipulated by participation in the Marshall Plan. By pillaging Eastern Europe, including its sector of Germany, the Kremlin was able to replace some of the capital it lost in the war. Indeed, some analysts estimate that in the immediate aftermath of the war, the amount of capital Moscow expropriated from bloc states equaled the total that the United States gave to Western Europe through the European Recovery Program.[9]

The level of political control which Stalin exerted provided three major benefits to the Soviet Union Beyond the simple control of territory, Moscow's dictatorial powers in Eastern Europe, especially after 1948, increased Soviet security and international standing. First, Moscow's total dominance of the internal politics of the conquered countries gave the Soviet Union foreign policy allies for dealings in the United Nations and against the United States and Western Europe. Second, Stalin's destruction of indigenous politics in Poland, East Germany (1949), Czechoslovakia (1948), Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary eliminated a major historical breeding ground of conflict and

danger to the Soviet Union. Both world wars started in Eastern Europe. As long as Stalin controlled the internal and external policies of his smaller neighbors, they would fight neither amongst themselves nor with actors outside of the bloc Stalin had created. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift occurred in part because Tito failed to understand Stalin's desire to determine the extent to which the West could be provoked and because Tito's territorial ambitions created needless trouble in Bulgaria.

Finally, Stalin gained the domestic political benefit of increasing the scope of Communist rule and ideology. He could point to the East European revolutions as examples of the fulfillment of Marx and Lenin's prophecies about the inexorable march of Communism. That the CPSU controlled all the media in the Soviet Union and the bloc made it relatively easy for the Soviet leader to paint the forcible and illegal coups as ideological triumphs, thus providing the Party and himself a boost in domestic legitimacy.

Along with the apparent advantages which hegemony over Eastern Europe bestowed upon the Soviet Union, however, Soviet domination entailed the assumption of some liabilities. These liabilities burgeoned in number, and manifested themselves more frequently as Moscow tried to fine-tune its domination for maximum effect. It did not take long, however, for the disadvantages of Soviet empire to reveal themselves. The most salient difficulties emerged from the exogenous and illegitimate character of the ruling regimes that the Soviets had installed.

First, the East European peoples resented the forced imposition of Communist regimes and systems, and they resented the external origin of those regimes. It might be said that whereas Communism was illegitimate within the Soviet Union, it was doubly so within Eastern Europe. With the possible exception of Bulgaria, which Russia had liberated from five centuries of repressive Ottoman rule in 1878, none of the bloc

countries possessed any cultural or historical affinity for the Soviet Union. Moreover, the peoples of Poland and Germany shared a common historical antagonism toward Russia, which was surpassed quite possibly only by their dislike of each other. In none of the bloc states did Stalinism ever come close to winning the support of the majority of the people. Though Stalin did not live to see the 1953 uprisings in Berlin and Pilsen, the first major suppressions of East European rebellion in the bloc sprang from his policy. Significant Soviet political, economic, and military resources would be diverted to Eastern Europe for such emergencies again: to Hungary and Poland in 1956; to Czechoslovakia in 1968; and to Poland throughout the 1970's, until 1983.

Second, Soviet dominance of the region performed its domestic and international legitimating function best only so long as Moscow continued to dominate world Communism. Stalin's split with Tito in 1948 destroyed Stalin's claim to lead to a monolithic movement. Though Stalin and later Soviet leaders sought to portray Tito as a heretic, Tito countercharged that it was Moscow that had abandoned the faith, thus opening to question the Kremlin's devotion to Marxism-Leninism. The hole Tito rent in the cloth of international Communism was relatively small, but it does not take much to make such tears grow. Tito's original deviations from Stalin's interests were minor, but the expansion of Communism failed to maximize Soviet interests if each regime were free to pursue its own agenda as Tito was. The tragedy of the split was that for the most part Soviet and Yugoslav interests coincided. Stalin's inability to tolerate Tito's independently derived authority over Yugoslavia, and his insistence on trying to remove him, created an ideological challenge within the Communist movement where none had existed previously because the split liberated Tito from an obligation to follow the Stalinist model.[10] Whether or not other Communist regimes followed the Soviet model was important because deviation, especially in the direction of reducing the burden on

the population at large, called into question the necessity of the more onerous components of Stalin's model.

Stalin's reaction to Tito's effrontery further eroded the already shaky claims to authority held by the Soviet-installed East European leaders. To ensure his control of the Soviet satellites after the Tito split, Stalin purged local elites of individuals whom he regarded to be too independent, including Wladislaw Gomulka in Poland, Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, Laszlo Rajk in Hungary and Rudolf Slansky in Czechoslovakia, in favor of leaders having even closer ties to Moscow. The purge resulted in even greater Kremlin control over the region, but at the cost of decreased regime authority and viability, and thus stability.[11]

Stalin's need to control East European politics down to the last detail led to the most onerous and repressive policies of the Communist era in Eastern Europe, and the regimes which conducted those policies served as conduits for Stalin's interests. Because the Soviet-dominated local Parties choreographed all state, economic, and social activity, they, the system they represented, and their Soviet patron became the focal point for popular dissatisfaction to the extent that such policies failed to address the basic aspirations of the peoples. While in the short-term the complete Soviet domination of the local regimes could be considered an asset, in the long-term, that domination decreased the legitimacy of those regimes and led to a distinct lack of popular enthusiasm for Communism and the Soviet Union. Additionally, the need to suppress and maintain vigilance for the ultimate expressions of popular discontent--outright rebellions--distracted Moscow and drained it of political, economic, and military energy and resources.[12]

When, on the other hand, the Kremlin loosened its grip enough to permit the bloc leaders room to court a degree of popular support exceeding minimal tolerance, the

resulting policies also often undermined Moscow's interests. A leader with genuine national support did not require Soviet force to maintain his position, and thus felt freer to maneuver politically. Furthermore, in order to win support from their respective societies East European leaders very often relied on nationalism as a tool. A leader who bases appeals for support on nationalism cannot hope for any measure of success while acting as a puppet for the interests of another greater power, especially if the major power is the only target of local nationalism. Initially the Soviet Union was able to portray itself as the protector of Eastern Europe against German revanchism with some degree of success, especially in Czechoslovakia. Bulgarians possessed a cultural and historical affinity with Russia and a greater fear of Turkey which mitigated the resentment of Soviet domination. As time went by, however, in general the threat from previous enemies dimmed in comparison to the fear and resentment of the Soviets. Khrushchev discovered that legitimizing national roads to Communism led to greater indigenous authority at the expense of the Soviet agenda, but Stalin went so far towards assuring the preeminence of Moscow's interests that he left the East European regimes with almost no legitimacy.

The most damaging legacy of Stalin's East European policy, however, was the Cold War. Stalin's died during the greatest period of tension which ever existed between the Soviet Union and the West: the Korean War was stalemated; the U. S. was anguishing over the 'loss' of China to the Soviet sphere; and both Washington and Moscow were in the process of arming themselves in Europe, where the inability to agree on its future seemed permanent. The Second World War started in Poland and was fought ostensibly for Poland. While it would be an oversimplification to argue that the fate of Poland caused the Cold War, the United States and Great Britain fought Germany largely to prevent Hitler from dominating the European continent. Neither wished to see Stalin

replace Hitler as European hegemon, even if Stalin controlled only half the continent, because they feared that he wished to dominate the other half as well.[13] Both geopolitically and ideologically the incompatibility of US and Soviet expectations regarding Eastern Europe dominated the Cold War. Washington interpreted Moscow's East-European policy as an attempt to expand Communism and Soviet influence by force to the whole world. Moscow, on the other hand, interpreted Washington's objections to its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe as an aggressive imperialist attack on the legitimacy of the Soviet system and the USSR's security needs. It hardly mattered whether one blamed Moscow or Washington more for the hostility which ensued; both sides believed the fate of Europe to be the most significant issue.[14]

A problem of interpreting the role of Eastern Europe in the East-West conflict arises because Soviet behavior toward the countries in the region was both a cause and effect of the Cold War. The assertion of Soviet control of Eastern Europe increased Western suspicions of Soviet intentions, which increased the level of bilateral suspicion and hostility. Heightened tension between East and West predictably caused Moscow to further assert its control over its satellites, thus creating a self-perpetuating dynamic. Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe during and immediately following the war was a major factor in the formation and development of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Those actions in turn contribited to the consolidation of several Communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe, and to the formation of the GDR and the Warsaw Pact. The entire character of the Soviet-East European relationship poisoned Soviet relations with the West and *vice versa.*

The poor relationship with the West, in turn, caused Moscow to spend huge sums of money to maintain troops in Eastern Europe; it also denied the Soviet Union access to Western capital, technology, and economic expertise. More intangibly, however,

Moscow's domination of Eastern Europe created a permanent corps of policy-makers, scholars, advisors, and commentators who would never advocate any degree of cooperation with the Soviet Union as long as it prevented the internal change that the Eastern European peoples so manifestly desired. Soviet historians during the Gorbachev years began to write about these detrimental effects of Stalin's pursuit of absolute security.[15]

For Stalin, however, the enmity of the West was a two-sided question. While his East European policy undoubtedly engendered Western hostility, with all of its attendant negative political, military and economic consequences, Western antagonism also served Stalin well domestically. Remembering that his primary interests included physical security, economic vigor, and the maintenance of the domestic political *status quo*, Stalin's' antagonism with the West contributed negatively to the first two interests but added substantially to the third, for he identified the Soviet internal *status quo* with the maintenance of his own power. As George Kennan wrote of him, "It was the protection of his own position that came first; and this was the key to his diplomacy."[16] Writing on the Cold War, Evgeniy Primakov, an international relations scholar, and a member of both the Politburo and Gorbachev's Presidential Council agreed, "Internal political factors in the Stalinist period played no small role here: reference to the struggle with imperialism was used as a justification for despotic power and contempt for the needs and interests of the people."[17] Kennan elaborated:

> Now, it is important to note that during the decades of Stalin's rule this danger of military hostility against the Soviet Union by capitalist countries was sometimes real and sometimes not real. There were times when Russia was indeed threatened--primarily by the Germans and the Japanese--and there were times when she was not threatened at all. Yet these fluctuations in the degree of external danger found no reflection in the

interpretation of world realities which Stalin put forward for internal consumption.[18]

Summary

Given Soviet (Stalin's) leadership values of the time, 1945-1953, Soviet East European policy has to be judged as successful, but only for the short term. Politically, Stalin was able to extend the geographic and popular scope of Communism, thus validating Moscow's claim to be at the fore of an inexorably progressing world revolution. Economically, the Soviet Union was able to accelerate its postwar recovery immeasurably by pillaging the available capital in the newly conquered territories; and militarily, Stalin established a buffer zone between the U.S.S.R. and possible invaders from the West. Moreover, he and his successors used their position in Central Europe as a platform for political intimidation of the capitalist adversary in Western Europe. While it is true that the fact and manner of the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe brought down the antagonism of the United States, Washington's enmity played more to Stalin's own internal political advantage than to his detriment.

De-Stalinization, 1953-1964

There could be, however, only one Stalin, and as his successors' problems in the region illustrated, Stalin's system of control over Eastern Europe, like his system inside the Soviet Union, could not survive him. The stranglehold he maintained on the East European leaders, which they in turn imposed on their populations, was untenable. The level of repression and violence not only courted popular revolt and political instability, but it risked the health of the local Communist Parties as well. The anti-Titoist purge hysteria which Stalin induced before his death was consuming many of Eastern Europe's leaders, just as Stalin's domestic purges consumed Soviet leaders. Both Rakosi, in

Hungary, and Gottwald, in Czechoslovakia, used Stalin's paranoia to eliminate potential political rivals.

Following Stalin's death, other signs alerted the new leadership of the necessity for change. Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov were confronted not only with fratricidal politics within the East European Parties, but popular revolts against those parties as well. That summer the East German government required Soviet assistance to suppress anti-regime revolts in Berlin and other cities. Popular uprisings in Czechoslovakia also signaled Moscow that the puppet regimes were dangerously unstable. Eastern Europe continued to figure in Moscow's relationship with the United States as well. Tensions were running high and the stalemated Korean War threatened to complicate an already dangerous relationship. Moscow's policy toward the United States at the time could be described as dual-track. On the one hand, the Kremlin eagerly encouraged a settlement in Korea and took several other steps to improve the tone of relations with the West.[19] On the other hand, given that both the domestic and international environments were very fluid and uncertain in the months after Stalin's death, it made sense for the Kremlin to line up all it ducks in a row and at least convey an appearance of international Communist solidarity to the West.

Finally, internal Soviet reform became the highest priority. In many respects the thaw that occurred in the Soviet Union beginning in the latter half of 1953 paralleled the changes which occurred upon Gorbachev's assumption of power in 1985. Both the immediate, post-Stalin ruling coalitions (initially Molotov-Malenkov-Beria, then Molotov-Malenkov-Khrushchev) and Gorbachev chose to devote the bulk of their political energies to domestic problems: the former, especially once Khrushchev emerged as the dominant leader, set about to create a system capable of functioning without dependence on pervasive terror; the latter pursued a wholesale transformation

of the entire political and economic system of the Soviet Union. If we include Malenkov's New Course along with the foreign policy of the early Khrushchev period it is possible to see a parallel with Gorbachev's foreign policy from 1986-1990: both regimes were accommodating on previously intractable issues and both regimes pursued policies of retrenchment. Both Khrushchev and Gorbachev also made waves at home which rocked the bloc states and profoundly changed the Soviet-East European relationship.

Though Soviet policies under Khrushchev made some sense with reference to their immediate goals, ultimately, many of their consequences damaged rather than served Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. Consider first Soviet participation in the suppression of the June uprising in Berlin in 1953. Given the international and Soviet domestic circumstances at the time, the Soviet action properly can be viewed as a regrettable, though necessary operation for the protection of a hard-won investment. Moscow would feel itself compelled to intervene militarily, outright, twice more. Military and political intimidation which did not lead to invasion, such as war games, maneuvers, and mobilizations, occurred on many more occasions. At some point, however, the effort required to protect the investment exceeded its value. First, every improvement in weapons' technology that reduced the value of territory for defense, i.e., increases in explosive power, distance, accuracy, and speed, reduced the military usefulness of Eastern Europe. There have been hundreds of such improvements since 1945. Second, the economic value of the Comecon countries declined dramatically with the 1953 cessation of the post-war appropriations of capital assets and reparations. As Eastern Europe became more and more financially dependent on the Soviet Union, the region's value declined further. Third, the political cost of forcing unwanted regimes on Eastern Europe, both in terms of the cost of confrontation with the West, and the costs of national resentments in Eastern Europe itself, increased incalculably also every year.

Even further, those very efforts to rescue failing regimes had effectively diminished the value of those regimes' usefulness to the Soviet state, both politically and economically.

First, Moscow incurred a political cost each time it intervened to buttress a faltering client or replace a disobedient regime. It was ideologically embarrassing to the Soviet Union that the governments of its putative allies were so unpopular that Soviet tanks were required to keep them in power. Second, regimes installed or maintained by the Kremlin in the aftermath of a crisis were as illegitimate, if not more so in the eyes of the local citizenry than the regimes which society had overthrown. In order to gain the acquiescence of their respective societies to their rule, those leaders had to make economic and political concessions to their societies, which ultimately decreased their value to Moscow. These concessions took four forms: the decentralization of political power through increased access to the Party for those not trained in Moscow; the acceptance of "national' variants of Communism; the decentralization of economic power; and an increased emphasis on satisfaction of consumer demands over capital investment.[20] The most striking examples of this dynamic were Poland and Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 though different concessions were applied in different countries in different measures.

The opening up of the East European Communist Parties relaxed, though did not destroy, one of the major tenets of Stalin's reign, the extension of personnel policy across borders. Following Tito's successful resistance to his authority, Stalin tightened his control over the satellite Parties, in both policy and personnel. Khrushchev's reconciliation with Tito and his acceptance of 'separate paths to socialism' was supposed to bring Tito back to the socialist camp but it had two undesirable effects. First, it undercut the authority and power of those leaders in Eastern Europe who had come to the fore in Stalin's anti-Tito hysteria, thus introducing an element of instability to East

European intra-Party politics, especially in Hungary and Poland. Rakosi and Gero in Hungary, and Bierut and Ochab in Poland could not survive Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign and embrace of Tito (Bierut actually died of a coronary upon hearing Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in February, 1956). Gomulka, who made the earlier mistake of telling Stalin that Tito was not so bad, and Nagy, who had a reformist reputation, were viewed more positively by their respective populations than their Stalinist predecessors. Yet because relative popularity at home of Gomulka and Nagy was due at least in part to the local perception that they were not as pro-Moscow as their predecessors, Moscow viewed both leaders with suspicion.

Second, Khrushchev set a dangerous precedent by allowing Tito to defy Moscow and gain from the experience. Khrushchev courted him, and sought his advice, not *vice versa*. For the first time since 1917 the Kremlin found itself working for international Communism and not the other way around. Before 1955, Moscow encountered little difficulty in convincing the world's various Communist Parties that service to Soviet national interests was identical to service to the movement, but the compromises which Moscow made with Tito signified the Soviets' tacit recognition that their interests sometimes diverged legitimately from others' in the movement. Foreign Communists were no longer merely instruments of Soviet policy, and Yugoslavia's position *vis a` vis* Moscow proved it. Moscow's newfound willingness to accommodate its smaller partners did serve the purpose of presenting a united front to the West.

Moscow's newly respectful attitude toward China also served two immediate goals; it presented Communist solidarity to the West, and contributed to Soviet efforts to legitimize Marxism-Leninism by demonstrating the health of socialist internationalism. In the long-term, however, Moscow's deference to Beijing undermined the utility of the

movement for Soviet interests in Eastern Europe in that the acceptance of China as an almost-equal partner provided a competing model for socialist development and leadership, and gave the East European states bargaining leverage against the Kremlin.[21] Yugoslavia, though initially ideologically isolated by the Sino-Soviet accommodation of 1957, was able to promote ideological independence as a 'third way' between Moscow and Beijing when the split between the two Communist giants burst into the open in 1960. At the same time, Albania allied itself ideologically with China in order to relieve pressures from both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In Rumania, in 1964, Gheorgiu-Dej used the split to assert the right of the Rumanian Communist Party to develop its ideological program and foreign policies according to specifically Rumanian interests. The other East European Communist leaders fell into line with Moscow, though Gomulka in Poland resisted Moscow's strongest denunciations of China.

Returning to the immediate post-Stalin period, the Kremlin's response to the uprising in East Germany indicated an understanding of the dangers of too much repression and economic exploitation. The cost of too much stick and too little carrot was social and political instability. Matyas Rakosi, the General secretary of the Hungarian Party expressed the lesson of slavish imitation of the Stalinist economic model rather diplomatically:

> We committed a fault first of all by changing over to an excessively fast development of our heavy and producer goods industries and by often neglecting in our planning the material resources and realistic possibilities of our country. But the most important of our faults was committed when in February 1951 the industrial targets of our plans were raised by us to too high levels. We had, of course, decided at the same time to raise the living standards of the working population as well. But I have to repeat: faults crept into our revised Five-year Plan which rendered such an increase in living standards impossible from the start.[22]

Following the revolt, the Malenkov leadership coalition in Moscow reduced economic extractions from East Germany, renounced its claim to reparations, and ended its insistence that the satellite regimes focus on the development of heavy industry to the detriment of the consumer. The East European regimes began to pay greater attention to producing and imports of consumer goods, to providing more housing, and increasing popular satisfaction.[23] In place of the previous system of theft Moscow came up with the Council for Mutual Economic Development (CMEA). Though formed by Stalin in 1949 as a response to the European Recovery Program in the West, Khrushchev tried to give the CMEA some real purpose and functions. According to the charter of the CMEA these included the coordination of foreign trade; the acceleration of technological progress; the industrialization of the less developed allies; and some degree of economic integration.[24] Unlike the Stalinist system the CMEA was designed to benefit all the members of the bloc.

As Adam Ulam wrote, "That such concessions were granted by people schooled in Stalin's school, not given to parting easily with the appurtenances and advantages of absolute power and economic exploitation, is an eloquent testimony of how critically urgent they considered the situation to be and how dangerous they considered the alternative of continuing the old ways."[25] Finally, the 'thaw' itself further delegitimized the leaders who had established themselves in the period 1949-1953, especially in 1956, when de-Stalinization began in earnest These men achieved their position by virtue of their adherence to the Stalinist model of repression and control. By its own example the Soviet Union showed the peoples of Eastern Europe that Moscow no longer considered terror to be legitimate. Those leaders like Rakosi, Chervenkov, and Bierut who refused to follow Moscow's lead risked social explosion and intra-Party challenge.

At the same time that the Kremlin was removing some of the more onerous means of control from its neighbors, it created another institution, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, to legitimate further the control it already exercised. No one in the West actually pretended that the Warsaw Pact machinery increased in any way the raw Soviet domination of the bloc armies, or ensured that those armies would be reliable partners in a military conflict with the West. Soviet penetration and control was already very thorough, but the the creation of the Pact was not a gesture for purely Western consumption. Stalin's death created a void in Moscow's authority to lead East European Communists. The cult of his personality and the myth of his infallibility were so strong that no other bonds or mechanisms were necessary to cement East European Communists to Moscow. Stalin's successors used the alliance and its machinery to help fill the void in authority and legitimacy that Stalin's death created.

Moreover, the Pact legitimized the presence of Soviet troops on East European territory and at least gave Soviet hegemony the appearance of alliance, rather than simply empire. An alliance, however dominated by the Soviet Union, nevertheless brought concomitant rules and formalities (including status of forces agreements which were signed with Poland, East Germany, Rumania, and Hungary between December, 1956 and May, 1957), which were no doubt more appetizing to the East Europeans than undressed subordination. A formal allia ıce also served to inform the NATO countries that an attack against any of the Warsaw Pact countries, including East Germany, would bring a response from the Soviet Union.

Additionally, the peoples, as well as the regimes, of Poland and Czechoslovakia were apprehensive about the power of Germany. Given the decision to grant West Germany membership in NATO, taken in October, 1954, not ten years after the

conclusion of World War II, and uncertainties about the aims of the Western alliance, the worries of Prague and Warsaw were understandable. Tadeusz Mazowiecki's desire to keep Soviet troops in Poland in 1990 speaks volumes about the intensity of Warsaw's apprehensions about Germany's power.

As with all alliances the primary motivations for the Warsaw Pact's existence were political and military, but there were also economic motives for its creation. First, it was much cheaper to rely on allied, instead of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, especially for purposes of garrisoning their own populations. As for the reliability of the allied military establishments, no one could say for sure, because it is a difficult concept to measure, and it varied with circumstances and countries. No one knew whether an army that would defend against outside attack from the West would also participate in offensive operations, or whether it could be counted on to fire on its own people, or even another East European population. For internal Pact purposes the political reliability of the bloc armies was to vary along a spectrum, with East Germany at the fore and Rumania at the bottom, but on the whole the allies proved willing to act when one of their number strayed.[26] East European reliability in terms of a possible conflict with the West was more of a mystery

and because perfect reliability was a possibility which Western military planners could not discard, they had to plan for it just to be safe. The added perceived strength of the allied militaries conduced to Soviet interests *vis a vis* the West, at least in the short-term.

A far more important development for the character of Soviet ties to the bloc was Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and Stalinism at the Twentieth Party Congress. The

Khrushchev speech was the next logical step in the process of de-Stalinization begun in 1953 because the top leadership could not embark on a program of dismantling the most pernicious aspects of Stalinism while simultaneously maintaining the saintliness of the man responsible. The congress marked the first clear explication of a change in Soviet leadership values since Stalin initiated collectivization in 1929. Khrushchev's secret speech generated huge shock waves which destabilized the regimes which Stalin had installed and blessed following the split with Tito. Khrushchev and many of his colleagues failed to grasp the connection between domestic actions and foreign consequences. It is also possible that they did not understand just how little authority their East European puppets possessed. If they did, they took a huge risk in allowing Khrushchev to denounce methods still in practice, and indirectly, the personnel still employing those methods. Because Stalin was dead, obviously neither the Party nor the people could make the man pay for his crimes, but the little Stalins in Eastern Europe, were still alive and in power, and Khrushchev had unwittingly discredited them and their repressive policies in the eyes of both the movement and the world.

The first international repercussions of the increased pace of de-Stalinization came in Poland, in October, 1956. The Polish Party had been in a state of internal conflict since a popular uprising against the Party in Poznan in June. In October, as a result of social dissatisfaction with the economy and the regime, Moscow's reconciliation with Tito, and the aftershocks from Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February, the intra-Party conflict came to a head. The leadership decided to exploit Wladislaw Gomulka's popularity with the Polish society at large, earned in part because as Party leader in 1949 he was arrested in Stalin's anti-Titoist purge. The Polish leaders

brought him into the Presidium as a symbol of the leadership's concern for the popular will. Gomulka agreed to serve only if the Party accepted his demands: that he be given his former position; that the Politburo be purged of Stalinists (known as the Natolin faction); and that Rodion Rokossovsky, the Soviet marshal who had served as Polish defense minister since 1949, be sent back to his homeland. The PUWP leadership acceded to Gomulka's demands. But Khrushchev objected.

Though it seemed that the Soviet First secretary wanted to manage Soviet-East European relations without exerting the onerous degree of control preferred by his predecessor, his actions betrayed his inability to understand that any government chosen by a foreign leader would have real troubles becoming accepted by the local populace. He flew to Warsaw where he refused to accept Gomulka, or his demands, especially that a Soviet, Rokossovsky, quit as Minister of Defense. The threat of Soviet intervention and civil war became real. The Poles presented Moscow with a united front and convinced Khrushchev that the new Gomulka-led regime would remain loyal to Moscow. The two sides were able to agree and Khruschev was freed from the responsibility of coordinating invasions of two bloc countries at the same time.

The price Khrushchev paid for Polish tranquility was Poland's further deviation from the Soviet model in the form of Gomulka's decollectivization and substantially increased toleration of the Catholic Church. The changes instituted by Gomulka hardly shook the foundations of Communist domination in Poland; eventually the Communist intelligentsia within Poland were to discover that Gomulka was a very limited leader and a very useful tool for Moscow for a relatively long time. Nonetheless, Gomulka's selection and his few deviations did erode the ideological consistency of the bloc by permitting variations on the Soviet model not permitted within the Soviet Union itself or other Warsaw Pact countries. The diversity within the bloc made justifications for

more stringent policies within the Soviet Union more difficult and reduced the utility of the bloc for purposes of internal legitimacy.

There was a monetary, as well as ideological cost to Moscow for East European regime stability. Moscow cancelled some Polish debts and extended long-term trade credits. Indeed, financial bail-outs of troubled regimes became an enduring pattern.[27] Yet even discounting the bail-outs as isolated exigencies akin to disaster relief, Soviet-East European economic relations following Stalin's death increasingly benefited the satellites to the detriment of Soviet internal development. Changes in the terms of trade, loans, grants, and credits were all Soviet instruments of Moscow's policy of financial prophylaxis. For example, Jan Vanous and Michael Marrese calculated Moscow's losses from intrabloc trade for the period 1974-1980 at 21.7 billion current U.S. dollars.[28] Once implemented, Soviet implicit subsidies became a permanent feature of the relationship because subsidies were less costly than the loss of East European stability caused by mass unrest, and Soviet contributions to bloc growth moderated competition for scarce resources within regimes as well.[29]

Differences in consumption levels between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at various times indicated a decision on the part of the East European parties in some cases to try to earn legitimacy from their populations through temporary infusions of consumer goods, somewhat like offering bribes for good behavior. With the exception of Hungary, the share of industrial production devoted to consumer goods declined in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe between 1950 and 1969 an average of eleven percent (In Hungary, the share increased by 1/2 percent)[30]. This overall reduction in attentiveness to the consumer was not surprising given Moscow's longtime ideological preference for investment in heavy industry over consumer industries. Eastern

Europe's imitation of the Soviet tendency was to be expected given the general application of the Soviet model in the region.

Exceptions, however, did occur. Hungary's long-term deviation was already mentioned. In 1957, following the uprisings which occurred in both Hungary and Poland the percentage of the net domestic product devoted to personal consumption, in contrast to the twenty-year downward trend, increased dramatically: in Poland the increase was 12% and in Hungary it was 10%. These increases occurred at the same time that net investment increased only 5% and in Poland and actually decreased 22% in Hungary.[31] Moreover, Warsaw planned a 12-13% increase in personal income for 1957 and Budapest planned a 20% increase; planned increases in net national income were 13% for the former and 17% for the latter.[32]

The popular rebellions which tool place in Eastern Europe throughout the Communist period demonstrated that the Communist regimes did not possess sufficient legitimacy to govern effectively. The monopoly of power by the Communist Parties choked off avenues of participation for all but Communist Party members and believers; and the alien circumstances of the ruling regimes' origins, and continued domination by Moscow severely limited the use of nationalism as a credible myth for enlisting popular support, as did the institutionalized hostility to religion. Regime performance remained as the only viable means for ensuring popular support. When regime performance, particularly in the form of maintaining living standards, did not meet popular expectations, the people often demanded changes of or within the various regimes. The examples are well-known. Moscow's subsidies, its bailouts, and its tolerance of occasional deviations from heavy industry in favor of consumption in Eastern Europe were forms of buying social acquiescence to Communist rule and Soviet domination.

The most prominent example of this last phenomenon in action was Hungary. Budapest's experience with the market-based New Economic Mechanism and greater dedication to the consumer sprang directly from the events of October, 1956. Following Soviet efforts at de-Stalinization, Matyas Rakosi, a particularly committed Stalinist, was left in the ideological cold. He was replaced by Erno Gero, who although not Rakosi, was equally detested by the Hungarian people. Gero, despite the Hungarian Party's ideological alienation, however, continued the most repressive policies in the bloc. The news of Poland's successful (though limited) defiance of Moscow's wishes emboldened opponents of Gero and Communism within Hungary. Protests and opposition gained momentum until October 23, when Gero's speech placing responsibility for the country's troubles on imperialist agents set off the revolt. Gero escaped and joined his fellow Stalinist, Rakosi, in the Soviet Union.

Just as Gomulka earlier was brought into the leadership to calm popular passions in Poland, Janos Kadar, who Rakosi had imprisoned, returned to assume direction of the Party, and Imre Nagy, who Rakosi had thrown out of power as premier in 1955, resumed in his former position. Neither man, however, could control the quickly disintegrating situation, because the revolution had already destroyed the Party and consumed the government. Despite a Soviet pledge to refrain from intervening in the construction of a new, multi-party state, the Soviet Army invaded.[33] On November 4, Kadar, either through compulsion or simple collaboration called for Soviet troops to help him establish his government. The Red Army subdued Hungary within a few days.

While there were similarities between the Polish and Hungarian crises the differences in how each affected Soviet interests were more salient. Popular dissatisfaction with the regimes fueled both revolts and de-Stalinization set both off, but

the Polish crisis at its core was an intra-Party squabble. Gomulka's assumption of power and the the few policy changes that he did implement did damage Soviet interests, particularly in the long-term, but the harm in accepting the Polish *fait accompli* was negligible in comparison with the potential costs of military intervention against a country of twenty-five million, possessing a not insignificant, and willing army.[34] In contrast, the Hungarian revolution threatened Moscow's political legitimacy, its leadership of world Communism, and its security position *vis a vis* the West. Both politically and strategically Hungary's loss would have been devastating, and possibly catastrophic. Intervention did cost the Soviets; the circumstances of Kadar's assumption of power in Hungary in 1956 were not conducive to stable and legitimate government. Though Kadar eventually was able to surmount the circumstances of his regime's origins and earn a relatively high degree of authority, the political and economic concessions he traded to Hungarian society for that authority diminished Hungary's ideological value to Moscow: the Kadar regime's increased devotion to the Hungarian consumer in comparison to the Soviet Union called into question the necessity of the Kremlin's tilt in favor of heavy industry. Soviet citizens wondered openly why living standards were higher in Eastern Europe when the Soviet Union was a richer country. Moreover, as was the case with Poland, Moscow provided Kadar with favorable terms of trade and credits which amounted to subsidies. Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous calculated Soviet implicit trade subsidies to Hungary for the years 1960-1978 at 4.689 billion (current) dollars.[35]

Nevertheless, Hungary's decreased ideological and economic value was a small price to pay to keep Hungary in the bloc. Because the mass uprising in Hungary effectively destroyed the local Communist Party, Soviet military power became the only tool that could prevent the first major retreat of Soviet Communism. The Kremlin could

not tolerate an essentially multi-party system in Hungary. Such a course would have been tantamount to a loud admission of the Soviet model's undesirability in Eastern Europe. This in turn would have invalidated the prescriptive and analytical elements of Marxism-Leninism and severely strained the Moscow's justifications for coercion elsewhere in Europe. In all probability the rest of Eastern Europe's Communist Parties would have been severely destabilized, if not completely discredited, thereby presenting the Kremlin with anti-communist revolutions in many or all of its client states simultaneously. Moscow managed to postpone that event thirty-three years. The CPSU also, as happened in 1989, would have faced unpleasant questions about its monopoly on power as well.

Furthermore, because of China's increasingly assertive role in world Communism, it is likely that Beijing would have challenged Moscow's leadership of the movement earlier than it did, through verbal attacks on Soviet tolerance of capitalist counterrevolution and Moscow's fear of confronting the West. As much as the Kremlin must have preferred to keep relations with its satellites a strictly European affair, Moscow did claim to head a worldwide movement and so had to tolerate Zhou En-lai's tour of Budapest and Warsaw in 1957. Zhou's trip marked the beginning of China's involvement in Soviet-East European relations.[36]

Finally, the Kremlin's security position would have been damaged by Hungary's successful declaration of neutrality. Though not as strategically important as the northern tier countries of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland, Hungary's loss would have been significant for three reasons. First, the loss of territory, economy and manpower of any quantity might prove damaging to some degree in a conventional conflict. Second, the possibility of Hungary's economic and military strength, as small as it was, being added to NATO's inventory at a later date, or in the event of a conflict,

could not be ruled out, though its effect would most likely would have been political, rather than military. Neither could the possibility that Hungary would compromise Soviet military plans or intelligence be ruled out. Third, Hungary's example would have set a dangerous precedent for the other Warsaw Pact countries.

Even given the logic which impelled the Soviet invasion, however, there was a dissenting view within the Kremlin leadership. According to Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan protested strenuously "...that armed intervention was not right and that it would undermine the reputation of our government and party."[37] While it was unclear among whom Mikoyan was worried about tarnishing the Soviet reputation, the Soviet action certainly did not improve the view of Moscow in Hungary, or among anti-Communists anywhere.

The Soviet Union tried to repair the damage done to its image and the Communist movement by the events of October and November, 1956 at the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties in November, 1957. Over the objections of the Yugoslavs and Poles, the Conference Declaration proclaimed the U.S.S.R. the *primus inter pares* in the movement; added the principle of mutual aid, such as was provided to Hungary, to the principles governing relations among Communist Parties; and conceded the legitimacy of different roads to socialism, though within a narrower context than some conferees preferred.[38] This was Khrushchev's attempt to fine-tune the Soviet-East European relationship to the perfect wavelength. He hoped that an elaboration of what was expected and permitted would prevent more of what occurred in 1956.

For some time the relationship worked. It seemed that the lattice of institutional and multilateral connections were serving both sides. Soviet aid through and beyond the

CMEA, as well as the memory of Moscow's willingness to use force, purchased a period of relative quiescence in Eastern Europe. Between 1960 and 1968, Vanous and Marrese calculated the Soviet implicit trade subsidy to its Warsaw Pact allies to be 2.715 billion (current) dollars.[39]

In contrast to increasing contacts through the CMEA Moscow had not yet given the WTO any flesh. It was not until 1962 that Moscow started to incorporate Soviet military doctrine into the Pact and to take the training of its allies seriously.[40] By the time Khrushchev departed the Kremlin, the Warsaw Pact's economic functions were as important as its military and political functions for the Soviet Union. The East Europeans provided two major benefits. First, the use of allied troops in Europe saved Moscow a considerable amount of money; if for purposes of internal bloc security and external bloc defense the Soviets had relied upon an equivalent number of their own troops, the cost to Moscow would have been greater. Even accounting for the dubious value of Rumania's contribution, the less up-to-date weaponry of the East Europeans, and the difficulties in establishing workable exchange rates, the cost of replacing East European forces with their Soviet counterparts was estimated to be equivalent to an additional 11.8 percent of the Soviet military budget.[41]

Second, because the Soviet Union provided all the major weapons for the Warsaw Pact countries, Moscow was able to reduce unit cost in its armaments industry.[42] The East Europeans, in general, paid for the weapons they received.[43] paid for their Of course, the economic savings involved in the Pact contribution presupposed the need to maintain a great number of heavily armed troops in Europe in the first place. Given the Communist belief in the implacability of the capitalist threat to the socialist motherland and the experience of French and German invasions of Russia (the latest of which no

doubt reinforced the first belief) the Soviet desire for a strong defense was not unreasonable.

The development of the ICBM in 1957, and its widespread deployment by both the United States and the Soviet Union by the mid-1960's reduced many of the defensive advantages of Soviet control of East European military establishments and territory (depending on how an escalation were to occur in the event of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict). In the event of an ICBM exchange such control would prove worthless.

The acquisition of large numbers of missiles and warheads by both the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1960's revolutionized strategy and international politics. In 1960 Khrushchev recognized that long as some small portion of a state's nuclear arsenal could survive a first strike by its adversary, the adversary could not guarantee its own preservation, let alone defense. Moscow could control all the territory in the world, but as long as Washington controlled a relatively few numbers of nuclear explosives the Soviet Union would remain forever insecure and defenseless, and *vice versa*. In other words, the Soviet First secretary accepted the fact of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and mutual deterrence. Khrushchev's creation and elevation of the strategic rocket forces at the expense of the other branches of the Soviet military, particularly the ground forces, demonstrated that he understood the disutility of conventional weapons for national defense in the face of a determined attack. In response to journalists' questions about President Kennedy's statement of the US ability to destroy the Soviet Union twice over, Khrushchev wrote, "I said jokingly, 'Yes, I know what Kennedy claims, and he's quite right. But I'm not complaining as long as the President understands that even though he may be able to destroy us two times over, we're still capable of wiping out the United States, even if it's only once.'"[44]

For the first time in history, the numbers and capabilities of conventional forces could (in the event of missile attack) mean nothing to a nation's security. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet in which he announced troop reductions and military reorganization Khrushchev said :

> In our time a country's defense capability is determined not by the number of soldiers it has under arms, or the number of men wearing uniforms. Aside from the general political and economic factors, about which I have already spoken, the defense capability of a given country depends to a decisive degree on the firepower and means of delivery it has.[45]

Khrushchev's recollections show that he implicitly understood how nuclear missiles diminished the value of territory and geographical barriers as well, "Our potential enemy--our principal, our most powerful, our most dangerous enemy [the U.S.]--was so far away from us that we couldn't have reached him with our air force. Only by building up a nuclear missile force could we keep the enemy from unleashing war against us."[46] Though both the Soviet Union and the United States were slow to realize the implications of the nuclear revolution, particularly within their respective conventional military establishments, the course of the bilateral relationship over the past thirty years has convinced both powers of the irrationality of a central clash.[47]

Certainly nuclear weapons and missiles represented a great departure in national defense for Moscow, but what was the harm of keeping troops in Eastern Europe as added insurance, a non-cataclysmic option in case of NATO attack? Insurance, as well as a desire to intimidate Western Europe may have been reasons Moscow felt compelled to station so many troops in territories of its client states: some Soviet, as well as other military theorists argued that MAD enhanced the importance of conventional forces and options.[48]

Events, however showed that the requirement to coerce wayward bloc members back to the socialist camp in time of crisis proved to be more important. V. G. Kulikov, Warsaw Pact Commander from 1977 until 1989 corroborated this view when he argued that Pact's main function was the protection of the socialist community's ideological purity, which included internal actions such as the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.[49] Indeed, the problem of the bloc armies' political and operational reliability suggests that the Warsaw Pact's main function was control of the allied armies. In this sense, the WTO was not really an alliance; as Walter C. Clemens, Jr. observed:

> The historical record suggests that [the] WTO is unique--not for being a voluntary alliance of equals dedicated to enhancing their common aims, but for providing the legal and military framework that for decades helps a hegemonical power to impose its will upon weaker neighbors who, given a free choice, might well opt for nonalignment or even participation in the security operations of the opposing camp. The historical record indicates that this institution, like other exploitative arrangements among nations, tends toward instability, despite surface harmonies.[50]

That Moscow was greatly concerned about the reliability of the Pact armies was suggested by the following facts. First, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military equipment lagged behind Soviet equipment in technological sophistication, even in the militarily more important northern tier countries of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany.[51] Second, the Soviet Union sought control of allied military establishments through various means including penetration by the KGB and indigenous security services, which were thought to be more ideologically committed than the armed forces.[52] That belief is grounded in seven instances between 1953 and 1976 where non-Soviet Pact forces refused to follow their own governments' orders to quell internal disturbances: (1) the

Czechoslovak army refused to suppress riots in Pilsen in 1953; (2) in East Berlin, the same year some East German units reportedly refused to leave their barracks and move against demonstrators; (3) Polish regular army troops in Poznan in 1956 refused to march on rioters (and in some instances joined with them); (4) the Hungarian army refused to aid the regime when faced with popular attacks against secret police headquarters in 1956, and 80 percent of the officer corps refused to sign loyalty oaths to the Kadar regime following the Soviet intervention; (5) the government of Czechoslovakia could not rely on the regular army to suppress anti-Soviet disturbances on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion in 1969, and close to 60 percent of the officer corps under the age of thirty left the military at their own request after the invasion; (6) the Polish army in Gdansk in 1970 resisted orders to put down anti-regime orders and reportedly disobeyed a direct order to employ 'overwhelming force;' and (7) Polish Minister of Defense Wojtech Jaruzelski, when faced with anti-regime demonstrations in Lodz and Warsaw in 1976, reportedly dismissed the possibility of using the army by saying, 'Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers.' [53]

While there were some token representatives of Pact forces in the Soviet attack on Hungary in 1956, and widespread participation of the Pact in the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, there is a difference between attacking a relatively defenseless country with which one is forcibly allied, and attacking your own people, or the West. Furthermore, one country, Rumania, refused to participate in the attack on Czechoslovakia. Finally, the fact that the Soviet General Staff felt it necessary to commission a study on East European reliability reveals the depth of Soviet concern about the problem.[54]

The ever-present possibility of the need to intervene militarily in its allies' internal affairs, which occurred twice and was threatened many more times, distracted

Moscow from other, more constructive tasks. Psychologically, it was exhausting to be on guard constantly against every possible ideological deviation. Militarily, the preparation required for the cannibalism of its allies distracted the military from its main mission of training to combat the West. Similarly, the steps taken to forestall allied deviations and to ensure reliability were hardly ringing endorsements of the universal appeal of one's ideology. Finally, there was an economic cost to Moscow's vigilance.

Regardless of whether the main function of the conventional Pact forces was internal, external, or both, the maintenance of those forces was expensive. Khrushchev noted that the cost of maintaining a Soviet division in one of the socialist allied countries was twice as much as the maintenance of that division in the Soviet Union.[55] The high cost of military forces had economic, and therefore social and political consequences, as Khrushchev observed in 1960, "The lower the expenditures on nonproductive objectives, the more funds will go for the reproduction of the means of production, for the development of the economy, and thus for an increase in output and a fuller satisfaction of the people's material and spiritual requirements."[56]

Indeed, even despite impressive economic growth rates through the 1950's and the first half of the 1960's the Soviet living standard did suffer under the burden of defense spending, and to a lesser extent, the subsidization of Moscow's foreign allies. Despite the pride many Soviets undoubtedly felt in the accomplishments of the state, the value of prestige as a commodity seemed to decline among some elements of the population in direct proportion to their dissatisfaction with material welfare. The refusal of dock workers in Odessa to load butter onto ships destined for Cuba while their own store shelves remained empty was symptomatic of this phenomenon. The pains which the regime took to portray foreign aid expenditures as having only modest impact

on Soviet living standards indicate that the Party did worry about the political effects of giving away or selling scarce consumer goods in a marginal consumer economy.[57] The pride that Soviets felt in their country's position as a world power survived Khrushchev's regime, but the persistent inability of Khrushchev and subsequent Soviet leaders to provide their citizens with desired levels of food, shelter, and other basic needs eroded the power of prestige to sustain the Kremlin's authority.

Summary

The number and quality of the disadvantages growing out of the relationship with Eastern Europe under Khrushchev's reign increased dramatically. The most important developments were the declining value of East European territory and manpower for Soviet defense; the increasing rebelliousness of the bloc peoples; the ideological deviations Khrushchev allowed for the sake of regime viability in the face of popular rebelliousness; and the declining economic value of the bloc trading partners due to a redirection of investment into popular consumption.

On the whole, however, in 1964 when Khrushchev departed the political stage, control of the region was still an asset for Moscow, because the existence of Communist regimes in the region, as well as the expansion of Soviet influence in the third world, increased prestige and authority within in its own borders.. In 1956 Moscow managed to paint its embarrassing confrontation with Poland in a positive light, while the West's Suez fiasco overshadowed the Kremlin's need to rescue Communism's failure in Hungary. The growing split with China had not yet caused too much damage. Khrushchev and his successors were able to point to tangible accomplishments: the Soviet space program; the Partial Test Ban Treaty with the United States; increased Soviet influence in a decolonizing world; and rising living standards at home. Moreover the East

European advantage in the terms of trade was not too onerous a burden for the Soviet Union in the early 1960's because the Soviet economy continued to grow. This growth made the economic loss through implicit subsidies to Eastern Europe easier to absorb. Some degree of subsidization was a relatively small price to pay for stability within the bloc.[58] During periods of poorer than expected growth, however, Moscow would reexamine those subsidies.

Integration and Ideological Retrenchment, 1964-1985

Leonid Brezhnev came to power with no clear ideas of how to change the pattern of Soviet-East European relations established during Khrushchev's tenure. At first, other developments distracted Moscow's attention from the simmering problems in Eastern Europe: the increasingly noxious rift with China; the renewed strategic competition with the United States; and the Soviet Union's own declining economic performance. The last development, like the ideological and technological developments which marked Soviet-East European relations during the regimes of Brezhnev's predecessors, devalued the utility of Eastern Europe during Brezhnev's tenure.

During the period 1959-1965, Soviet growth rates reached their lowest point since the end of the war.[59] This unexpected slowdown led Moscow, even before Khrushchev's dismissal, to experiment in the economy, using market concepts such as profit, loss, charges for capital, and interest in order to make the Soviet economy more efficient. The Liberman reforms, introduced in part in 1964, were designed to increase capital and labor productivity and to improve the quality of Soviet manufactured products. The improved accounting methods spawned by the reforms led Moscow to reevaluate the profits and costs of many enterprises. As a result of new awareness of the effect of rent and interest charges on production costs, the Soviets concluded that the

costs of expanding extraction and transport of such resources as oil, coal and iron ore were far greater than they had previously believed. Because the bulk of Soviet exports to Eastern Europe were raw materials, this meant that Soviet subsidies to the region were greater than were previously understood.[60]

The main cause of the slowdown in growth was that massive investment campaigns directed from the center could no longer squeeze the same results out of an economy that had become too large, complex, and inefficient for much more extensive development.[61] After learning of the degree of their subsidization of Eastern European regimes, it was not unreasonable for Moscow to assume, however, that the subsidies and bailouts themselves were at least partly responsible for the diminishing Soviet rates of growth. Indeed, the Brezhnev leadership's policies toward the region were consistent with a desire to make Eastern Europe if not profitable, then less of an economic burden.

Moscow sought to reduce the burden of the bloc by charging more for extractive products; and encouraging greater capital investment, coordination of planning, and specialization within the bloc. Because of declining growth rates in Eastern Europe and the inability of the region to supply Moscow with needed goods Moscow even gave its blessing to economic reforms in the GDR, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.[62] None of Moscow's efforts toward coordinating plans or achieving specialization amounted to very much, but the attempts to renovate the Czechoslovak economy led at least indirectly to the Prague Spring and its resulting suppression by Moscow in 1968.

In the summer of 1968 when the confrontation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union reached its boiling point, no one in the Kremlin should have been surprised that the reforms begun in 1963 should have led so far. First, the Khrushchev regime produced its strongest condemnation ever of Stalin and Stalinism at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. This was the starting point for an even stronger de-Stalinization

campaign than that which followed the 20th Party Congress. The increased intensity of the Soviet political thaw was coupled with an interest in economic reform sparked by Soviet economic decline and Evsei Liberman's ideas.

Czechoslovakia was ripe for some kind of change because it was experiencing even greater economic difficulties than the Soviet Union at that point, and because both the Party faithful as well as the population in general held the Party leader, Antonin Novotny, responsible for Czechoslovakia's difficulties. It was understandable, therefore, that Novotny interpreted Moscow's willingness to attack Stalin and to experiment with new economic methods as a signal to proceed with reform in Czechoslovakia. He did not want to be left in the cold by a wave of de-Stalinization as had Bierut (who had a heart attack and died following Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress), and Rakosi in 1956. At the same time others in Eastern Europe were also developing programs to deal with declining economic performance and the political risks such poor performance entailed. Most of these plans were emasculated in the implementation or simply lacked the boldness to make a difference, like the Soviet plan.[63] Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, however, was a little better, though Kadar proceeded much more cautiously and was in greater control of his Party than was Novotny.

The Czech leader, like the Soviets and his fellow East Europeans waffled on the implementation of the economic reform plan devised by Ota Sik; the Czechoslovak economy showed no signs of improving. Discontented elements within the CCP who were unhappy with the pace of reform as well as Novotny's leadership joined together with unhappy intellectuals to end Novotny's reign. In a striking parallel to the Velvet Revolution of 1989 the violent police suppression of peaceful student demonstrations in

October, 1967 served to unite Novotny's opponents. Just as Milos Jakes was to find no support from Mikhail Gorbachev, Novotny failed to enlist Leonid Brezhnev's aid in preventing his own downfall and on January 4, 1968 Alexander Dubcek replaced Novotny as First secretary of the CCP.[64]

The Party under Dubcek sought to keep up with the spontaneous torrent of popular expression which followed the old regime's ouster. In response, it drafted an Action Program which was to be the root of the Spring which ended with the Soviet invasion. In this blueprint for reform, accepted in April by the Party's Central Committee, the Party proposed five radical changes in the political-social order: democratization both within the Party and in the political system as a whole; a relaxation of censorship; greater attention to individual rights; and placing limits on the power of the secret police. The only area of policy not subject to change in the program was Prague's foreign policy. Dubcek remained firmly committed to loyalty to Moscow and the socialist commonwealth.[65]

Promises of loyalty in foreign policy were not, however, enough to allay the fears of the Soviets and their more conservative allies about the direction that Prague was heading. Moscow thought "socialism with a human face," to be dangerous precisely because it showed Soviet-style, unreformed socialism to be inhuman. Moreover, Prague's version of democratic socialism was not very distinguishable from the political systems of the class adversaries to the West. It called into question the basis for authority for the other Warsaw Pact members who held power in the traditional, undemocratic fashion.

Moscow felt threatened not only by the ideological heresies endorsed by the Czechoslovak Communist Party but by the tolerance of Slovak nationalism and the implications which these had for spillover into the Ukraine.[66] For these reasons, and

because hardline allies Walter Ulbricht and Wladislaw Gomulka believed that the Prague reforms threatened their respective hold on power, the Kremlin decided that the reforms would have to be reversed.[67] Prague and Moscow talked past each other all spring and summer: Dubcek failed to understand how his reforms threatened the Kremlin leadership; and the Soviets could not understand the popular nature of Dubcek's support or his inability to get their message. Finally on August 20 the Soviet Union, along with forces from East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary, invaded Czechoslovakia in order to compel a retreat from the reforms.[68]

Certainly, the Soviets and their puppets were correct in regarding the Czechoslovak experiment to be highly destabilizing. Unfortunately for Moscow, the Prague Spring was symptomatic of a bloc-wide disease: not one of the regimes in Eastern Europe was legitimate. The cure which Moscow applied to Czechoslovakia simply postponed the onset of symptoms in a different part of the bloc further down road. Indeed, like a cancer that metastasizes, indigenous flare-ups against inauthentic, unpopular, and incompetent regimes occurred in Poland in 1970, 1976, and 1980-1982. It seems, moreover, that the steps which the Brezhnev regime took to ensure greater stability within its empire actually accelerated economic decay and therefore further diminished Eastern Europe's usefulness to the Soviet Union.

The first costs resulted from the invasion itself. The most obvious damage was to Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. Neither Dubcek, nor the recalcitrant Czechoslovak Communist Party caved in immediately to the pressure of the invasion and immediately backed off from their attempts to run Czechoslovakia as they saw fit. It would be eight more months before Moscow could secure Dubcek's dismissal. At first Moscow and its

enthusiastic German and Polish supporters only succeeded in permanently alienating the entire Czechoslovak population (save a few hardline Muscovite loyalists). The absolute refusal of the Czechoslovak armed forces to cooperate with the Red Army signified a loss, albeit small, of Warsaw Pact manpower, for the new regime in Prague under Gustav Husak let go of thousands of officers who refused to sign loyalty pledges. Moscow's fear that the Prague Spring threatened the security of the bloc caused the alienation of an allied country which historically was friendly to Moscow; that fear ultimately was counterproductive. Of course, the stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the invasion, regarded to be permanent before 1989, compensated for any loss in manpower. Furthermore, the military effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia most assuredly increased for two reasons: first, Soviet troops could be assumed to be more loyal and reliable to Moscow than Czechoslovak troops were even before the invasion; and second, the Red Army was equipped with more advanced armaments than their brothers in arms. On the other hand, the accumulation of huge NATO and Soviet stockpiles of nuclear weapons rendered the likelihood of an armed conflict between East and West in Europe extremely small, and diminished the importance of conventional advances in both manpower and territory. The Prague Spring's real threat to the Soviet Union, however, was political, not military in character.

Nevertheless, Moscow's military reaction was not cheap. At a time of great concern about economic decline Moscow mounted a significant military operation, especially if one considers that there must have been a cost to the many maneuvers in an around Czech territory before the invasion. Remembering that Khrushchev wrote that the cost of maintaining a division abroad was double the cost of keeping it at home, the stationing of seventy-five thousand troops (5 divisions) in Czechoslovakia must have

added a significant sum of money to the Soviet Union's annual defense budget (it is impossible to determine exactly how much because there are no published analyses of Soviet costs in Eastern Europe).[69]

Moscow's action interrupted progress toward a strategic arms agreement with the West. Though it must be conceded that the interruption was brief, it may be that the pause in negotiations was costly to the Soviets. Had the Johnson Administration not halted the negotiations in protest, it is more likely that a strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT) would have been concluded in 1968 and that the United States would have accepted limits on the number of missiles that could be equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The Nixon Administration rejected limits on MIRVs because the United States possessed a technological and numerical advantage, and so the Soviets lost an opportunity.

Another price which Moscow had to pay for its actions was the loss of any chance of mending the splits in world Communism. The invasion ultimately corroded the cohesion of the Soviet bloc and decreased Kremlin influence in the movement. The first reverberations against Soviet interests came in the reaction of the various Communist Parties to the invasion. The Chinese reviled Moscow; clearly, any hope that the Soviet Union held for a reconciliation with Beijing perished on August 20, though there was not much hope at that point anyway. Nevertheless, as Karen Dawisha wrote, "...the invasion was an important stepping stone toward Chinese acceptance of the notion that an entente with 'the enemy of your enemy'--namely, the United States--was the best guarantee of Chinese security against Russian expansionism."[70] Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania sided with Prague and condemned the Soviets. The Italian Communist Party also expressed incomprehension but was not as vehement as the Balkan Parties.[71]

The criticism of China was no surprise, and it really mattered little to Moscow that Albania, Yugoslavia, and nonruling Communist Parties from France and Italy would criticize Moscow anyway, because the Sino-Soviet split and the reopening of the rift with Yugoslavia had already exposed the fiction of Communist unity. Rumania's behavior was regarded somewhat differently because it still belonged to the bloc. Apparently, however, Moscow's military and political intimidation of Rumania from 1968-1971 had a salutary effect on Ceausescu because he subsequently moderated his anti-Soviet rhetoric.[72]

More damaging to Moscow than another cleavage in the illusory Communist unity was the lesson which the U.S.S.R. derived from the entire Czechoslovak experience. Moscow concluded that any economic reform based on principles of decentralization of decision-making power (as any real reform had to be) was automatically a threat to Communist power. Before the invasion the Brezhnev regime had not really distinguished itself from its predecessor in its East-European policy. A sharp turn toward economic, political and cultural orthodoxy marked the Brezhnev regime following the invasion.

In the U.S.S.R. the leadership scrapped the modest experimentation with the Liberman economic reforms because it feared that those ideas, which resembled the Sik reforms implemented in Czechoslovakia, would lead to the same result in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[73] The myriad economic problems in all the centrally planned economies which reform was supposed to address were addressed in the previous fashion of changing the plan superficially and ineffectually. The Kremlin made no attempt to deal structurally with the waste of capital, the inefficient use of labor, or the lack of technological innovation which chronically plagued the Soviet and East European economies.[74]

It is easy to see that Brezhnev felt he had no choice: if he permitted the Prague Spring to continue, the Czechoslovak deviation would have discredited the entire Soviet system, yet the fact that external military force was required to return Czechoslovakia to the *status quo ante* also discredited the system. Brezhnev pursued several avenues designed to make Eastern Europe more stable, less burdensome to Moscow and at the same time, easier to control. His efforts, however, produced the opposite results.

The U.S.S.R. evidently believed that the strengthening of bilateral, as well as multilateral, institutional ties in the form of the CMEA and the WTO would create a system of Socialist interdependence so strong and thorough, that the level of Soviet control would obviate any further need to resort to coercion, as had been necessary in 1956 and 1968. It should be noted that the Kremlin's plans to improve existing institutional structures predated the invasion of Czechoslovakia. That unpleasant necessity, however, gave particular impetus to Moscow's desires.

The first attempts to centralize and therefore increase the powers of the CMEA as an instrument of Kremlin control occurred at CMEA meetings in January and April, 1969. Rumania and Hungary, with some understandably cautious support from Czechoslovakia, led the refusal to go along with Moscow's desire to extend Comecon's central powers. Budapest and Bucharest both objected to a division of labor which they believed would keep them agricultural and poor while the northern tier states remained free to develop complete economies, and in truth everybody found something to dislike about the Soviet plans. The result was that everyone agreed to work harder to find new methods for improving economic cooperation but no steps were taken that might offend anyone.[75]

Moscow had no better luck in making its bilateral relationships more profitable, especially with Czechoslovakia. As was the case with Poland and Hungary following their troubles in 1956, the Soviet Union concluded an agreement with Prague the purpose of which was to buy stability within Czechoslovakia in exchange for that country's acceptance of diminished sovereignty. On October 29, 1969, after a long visit of the highest leaders from the Czech Party and state to Moscow, the two countries announced a bilateral trade agreement. The Kremlin promised the following: to increase already planned deliveries to Czechoslovakia of oil, iron, cotton, and other commodities which the Soviets usually supplied to Prague; to include additional unspecified durable goods (assumed to be manufactured goods) which were not part of any previous trade arrangement; to buy for Prague goods on the world market which were in short supply in Czechoslovakia (using scarce reserves of hard currency); and to assist in the construction of the Prague subway. In return for Moscow's generosity the Czechs promised to live up to previously concluded trade obligations.[76] Evidently, all that an East European country had to do to secure a one-sided trade agreement from Moscow was to threaten the leading role of the Party, or at the very least threaten Moscow's control over the Party, because Czechoslovakia conformed to the pattern established by Poland and Hungary.

Consider also that the Soviets felt themselves to be operating in dire economic straits at the time. On December 15, 1969 Leonid Brezhnev harangued the Central Committee of the CPSU about the country's poor economic performance. His speech from that plenum was not published. On January 13, 1970 *Pravda* ran a front page editorial which mentioned that Central Committee plenum, and urged the Soviet people to do what they could to correct the economy's many defects.[77] On April 13, 1970 in Kharkov, Brezhnev gave a similar speech decrying the state's poorer than expected economic

performance of recent years, part of which he attributed to unexpected foreign policy problems.[78] While it is impossible to blame the Soviet East European policy for its domestic economic difficulties (such difficulties were inherent in the system), it is probable that Brezhnev believed that the costs emanating from the invasion and its aftermath were a contributing factor.

The improvement of their economy was obviously a primary interest of the Soviet leadership, but the Kremlin had already decided that beyond administrative streamlining and ideological mobilization the consequences of proceeding with its own internal economic reform were too dangerous politically. Similarly, any attempts to reduce the economic liability of its East European possessions by promoting measures to increase economic efficiency in those countries (excepting Hungary) could result in another Czechoslovakia. There was, however, another avenue to explore: economic cooperation with the West.

Detente and the Increasing Economic Liability of Eastern Europe

The minor furor in the West over the invasion of Czechoslovakia had interrupted Soviet-American progress towards the conclusion of a strategic arms agreement, as well as emerging Soviet-West German political and economic cooperation, but as the tide of international outrage over Soviet behavior subsided, East-West contacts resumed. Even before high detente began in 1972, trade between Comecon and West increased substantially. For the years 1962-1972 trade among CMEA members doubled, but trade between CMEA members and Western Europe for the same period quadrupled, and with the United States and Japan the volume of trade increased eight times.[79]

As East-West relations improved, Moscow realized that increasing trade with the United States and its allies could ameliorate some of the shortcomings of intra-CMEA trade, the main difficulties being that not one of the East European countries could

supply Moscow with high technology, or even high quality goods. The benefit from relaxed tensions with the West was not so much an increased volume of trade, but improved access to higher quality and technology products.[80] Aside from the advantages which accrued to the U.S.S.R. from direct trade with the West, Moscow obviously hoped that it could benefit as well from Eastern Europe's expanded and deepened contacts with the class enemy. First, Eastern Europe could go to the West for needed capital instead of always looking to the Kremlin, thereby reducing Moscow's financial burden, and second, Moscow could avail itself of Western technologies being imported by its bloc neighbors. Indeed, in the theoretical justifications for increasing trade with the class enemy, Soviet academics and did not abandon their previous calls for further CMEA integration and cohesion simply because another source of trade was opening; in the period of Soviet-U.S. negotiations leading to the agreements of 1972 the Kremlin was careful to remind everyone that socialist integration was still a paramount concern.[81] Following the agreements Moscow was equally careful to point out that peaceful coexistence and economic interdependence with the class adversary did not come at the expense of socialist cohesion.[82]

Moscow's new enthusiasm for the world "division of labor", however had some profoundly disturbing implications for both the regime, and the Soviet system itself.[83] First, despite claims that the Kremlin had always pursued a policy of close international economic integration, for most of Soviet history Moscow's external economic policy was the pursuit of autarky. Following the conquest of Eastern Europe the policy became one of socialist, rather than national autarky. This was part of Zhdanov's proclamation of the two camps. Interestingly, Nikolai Shmelev, in his 1973 article in favor of trade with the West, supported his argument by quoting from Lenin's desire for Western trade from 1922.[84] At that time the Soviet economy was in a shambles. It is not suggested

that Moscow regarded itself to be in the same dire economic straits in 1973, but as any visitor to the Soviet Union could tell, and as Moscow has now acknowledged, official statistics, for various reasons, did not paint an accurate portrait of the economic health of the U.S.S.R. at any time in its history.[85] In a related vein, the decision to import (both legally and illegally) high technology products from the West was tantamount to an admission that the Soviet Union itself was incapable of producing such goods. The acceptance of a permanent technological inferiority to the West was hardly advantageous to Soviet claims about the ideological superiority of the Socialist system.

Finally, increased bloc trade meant increased interaction and movement among peoples, and Moscow was no doubt aware of the greater danger of ideological penetration that detente posed to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. (Indeed, the inability to perceive an ideological threat had never been one of Moscow's weak points). The number of East European visitors to West European countries increased dramatically during the 1970's and they only needed to see the difference in living standards to be further disillusioned with their own system. Perhaps more importantly, Soviet visitors to Eastern Europe were provided with glimpses of the West through greater access to Western media, tourists and business travelers, and material goods. In that vein, the Soviet emphasis on Socialist cohesion and integration was as logical from a political-ideological standpoint as from an economic one.

Another way in which Moscow tried to enhance the cohesion of the bloc and reduce its economic burden at the same time was through the Warsaw Pact. Specifically, Brezhnev sought to make the Soviet Union's East European partners pay a greater share of the common defense burden.[86] Yet, it was doubly illogical for the Kremlin to ask already financially strapped regimes to carry a heavier defense burden if it desired to avoid the social unrest and instability that characterized Czechoslovakia in the 1960's.

First, as has been established, the inability of the highly illegitimate East European regimes to meet the ever rising economic expectations of their respective populations was politically dangerous because that inability often led to social unrest and political upheaval. For Moscow to ask its allies to spend more money on an area of the budget which detracted from society's standard of living was to court disaster. From 1965-1976 the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries as a group were able to hold their defense spending to levels of 3.0-3.3 percent of their GNP. Over that same period only Bulgaria and East Germany actually increased their defense spending as a percentage of GNP.[87] Even taking into account relatively stable, or even decreasing defense expenditures among the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members, East European economic performance was poor, especially if one were to subtract the effect of borrowing from the West as a stimulus to economic performance. The decline in economic performance led to social disquiet; during the 1970's Poland exemplified this phenomenon better than any other bloc state. Second, Soviet defense was not popular in Eastern Europe, and so the Brezhnev regime was essentially squeezing the East European leaders between Moscow and the desires of their respective populations.

As the 1970's progressed, the increasing economic cost of Eastern Europe became more apparent to Moscow. Just as the improved accounting procedures of the early 1960's made the Soviet Union more aware of the degree of subsidization to Eastern Europe, the oil shocks of the 1970's made Moscow more aware of the value of the natural resources that Moscow was trading to its partners in exchange for poorly made machine tools and undesirable consumer goods. As Josef C. Brada explained:

> The Soviet Union subsidizes the East European members of the CMEA because the formula for setting prices in intra-CMEA trade creates a systematic divergence between intra-CMEA and world market prices (WMPs). Intra-CMEA prices are based on the average of past WMPs. As a result, those commodities whose

> prices on world markets are rising, such as fuels and raw materials during the 1970s, tend to be underpriced in intra-CMEA trade relative to contemporaneous WMPs. In contrast, manufactures, including machinery, tend to be overpriced in intra-CMEA trade. Such overpricing occurs in two ways. The first is that if the WMPs of manufactures grow more slowly than do those of raw materials; then, under the CMEA price-setting rule, the terms of trade between manufactures and raw materials will be more favorable for the former in intra-CMEA trade than they would be on the basis of contemporaneous WMPs. The second way in which manufactures become overvalued in intra-CMEA trade is through the process of documenting WMPs. WMPs for machinery and other manufactures are based on a quality standard that similar East European goods do not meet. Evidence of the lower quality of East European manufactures is provided by the often large discounts from WMPs at which East European exports of such goods have to be sold in the West. Thus, to the extent that WMPs of Western manufactures are used to set the intra-CMEA prices of lower-quality products, the latter are overpriced.

Because the Soviet Union was a net exporter of fuels and other raw materials and a net importer of machinery and other manufactures, Brada explained, its trade with its East European partners could be considered a subsidy.[88] The world market price of oil actually declined during the 1980's, thus reducing the amount of the Soviet subsidy to Eastern Europe, but the trading mechanism remained in place which left Moscow vulnerable in the case of another oil price rise, and the quality of East European manufactures did not improve.

Moscow faced an economic disadvantage in that orientation of its trade with Eastern Europe instead of the West presented it with a significant opportunity cost. Soft currencies afforded the advantage of more flexible trading arrangements than did the market, and the terms of trade with its six CMEA partners improved for the U.S.S.R. during the decade, but they could not match the terms which the Soviets received from the West.[89] For the period 1975-1980 Jan Vanous and Michael Marrese estimated that Moscow lost almost 55 billion U.S. 1982 dollars.[90] For perspective, consider the year 1980: the Soviet GNP of 906.9 billion dollars grew 0.3 percent, but the trade subsidy

to Eastern Europe was 21.7 billion dollars, or 2.3 percent of the GNP, and well greater than the amount of economic growth.[91] Beyond the subsidies described by Vanous and Brada, however, Moscow again found itself bailing out another regime in trouble with its own population, for 1980 saw the birth of Solidarity and all the trouble that organization caused for Communists everywhere.[92]

Just as within an individual Communist state all social and economic problems and competitions were referred to the regime, within the Soviet bloc all problems and crises were were sent to Moscow. As Valerie Bunce wrote:

> Originally, the size and resource base of the Soviet economy, Soviet dominance in intrabloc trade, and the Soviet role as a political and economic monopoly had formed the basis of Soviet strength in intrabloc bargaining. Now, all of these characteristics seemed to increase Soviet *weakness* within the bloc. All economic roads led to Moscow, especially in hard times.[93]

For an example of the phenomenon which Bunce described, she pointed to Rumania's increasingly Soviet-oriented trade toward the latter half of the 1970's.[94] The predicaments of Bucharest and Warsaw illustrated perfectly the failure of Moscow's policy of economic *Westpolitik*. It temporarily increased the material welfare of Soviet and East European consumers, but that increase was based on a debt to the Western capitalist democracies that could be repaid only at great economic cost to the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, the temporary improvement in the material welfare of bloc workers in the mid-1970's succeeded in raising expectations of the workers for a continuation of the regime's economic performance. Success, however was chimerical, because states like Poland and Rumania threw the money which they borrowed from the West down a rathole. There were no structural reforms of the East European economies, except in Hungary, and that reform, by capitalism's standards, was half-hearted and riddled with

problems. In the end, Moscow and her bloc clients were in greater trouble than before detente. First, because the East European economies were now tied into the world economy through their extensive debts to Western banks, they were no longer as protected from cyclical economic disturbances such as the energy recessions of the 1970's and early 1980's. The lesson which Moscow took from Czechoslovakia, that economic reform was politically dangerous, obscured the lesson which Professors Liberman and Sik tried to teach in the 1960's: that structural reform was necessary if capital were not to be wasted.

By 1980 in Poland it became apparent that avoiding real economic reform was far more dangerous to the East European regimes than not, because popular expectations had risen while the regime's ability to respond to those expectations had actually declined. On July 1, 1980 the government of Poland under Edward Gierek introduced changes in the system of meat sales and prices that resulted in a doubling in price for some kinds of meat. Polish workers throughout the country protested immediately with strikes. Gierek's regime granted local authorities the power to settle strikers' demands for pay raises and other benefits. By mid-July most of the country was affected by the work-stoppages. The Soviet Union looked on with great interest, not only because Poland suffered from a history of destabilizing worker unrest but also because striking railroad workers had disrupted rail traffic to and from the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) began to warn the striking workers that inflation would absorb the pay raises granted by the government and that workers would find themselves in the same boat they were in on July 1. To protect against this happening KOR advocated that workers seek to protect their

constitutional rights, including the right to form independent trade unions. Strikes began in the Gdansk shipyards on August 14 and soon after, representatives from other striking factories in arrived there and the various strike delegations formed the Inter-factory Strike Committee (MKS). More committees formed in other cities. On August 18 government representatives went to Gdansk but refused to recognize the power of the MKS to negotiate. The workers would not permit any other representation. Gierek went on television and radio to excoriate the intransigent workers and Moscow reacted with approval:

> Touching on the situation at certain enterprises along the Gdansk coast, E. Gierek took note of attempts to use strikes for hostile political purposes, and of cases in which certain irresponsible, anarchistic and antisocialist forces have incited negative sentiments. We consider it our duty, he said, to state with utmost firmness that any action directed against the political and social order cannot and will not be tolerated in Poland. No one can hope for concessions or compromises, or even vacillation on this fundamental question.[95]

The power and organization of the workers, however, did force Gierek to compromise and on August 31, the government concluded an historic agreement with the Gdansk MKS. The Gdansk Agreement contained a number of concessions to the striking workers, but the most salient included 'the right of free association in trade unions' and the right to strike.[96] The Communist Party's admission that it was not the sole and legitimate representative of the Polish working class set a stunning ideological precedent, whether the regime meant to live up to the agreement or not.

One consequence of the accord was Gierek's fall from power; his about-face cost him all his credibility in the PUWP and in the country as a whole. Stanislaw Kania, Gierek's replacement as First Secretary of the PUWP, was not so encumbered as Gierek with a history of opposition to workers' demands, and he proved, much to Moscow's

dismay, to be willing to go much further than Kania in granting the unions (under the banner of Solidarity) a greater degree of participation in Poland's politics. Kania met with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa on November 14, 1980 and proclaimed his belief that Solidarity was qualified to play an important role in Poland's political life.[97] Shortly thereafter, Konstantin Chernenko, a Brezhnev associate with both Politburo and Secretariat membership, published an article in *Kommunist* excoriating "capitulationism" and "the ideas of trade unions' 'freedom' from the struggle of the working class' ultimate goals, and their 'independence' from the interests of all the workers."[98] "Capitulationism" referred to Kania's habit of indulging Solidarity's demands. Chernenko's phrase "workers' interests" signified 'Party interests.' According to Leninist ideology, the Communist Party **was** the workers' party; Solidarity, as a manifestation of the Polish workers' dissatisfaction with the representation of the Communist Party, could not be reconciled with Communist ideology. No non-Communist organization could be permitted to challenge the authority of the Party, especially on workers' interests. If such participation were permitted in Poland, then the CPSU would face great difficulty justifying its prohibition within the Soviet Union itself.

At the CPSU's 26th Party Congress Brezhnev, himself vented his hostility to the Polish reforms. He spoke of the 'subversion' occurring within Poland, though he conceded that the crisis was at least partly indigenous:

> The imperialists and their accomplices are systematically conducting hostile campaigns against the socialist powers. They malign and distort everything that goes on in them. For them the main thing is to turn people against socialism.
>
> Recent events have shown again and again that our class opponents are learning from their defeats. Their actions against the socialist countries are increasingly refined and treacherous.
>
> And whenever in addition to imperialist subversive activity there are mistakes and miscalculations in home policy, there arise conditions that stimulate elements hostile to socialism. This is what has happened in fraternal Poland, where opponents of socialism supported by outside forces are, by stirring up anarchy, seeking to channel events into a

> counterrevolutionary course. As noted at the latest plenary meeting of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, the pillars of the socialist state in Poland are in jeopardy.

The Soviet leader went on to threaten Poland, "...the Polish working class, and the working people of that country can firmly rely on their friends and allies; we will not abandon fraternal, socialist Poland in its hour of need, we will stand by it."[99] Moscow's offers of fraternal aid were accepted before, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956.

Because the PUWP was remiss in stamping out the rampant heresies within the Polish polity, the Kremlin's ideology chief, Mikhail Suslov flew to Warsaw on April 23, 1981 for consultations with Kania and Wojtech Jaruzelski, the long-time Defense Minister and new Prime Minister. Reportedly the Kremlin's inquisitor expressed no faith in the ability of Kania and Jaruzelski to extinguish the heretical sparks of pluralism both within the PUWP and in Polish society. The participants in the discussion proclaimed that the Poles and Soviets "...oppose any interference in Poland's domestic affairs **on the part of imperialist circles [emphasis added].**"[8] The fact that Suslov obviously did not include the USSR under the rubric of imperialist and did not exclude the possibility of interference on the part of anti-imperialist circles implied yet another Soviet threat to intervene in Poland.

On June 5, the Soviet leadership aired the full force of its grievances against Warsaw in a letter addressed to Kania, Jaruzelski and "other Polish comrades," which recalled the Warsaw letter sent to the Czechoslovak leadership in 1968. The Soviet Politburo noted first its disappointment in the failure of their Polish counterparts to control Solidarity:

> We considered it important from the first days of the crisis that the [PUWP] deliver a resolute rebuff to attempts by socialism's enemies to

> take advantage of the difficulties that came out of their own far-reaching aims. This, however has not been accomplished. Endless concessions to the antisocialist forces and their insistent demands have led to a situation in which the PUWP has retreated step by step under the attack of internal counterrevolution, which depends on the support of foreign centers of imperialist subversion....[100]

Finally, when Jaruzelski declared martial, law the Kremlin heaved a sigh of relief that the sixteen month experiment with pluralism had been terminated. According to *Pravda:*

> Solidarity's extremist leaders, as well as members of illegal antisocialist organizations, especially KOS-KOR and the Confederation of Independent Poland, have been interned. A group of persons responsible for the social, political, and economic crisis in Poland has also been isolated.
>
> The decree prohibits meetings, demonstrations, and the dissemination of publications and information without obtaining preliminary permission from the appropriate agencies for as long as martial law remains in effect. Strikes or protest actions are not permitted. The work of societies, trade unions and organizations **whose activity threatens the state system** [emphasis added] is suspended temporarily.[101]

Beyond the PUWP's intolerable acceptance of an independent challenge to its authority, Moscow objected to an increase in the level of democracy within the PUWP itself. One scholar noted that one million out of the three million members of the Polish Communist Party had joined Solidarity and "...far from explaining the leading role of the Party to their fellow trade unionists, they carried the virus of reform into the party itself."[102] Moscow's antipathy to internal Party reform was evinced by *Pravda's* deletion of all references to such reform, including the possibility of limited terms in office for Party officials, in its version of Stanislaw Kania's October 4, 1980 report to the Polish Central Committee.[103]

Reportedly one of the reasons Mikhail Suslov travelled to Warsaw in April of 1981 was to berate Kania and Jaruzelski for their ideological tramplings on democratic

centralism.[13] The June letter sent to the Warsaw leadership before the Ninth Polish Party Congress showed Moscow's displeasure with the level of democracy entering the Polish Party:

> The situation within the PUWP itself recently has become an issue of special concern. Slightly more than a month remains before the congress. Increasingly, however, forces hostile to socialism are setting the tone of the election campaign. The fact that casual people, who proclaim opportunistic views openly, are frequently becoming the leaders of local party organizations and who are among the delegates to conferences and the congress can only cause concern. As a result of the different manipulations by the PUWP's enemies and by revisionists and opportunists, experienced personnel who are devoted to the party's cause and have unblemished reputations and moral qualities are being pushed aside....[104]

The Kremlin leadership warned the Poles repeatedly to back off from their reforms. In his Twenty-sixth Party Congress address Brezhnev said, "We will not abandon fraternal, socialist Poland in its hour of need, we will stand by it," and in the June letter the Soviet Politburo implied that Warsaw was testing Moscow's fealty to the Brezhnev Doctrine: "Thus, the PUWP bears a historic responsibility not only for the fate of its homeland, its independence and progress and the cause of socialism in Poland, **you also bear an enormous responsibility for the common interests of the socialist commonwealth...**"[emphasis added][105]

Before the declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981, the Soviets seriously considered using military force to ensure that the Poles met their obligations to the socialist commonwealth. A number of the highest ranking Soviet military officers, including the commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) apparently advocated some form of military intervention against Poland.[106] Soviet and Warsaw Pact military behavior before the imposition of marital law recalled the

extensive maneuvers which preceded the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Warsaw Pact staged three combined forces exercises in Poland or near its borders.[107] The Polish Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski admitted in March, 1981 that one of these exercises, "Soyuz-81" was extended three weeks because of the tense situation in Poland.[108] The Warsaw Pact exercises did not include the mobilization of thirty Red Army divisions on Poland's eastern border.[109]

The major problem for the Kremlin was that many of the same conditions which existed in Poland also existed in the Soviet Union. While it was true that the CPSU was an indigenous force and the PUWP was propped up from Moscow, it was also true that Soviet workers were increasingly dissatisfied and that the regime had lost the ability to motivate or pacify them through traditional nationalistic or ideological appeals.[110]

Beyond the inability to see past forcible reaction and ideological retrenchment, the Brezhnev regime had made one other grave mistake which contributed to the predicament in which it found itself in 1980. That mistake was Helsinki, because it contradicted the doctrine of socialist internationalism upon which Brezhnev based his interference in Poland's difficulties. Brezhnev may have only signed the human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreements in 1975 because he believed it to be a harmless *quid pro quo* for American and other Western trade agreements, but the Soviet signature on the document provided dissidents within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the Western powers with the ideological ammunition to argue that the Soviet reaction to the Solidarity uprising was a violation of an agreement which Moscow had itself signed.

Summary and Conclusion

Whereas in the cases of his predecessors it can be argued that Eastern Europe was a net asset, for the Brezhnev regime the possession of Eastern Europe was more like possession by Eastern Europe. Politically, popular uprisings against Soviet-supported regimes in the region, most notable in Czechoslovakia and Poland, embarrassed and strained Moscow. In an age in which the USSR tried to portray itself as the defender of the weak against the ravages of imperialism in the Third World, the Kremlin's ideological contortions in defense of its behavior in Eastern Europe fell flat, especially because it could no longer claim to be acting on the part of a unified world Communist movement. The Soviet reaction to the emergence of Solidarity in Poland mocked even it own attitude that all means are valid in the pursuit of the goal of a workers' state. In this case, it was especially absurd to see Moscow straining to call an indigenous workers' uprising against an alien-supported regime the work of foreign imperialist agents.

Militarily, at the close of the Brezhnev era with Chernenko's death in March 1985, the control of Eastern Europe could be viewed had not only as decreasingly advantageous to the Soviet Union's defense, but actually disadvantageous. Both the United States and the USSR had so many missiles pointed at each other from the other's home territory and from sea-launched platforms as to render European territory much less significant than in pre-nuclear era. In fact, the Soviet modernization of its intermediate missile capability with the deployment of the SS-20s in 1976 actually reduced Moscow's security because it provoked the deployment of 128 NATO Ground Launched Cruise Missile launchers and 150 Pershing II Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles, the latter being a weapon capable of reaching Moscow from some NATO locations as quickly as five minutes.[111] Both weapon systems were significantly more accurate than any other U. S., Allied, or Soviet system.[112] Furthermore, Moscow's blatant intimidation of Poland and its obvious support for the imposition of martial law

contributed to the ongoing chill in its relationship with the United States: the Reagan Administration cited Moscow's Polish policy as an impediment to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and as further justification for its military build-up policy.[113]

Finally, there could be no question that Eastern Europe was an economic drain: it cost Moscow in direct subsidies; it cost Moscow in indirect subsidies; and trade with Eastern Europe represented a tremendous opportunity cost in lost trade with the West. Furthermore, the need to respond to anti-regime activity in Czechoslovakia and Poland had costs derived from increased military activity and the burden of a financial bailout of the country for the newer Soviet-approved regime. Additionally, in the case of Poland, an already hostile U.S. administration further reduced Soviet and Polish access to Western commerce, thus increasing Poland's economic reliance on the USSR and denying Moscow a source of Western technology and manufactured goods.

Chapter Summary

Eastern Europe's value to the Soviet Union was never greater than in the immediate postwar period when Moscow stole entire industries from the region, placed a territorial buffer between it and the West, and extended its political control to six countries and millions of people. By the end of Brezhnev's tenure, the region had become a liability in economic, security, and political terms. The Polish Party's difficulty in 1980-1981 was the latest and most salient symptom of the dysfunctional relationship: Soviet military intimidation and the imposition of martial law was used by the West to justify its rearmament program; Poland's paralyzing debt and larger economic decline required Soviet assistance; and the organized challenge to Communist authority by a genuine workers' movement undermined the Marxist-Leninist ideology on which the Soviet power was based. Despite the diminution of Eastern Europe's utility for the

Soviets across all these lines the Soviet Union's rulers believed in the necessity to force the Polish government to repudiate the recognition of Solidarity. The failure to do so would called into question the legitimacy of the Soviet Party's right to exclude its non-Communist citizens from participation in politics. As long as the CPSU required the ideological legitimation (as limited as it was) provided by the existence of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the continued maintenance of Communist power (as costly as it was) in Eastern Europe was rational policy. Internal ideological legitimation was the dominant factor in the Kremlin's collective political calculus because it was on that factor that the country's rulers believed their authority hinged. In order to understand why the Gorbachev regime began to value the other factors more highly, the application of a new model, which can explain cognitive and ideological change, is required.

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[1]Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[2]References to the economic growth of the Soviet and East European Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs) occur throughout the analysis, and are based on different sources: the CPEs themselves; CIA and other U.S. Government estimates; and the estimates of international organizations, i.e. the World Bank, and the United Nations. While the figures may vary from estimate to estimate, the trends over time are consistent. For the difficulty and different methods used in calculating GNP in CPEs see Paul Marer, *Dollar GNPs of the USSR and Eastern Europe* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1985).

[3]See George Kennan [writing as 'X'], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July, 1947), pp. 566-582.

[4]For the argument that domestic structures and politics are largely shaped by the international environment, see Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization,* Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 881-911; for the application of this theory to Soviet foreign policy, see Jack Snyder, "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," *World Politics,* Vol. 42, No. 1 (October, 1989).

[5]See Diplomaticheskaya Akademiya MID SSSR, *Vneshnaya politika i diplomatiya sotsialisticheskikh stran* (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1981), p. 93; and Elizabeth Teague, "Perestroika: the Polish Influence," *Survey*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (October, 1988). For specific calculations of Eastern Europe's value to Moscow, see: Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Has the Soviet Union Become a Liability to the Soviet Union? (I) The Political-Ideological Aspects," in Charles Gati, *The International Politics of Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 17-36; A. Ross Johnson, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union? (II) The Military Aspect," in Gati, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-58; Paul Marer, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union? (III) The Economic Aspect," in Gati, *op. cit., pp. 59-81*; Valerie Bunce, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-46; Marshall Goldman, *USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983), pp. 142-169; and Victor Winston, "The Soviet Satellites--Economic Liability?" *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January-February, 1958), pp. 14-20.

[6]For a treatment of what J. F. Brown calls the "viability-cohesion" dilemma, see *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its East European Allies: A Survey,* RAND Report No. R-1742-PR (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND Corporation, 1975; and Dawisha, *op. cit.* pp. 102-118.

[7]See H. Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), pp. 30-43; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1956); Malcolm Mackintosh, "Stalin's Policies towards Eastern Europe, 1939-1948; The General Picture," in Thomas Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers* (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 229-243. See also in the same volume Stephen Fischer-Galati, "The Communist Takeover of Rumania: A Function of Soviet Power," pp. 310-320; Nissan Oren, "A Revolution Administered: The Sovietization of Bulgaria," pp. 321-338; Susanne S. Lotarski, "The Communist Takeover in Poland," pp. 339-367; Hans W. Schoenberg, "The Partition of Germany and the Neutralization of Austria," pp. 368-384; Paul Ignotus, "The First Two Communist Takeovers of Hungary: 1919 and 1948," pp. 385-398; and Pavel Tigrid, "The Prague Coup of 1948: the Elegant Takeover," pp. 399-432.

[8]See Christopher D. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention," *World Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January, 1977), pp. 217-241; and Jan F. Triska, "Workers' Assertiveness and Soviet Policy Choices," in Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, eds., *Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 268-282.

[9]Paul Marer, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union: (II) The Economic Aspect," in Charles Gati, ed., *The International Politics of Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, pp. 59-81; Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," in Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds., *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism* (Lexington: Heath, 1974), pp. 231-260; and Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1976), pp. 166-212.

[10]See Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1952).

[11]See Dawisha, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-73; and Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 461-470; see also Christopher Jones' argument that the determining factor of Kremlin intervention is the desire to control the local Communist Party, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention," *World Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January, 1977), pp. 217-241.

[12]Some of the economic cost involved in reacting to the periodic explosions within the socialist commonwealth are not as obvious as the cost of military maneuvers. For examples of the price Moscow paid to Poland to crush Solidarity see Frank Lipsius, *The New York Times*, February 7, 1982, p. 19E; Paul Lewis, *The New York Times*, January 10, 1983, p. 4E; and *The Economist*, "Now Russia Asks for Time to Pay," February 6, 1982, pp. 73-74.

[13]See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 1-24.

[14]See William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982); Wojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); and John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), pp. 175-206.

[15]See for example, Vyacheslav Dashichev, "Vostok-Zapad: poisk novykh otnosheniy--o prioritetakh vneshney politiki Sovetskogo gosudarstva," *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* May 18, 1988, p. 14

[16]George Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 239.

[17]Evgeniy Primakov, Vladlen Martynov, and Herman Diligenskiy, "Nekotorikh problemy novogo myshleniya," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya,* [*Meimo*] No. 6, 1989, p. 6.

[18]George Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), pp. 239, 237-238.

[19]See Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974) p., 546.

[20]See Jan F. Triska, "Workers' Assertiveness and Soviet Policy Choices," in Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, *Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 268-282

[21]For Beijing's role in Soviet-East European relations see Trond Gilberg, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Eastern Europe," in Herbert J. Ellison, ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective* (Seattle and London: The University of Washington Press, 1982), pp. 268-294.

[22]*Szabad Nep,* July 12, 1953, as cited in United Nations Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe, 1954*, p. 39.

[23]United Nations Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe, 1954*, pp. 37-55; Nicolas Spulber, *op. cit.,* pp. 166-212; and Frederic Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp. 252-259.

[24]*East Europe*, Vol. 10, No. 8 (August, 1960), pp. 42-45.

[25]Ulam, *op. cit.*, p. 548.

[26]For elaborations on the issue of reliability, both for internal Pact discipline and in case of East-West conflict, see Ivan Volgyes, *The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982); Daniel N. Nelson, ed., *Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984); and A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (New York: Crane Russack, 1982) especially pp. 147-149.

[27]See Frederic Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp. 252-259 and 434-436; Lipsius, *op. cit.*; and Lewis, *op. cit.*

[28]Jan Vanous and Michael Marrese, *The Wall Street Journal,* January 15, 1982, p. 24. For an analysis of Vanous' and Marrese' methods see Josef C. Brada, "Interpreting the Soviet Subsidization of Eastern Europe," *International Organization,* Vol. 42, No. 4 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 639-658.

[29]See Jan Vanous, "East European Economic Slowdown," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July-August, 1982), pp. 1-19.

[30]Bogdan Mieczkowski, *Personal and Social Consumption in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 282.

[31]United Nations Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe, 1957*, p. 19.

[32]*Ibid.*, pp. 19, 23.

[33]See Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1986).

[34]Konstantin Rokossovsky, the Polish-born Soviet Marshal serving as Polish minister of defense, reportedly warned the Kremlin that the Polish army would fight any Soviet invasion, Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes,* Translated and edited by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), f. 24, pp. 114-115.

[35]Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe: A Soviet Perspecitive* (Berkeley, Ca.: Institute for International Studies, 1983), p. 189.

[36]See Gilberg, *op. cit.*

[37]Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, op. cit.,* p. 122.

[38]Declaration of the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, *Pravda,* November 22, 1957, pp. 1-2.

[39]Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Soviet Subsidization, op. cit.,* pp. 186-191.

[40]Jeffrey Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems Command and Control* (Boulder, Co. and London: Westview Press, 1985), p. 21.

[41]Keith Crane, *Eastern Eurcpe's Economic Contribution to Soviet Defense,* RAND Paper, No. P-7455 (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND Corporation, August, 1988), pp. 2-4. Crane used 1986 as the year for the comparison, and so figures for 1955-1964 would be lower, but significant nonetheless.

[42]*Ibid.*

[43]For a general picture of Soviet-East European defense burden-sharing see Condoleezza Rice, "Defense Burden-Sharing?" in David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp, (eds.), *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition* (London: Macmillen, 1984), pp. 55-87.

[44]Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers,* translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 517. Also see Khrushchev's speech, *Pravda,* Jan 15, 1960, p. 3.

[45]Khrushchev in *Pravda,* Jan 15, 1960, p. 3.

[46]Khruschev, *Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit.,* p. 516.

[47]For an elaboration of the evolution of Soviet strategic thinking see David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983) esp. pp. 27-86. For differing views on the impact of nuclear weapons on war and foreign policy, including such issues as assured destruction and counterforce versus countervalue strategies, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*

(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959); and Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).

[48]See for example General M. A. Gareev, *M. V. Frunze, Military Theorist* (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988) p. 216; and Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, "Voennaya Strategiya," in *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya,* Vol. 3 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), pp. 564-565.

[49]Marshal V. G. Kulikov, "Chetvert' veka na strazhe zavoevanniy sotsializma i mira", *Krasnaya Zvezda,* No. 5 (May, 1980), pp. 20-28.

[50]Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The European Alliance Systems: Expoitation or Mutual Aid?" in Gati, *op. cit.,* p. 235.

[51]Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviets, the Warsaw Pact, and the Eastern European Militaries," in William E. Griffith (ed.), *Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 149-150.

[52]Volgyes, *The Political Reliability, op. cit.,* pp. 17-23; and Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, *op. cit.,* p. 149.

[53]Volgyes, *op. cit.,* p. 9.

[54]*Ibid.,* p. 3.

[55]Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit.,* p. 515.

[56]Khrushchev in *Pravda,* Jan 15, 1960, p. 4.

[57]Marshall I. Goldman, "A Balance Sheet of Soviet Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 43, No. 2 (January, 1965), p. 359; and Nadia Derkach, *The Differences in Soviet Portrayal of Their Aid to Underdeveloped Countries in English and Russian,* RAND Paper No. P-2853 (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND Corporation, January, 1964).

[58]For Soviet growth rates during the period, 1955-1964, see United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *USSR, Measures of Economic Growth, 1950-1980* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 56-57. For measures of East European growth, see Jan Vanous, *op. cit.,* p. 2.

[59]United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *op. cit.* pp. 15-16.

[60]See for example L. Zevin, "Vzaimnaya Vygoda Ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskaikh i razvivayushchikhsya stran," *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* No. 2, 1965, p. 73; and I. Dudinskiy, "Toplivno-syr'evaya problema Stran SEV i puti ee Resheniya," *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* No. 4, 1966, p. 85.

[61]Marshall I. Goldman, "Economic Revolution in the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 45, No. 2 (January, 1967), pp. 319-331.

[62]See United Nations Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe, 1969,* p. 36.

[63]For a description and analysis of the Liberman reforms see Marshall Goldman, "Economic Revolution," *op. cit.*

[64]For a description of the events leading to Novotny's fall and the Prague Spring, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[65]The Action Program is translated in Robin Alison Remington, ed., *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis* (Cambridge, Ma.: The MIT Press, 1969), pp. 88-137.

[66]See Karen Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring,* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984), pp. 15, 23-24, 40, 151-152.

[67]For evidence that Ulbricht and Gomulka were at the fore of efforts to crush the Czechoslovak reforms see Karen Dawisha, *op. cit.,* pp. 31, 39, 45; Henry Kamm's reporting that Ulbricht led the call for the Dresden Conference, *The New York Times,* March 26, 1968, pp. 1, 20; and Zdenek Mlynar's claim that Ulbricht and Gomulka were the to suggest openly military intervention at the May 9 Moscow meeting, trnaslated by Paul Wilson, *Nightfrost in Prague* (New York: Karz Publishers, 1980), p. 206.

[68]For discussions of Moscow's options and analyses of the Soviet decision to invade see Karen Dawisha, *op. cit.;* and Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

[69]The Soviet troop strength comes from Soviet Lt. General Eduard Vorobyev, Commander of the Central Group of Soviet Forces, from an interview on Czechoslovak radio at 2300 GMT, November 30, 1989, *Foreign Broadcast Infromation Service,* EEU-89-230, December 1, 1989, p. 30. A Western corroboration of that figure can be found in Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power in Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 450.

[70]Dawisha, *op. cit.,* p. 373.

[71]See Remington, *op. cit.,* pp. 324-367.

[72]See Simon, *op. cit.,* pp. 83-87.

[73]Professor of Economics A. M. Birman in "Reforma god pyatyy," *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Vol. 41, No. 7, February 11, 1970, p. 10 complained that the regime was backing away from planned reforms and that the economic bureaucracy was emasculating experiments

already underway. Under Gorbachev, Viktor Sheinis argued that the invasion marked a general turn toward orthodoxy by the Brezhnev regime, *Izvestia*, October 13, 1989, p. 6.

[74]See A. M. Birman, *op. cit.*

[75]See Henry Wilcox Schaefer, *Comecon and the Politics of Integration* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 39-60.

[76]*Pravda*, October 29, 1969, p. 1.

[77]"K novim sversheniyam," *Pravda*, January 13, 1970, p. 1

[78]*Pravda*, April 13, 1970, pp. 1-2.

[79]*Statistical Yearbook, 1973,* (New York: United Nations, 1974), Table B, as cited in Hutchings, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

[80]Daniel N. Nelson, "Eastern Europe and the Non-Communist World," in Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., *Eastern Europe in the 1980's* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 204.

[81]See for example O. Bogomolov, "Razvitie stran SEV po puti ekonomicheskoy integratsii," *Kommuinist*, No. 16, 1971, pp. 72-84; and O. Chukanov, "Sotsialisticheskaya ekonomicheskaya integratsiya i nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya," *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1971, pp. 80-92.

[82]See the report on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Pravda*, June 6, 1972; and Nikolai Shmelyev, "Novye gorizonty ekonomicheskikh svyazey," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, No. 1, 1973, pp. 4-15.

[83]The international, or world division of labor was the justification for economic interdependence with the West in the Soviet theoretical literature at this time. See for example Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p. 4; and A. M. Alekseev, *et. al., Mezhdunarodnye Valyutno-Finansovye i Kreditnye Otnosheniya* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1984), p. 49.

[84]Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[85]See Vladimir G. Treml, *"Perestroyka* and Soviet Statistics," *Soviet Economy*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January-March, 1988); and V. P. Orlov, "Illyuzii i realnost ekonomicheskoy informatsiy," *EKO*, 1988, No. 8, pp. 3-20.

[86]See William M. Reisinger, "East European Military Expenditures in the 1970's: Collective Good or Bargaining Offer?" *International Organization*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter, 1983), pp. 143-155.

[87]The statistics are taken from Thad P. Alton, Gregor Lazarcik, Elizabeth M. Bass, and Wassyl Znayenko, "Defense Expenditures in Eastern Europe, 1965-1976," in *East European Economies Post Helsinki: a Compendium of Papers* (Washington, D. C.: Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, August 25, 1977), pp. 271, 270. For the difficulties involved in calculating expenditures see pp. 267-269; and Reisinger, *op. cit.,* pp. 144-145.

[88]Joseph C. Brada, "Interpreting the Soviet Subsidization of Eastern Europe," *International Organization,* Vol. 42, No. 4 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 639-640.

[89]See Eleftherios N. Botsas, "Patterns of Trade," in Fischer-Galati, *op. cit.,* pp. 97-111.

[90]See Jan Vanous and Michael Marrese, *The Wall Street Journal,* January 15, 1982, p. 24; as well as their *Soviet Subsidization of Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe: A Soviet Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983).

[91]Dollar GNP was converted from rubles at .65 ruble/dollar, the commercial rate which Marrese and Vanous used. They used 1982 dollars. The overall amount of Soviet subsidies remains relatively unaffected by differences in ruble-dollar conversion ratios and methods according to Marrese and Vanous, *Soviet Subsidization, op, cit.,* p. 147. The 1980 GNP ruble figure comes from Paul Marer, *op, cit.,* p. 18. The Soviet GNP growth rate for 1980 comes from United States Congress, *Measures of Soviet GNP in 1982 Prices: A Study Presented to the Joint Economic Committee* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November, 1990), pp. 76-77.

[92]See Elizabeth Ann Goldstein, "Soviet Economic Assistance to Poland, 1980-81," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 1982; Frank Lipsius, *op. cit.*; Paul Lewis, *op. cit.*; Paul Lewis, *The New York Times,* January 8, 1982, p. A1; Steven Rattner, *The New York Times,* January 5, 1982, p. D1; and *The Economist, op. cit.;*

[93]Bunce, *op. cit.,* p. 21.

[94]Jeanne Kirk Laux, "The Limits of Autonomy: Romania in the 1980's," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Eastern European Economic Assessment, Part II* (Washington, D. C., 1981), pp. 107-127.

[95]*Pravda,* August 20, 1980, p. 4.

[96]For a discussion of the Gdansk Agreement see Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 57-62.

[97]*The New York Times,* November 15, 1980, p. A5.

[98]Konstantin Chernenko, *"Velikoe Yedinstvo Partii i Naroda," Kommunist,* No. 17, 1980, pp. 10-27.

[99]Leonid I. Brezhnev. *Report of the Central Committe of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy,* Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1981, p. 14.

[100]*Pravda,* June 12, 1981, p. 2.

[101]*Pravda,* December 14, 1981, p. 1.

[102]Edwina Moreton. "The Soviet Union and Poland's Struggle for Self-Control," *International Security,* vol. 7, no. 1 (Summer 1982), p. 91.

[103]Sydney I: Ploss. *Moscow and the Polish Crisis* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 27.

[104]*Pravda,* June 12, 1981, *op. cit.*

[105]Brezhnev, *op. cit.,* and *Ibid.*

[106]Richard D. Anderson, Jr., "Soviet Decision-Making and Poland," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 31, No. 2 (March-April, 1982), p. 24.

[107]Simon, *op. cit.,* pp. 168-172.

[108]*Ibid.,* p. 169.

[109]*Strategic Survey, 1980-1981* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 74.

[110]For the connection between events in Poland and reform in the Soviet Union, see Diplomaticheskaya Akademiya MID SSSR, *Vneshnaya politika i diplomatiya sotsialisticheskikh stran* (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1981), p. 93; and Elizabeth Teague, "Perestroika: the Polish Influence", *Survey,* Vol. 30, No. 3 (October, 1988).

[111]For an example of the Soviet view on this, see Alexander Bovin, "Vneshnaya Politika i Perestoika," *Izvestia,* June 16, 1988, p. 5. For the numbers and characteristics of the GLCMs and Pershing IIs, see *The Military Balance, 1986-1987* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), p. 200.

[112]*Ibid.*

[113]See Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp. 47, 233, and 266.

Chapter 4: The Process and Politics of Change

Introduction

Recall that the main methodological hypothesis from this study's introduction is that three basic analytical models were required in order to understand Soviet foreign policy: chapter 3 explained the Soviet-East European relationship in terms of costs and benefits, and emphasized the goals of Soviet foreign policy, both in terms of the international system and internal ideology; in this chapter a model based on bureaucratic politics and elite conflict, underscored by cognitive theories which explain how and why the ideological and policy views of the relevant actors changed, demonstrates how those actors who desired change were able to achieve their goals, and how final policy was influenced by this process.

Method and Theoretical Framework of the Domestic Politics Model

When Gorbachev took office in March 11, 1985 he was not a crypto-radical who planned to disguise his intention of dismantling the Soviet system from his fellow Communist leaders until they no longer possessed the power to stop him. Nor was he a typical Party apparatchik who allowed himself to be swept up by Soviet society's thirst for change. Though it would be impossible to know for sure what the Soviet leader was thinking and when he was thinking it, the evidence suggests a middle view. The General secretary of the CPSU was a very open-minded and skillful poli ician with two primary and interrelated goals: to increase the authority of the CPSU by opening it up to greater popular participation; and to improve the living standard of the Soviet population. For tactical political reasons he did over the course of his tenure conceal some of his ideas for reform. It was only logical that Gorbachev should keep some of his plans to himself. After all, a shrewd politician does not tell those whose jobs he plans to eliminate and

invalidate of his intentions, when at the same time he depends on their support. On the other hand, it is impossible to prove that the Soviet leader knew when he entered office what the result of his initial policies would be, because those initial policies released social and political forces which he himself could not control, and which altered his original goals. Nevertheless, Gorbachev for a time was able to use his ability to learn and adapt to new information and new pressures in order to maintain his position and achieve some of his goals. Those who could not adapt along with him, he tossed aside.

In this examination of the effect of the policy process there are two foreign policy theories that can be used as an analytical framework. The first is motivated bias. As explained in the introduction, motivated bias explains policy-making from the point of view of the formative experiences, or institutional perspectives of the policy-makers. Put simply, a group of leaders comes to power determined to make changes in a given direction. In one sense, the desire for change, even if only by a slight degree, is quite natural to anybody with political ambitions. All politicians, regardless of system of government, want to believe that they alone have something unique and beneficial to offer their countries. The profession of politics seldom, if ever, calls to individuals who regard themselves to be interchangeable cogs.

In another sense, the motivation for change can be tactical; politicians often adopt particular views in order to position themselves differently from competitors for power. In the Soviet Union, both motivations played a role in every struggle for succession, including Gorbachev's.[1] There is no doubt that Mikhail Gorbachev, because of temperment and experience, came to power as a genuine reformer, confident in his ability to improve the condition of his country and willing to consider methods which previous leaders considered unorthodox, if not heretical. When Gorbachev's ideological orientation is considered, his attempts to discredit his competitors for political power

can be understood as a relatively straightforward clash of values. According to this explanation, Gorbachev desired power in order to promote his reformist agenda.

Being like any other ambitious politician, however, Gorbachev also desired power for its own sake, and consequently had a powerful motivation to adopt positions that would distinguish him from his competitors for leadership. Indeed, for tactical purposes, both Stalin and Khrushchev adopted political positions during their struggles for leadership, which they abandoned once they discredited rivals and acquired power. Though somewhat of an oversimplification, in the political-economic debates following Lenin's death, Stalin first aligned himself against the left (most notably Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev) and advocated a continuation of the alliance between the Party and the peasantry; after the right discredited the left, Stalin switched positions and succesfully discredited the Right Opposition (Tomsky, Rykov, and Bukharin). Khrushchev first condemned Georgi Malenkov for advocating a reduction in investment in heavy industry and the policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, then adopted both positions after forcing Malenkov to give up the leadership of the Party. Similarly, Gorbachev also had powerful political incentives initially for adopting reformist positions: his main rivals for power, Viktor Grishin and Grigory Romanov, held anti-reformist views very similar to those of Leonid Brezhnev and Konstantin Chernenko. It would make no sense for Gorbachev to try to discredit political competitors holding his political views. According to this explanation, Gorbachev possessed a motivated bias, or ulterior motive for his reformism, the desire to be General secretary of the CPSU. Both this explanation and Gorbachev's genuine desire to improve the Soviet system are true to some extent.

The degree to which the latter explanation pertains can be refined further by applying the foreign policy theory of complex learning, which helps to explain both why

the regime's values as a whole evolved, and why certain actors' views evolved. It is used to show how those who think about foreign policy: academics, advisors, and policy-makers, learn from past mistakes to alter their country's behavior. Complex learning theory fits into the bureaucratic politics model and motivated bias theory quite nicely, because the process of learning involves persuasion, or teaching. Someone must prepare the lesson. Obviously not everybody derives the same lessons from the same experiences. In politics, those who share the same biases tend to take the same lessons from national experiences. In the United States, for example, many liberals took from the country's intervention in Vietnam a belief that all types of intervention in the Third World were a bad idea. Some conservatives, on the other hand, were persuaded by America's failure in that case that the intervention in such cases should be complete and overwhelming so as not to suffer defeat again.

Another element of learning is that not everybody learns the same lessons at the same pace. Andrey Sakharov derived lessons from the arms race which the leadership of his country was not ready to accept for twenty years. Khrushchev's colleagues, in part removed him because they could not accept his views on national defense and security. Later Gorbachev learned the lessons which Khrushchev failed to impart to his peers, and the people who provided Gorbachev with those lessons, at least at first, were a number of academics in the field of economics, sociology, and international affairs who had advocated economic, ideological, and political changes which were not implemented for several years. For example, the liberal sociologist, Tatyana Zaslavskaya responded to Stephen Cohen's suggestion that in the years following Khrushchev's ouster a community of reformers existed within the Party at different scholarly and academic institutes waiting for leaders who would give life to their ideas:

> I think that is an accurate image. But it was a very long wait. In the 1970's [Abel] Agenbegyan [later one of Gorbachev's economic advisors] had a favorite toast: 'We will outlive them.' And if such people had not worked on all our country's problems for all those years, no political leadership could have started *perestroyka*. People had to do the groundwork first.[2]

Khruschev's removal brings us to the final element of learning and motivated bias as they relate to decision-making: the result of powerful actors possessing different biases, and learning different lessons at different speeds is domestic political conflict. In Gorbachev's case he was strong enough politically to survive challenges to his authority and his policies when directed from conservative opposition, and adaptable enough to concede and learn when challenged from the liberal opposition which his policies permitted. Indeed, I will show that conservative opposition to Gorbachev's policies had little effect on his policies until after the Communist regimes collapsed in 1989. Hesitancy and wavering on his part, especially after 1988, may have reflected fear of conservative opposition to his policies and political future, but it is difficult to distinguish hesitancy of this kind from genuine indecision based on the fear of the social consequences of a misstep. It was not until the implications of his policies threatened the integrity of the union itself that Gorbachev turned back to conservative elements for support at the end of 1990.

Gorbachev often bent to the will of more liberal elements in Soviet society because it was safer to follow the majority at crossroads of decision. That the majority of the Soviet population favored political democratization and liberalization is deduced from the electoral success of noted liberals like Andrey Sakharov, Anatoly Sobchak, Gavril Popov, Sergey Stankevich, and Boris Yeltsin. In the sphere of economic reform, Gorbachev's hesitancy reflected the ambivalence of the Soviet population, who wanted to enjoy the benefits of the market but did not want to pay the costs, i.e. unemployment, an

end to subsidies. In foreign policy he evinced no such trepidation because he knew, or thought he knew, what the consequences of his actions would be, and because the Soviet people overwhelmingly favored his policy of retrenchment.[3]

Methodologically, in order to demonstrate the relevance of motivated bias, learning, and the governmental politics model to the Soviet foreign policy-making process it will be necessary to show the following: (1) Gorbachev and his colleagues held reformist ideas before they took power; (2) once in power, the reformists learned that their previous conceptions of the means required to achieve their political and economic goals would be insufficient; (3) deep disagreements existed and deepened between the increasingly radical Gorbachev reformers, and other actors, both individual and institutional, within the leadership; and (4) those disagreements were resolved either through compromise if Gorbachev did not feel himself strong enough to overwhelm his opposition, or simply by overwhelming his opposition.

It should be emphasized that Gorbachev's political maneuvering was extremely adroit in that until he alienated the Soviet public in late 1990, he always managed to keep himself in the center of the Soviet political spectrum. He used the public desire for change to motivate the *apparat*, and he used the power of the *apparat* to caution the public about demanding too much too soon. As Soviet society moved further and further to the left Gorbachev moved further to the left. Of course, it should be remembered that without his initial efforts Soviet society's political journey would have been much more difficult. As the Gorbachev leadership's policy of *glasnost* allowed the Soviet people a better view of the damage which Gorbachev's predecessors in the Kremlin had wrought on the country, large segments of the public demanded more and more ideological capitulation from its leaders. Each step left which Gorbachev took in both domestic and

foreign policy, dating from March 11, 1985, took Eastern Europe one step further from Soviet control.

Specifically regarding Eastern Europe, Gorbachev faced little opposition in backing away from the Brezhnev Doctrine until it was too late for his opponents to do anything about it. There are several reasons for this. First, Gorbachev himself was not clear about what he wanted from the Soviet-East European relationship; he knew only what he did not want. He did not want to use violent means to support regimes which lacked indigenous popular support, because the costs exceeded the benefits. This was evinced by his foreign minister's statements: "it is easier to change our policies than their people," and "Perestroyka should not be blamed for the destruction of the political structure of Europe. It has been destroyed by the will of peoples no longer willing to put up with violence. The undermining of faith in Socialism based on suppression and violence began in the 1940's, not in 1985.[4]

Second, it is doubtful that the Soviet leaders and experts expected or attempted to facilitate the rapid and complete collapse of Communism within Eastern Europe, despite the claim of the current Deputy Director of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe, "The events which took place in Eastern Europe in the last months of 1989 were in many respects the crowning success of the recent Soviet European policy, and they confirmed several positive tendencies."[5] It is more likely that Gorbachev wanted Eastern Europe to follow the Soviet pattern than to set an example, though he did not hesitate to use that example as a warning to conservatives within his own Party.

Mikhail Gorbachev dominated the foreign policy-making process in the Soviet Union to a greater degree than any other Soviet leader except Stalin. He did this in three steps. First he implicitly linked foreign policy to domestic reform by giving reform the highest political priority, which served both to justify and to spur efforts to lessen international tension and seek greater economic integration. Eastern Europe, as an area of interest by itself, was a relatively low priority. At the same time, the ideological transformation which he introduced obviated the rationale for Brezhnev's foreign policy. Finally, in terms of tactics, Gorbachev always kept himself in the center of the political debate, thus assuring that both left and right (democrats and orthodox Communists, respectively) felt that he was the only alternative to political calamity. A perfect example of this dynamic was Gorbachev's threatened resignation as head of the CPSU in the face of strong criticism from conservatives at the founding Congress of the Russian Communist Party in June 1990. Ivan Polozkov, the orthodox Marxist chosen by the Congress to lead the new party, expressed a willingness to work with Gorbachev.6

Over the course of the four and a half years between his succession and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, the entire political spectrum moved to the left, and he, always remaining in the center, moved left with it. (For the purposes of this discussion, left means toward reform and liberalization, and right means in opposition to change and orthodoxy).7 As he did so, he left conservatives behind and brought liberals in.

His task was made easier by the fact that the conservatives (the entrenched bureaucracy and provincial party officials) were the slowest to adapt to the conditions of *glasnost* and *democratizatsiia* which Gorbachev had introduced as new means of exercising political leverage. It was natural that those people most hostile and resistant to open political dialogue be least adept at it. Gorbachev used this situation to his

advantage. First, as the entire country moved left he consolidated his power by bringing in his allies to the top leadership. Ligachev was hardly a conservative by the standards of 1985. Then Gorbachev used allies like Ligachev and Shevardnadze to isolate and squeeze out those who remained hostile to his ideas. Third, he created institutions (the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, and an increasingly unfettered mass media), which were independent of the Party as another base for authority and power. Finally, he used public dissatisfaction to force out unpopular conservatives, thus squeezing his political opponents between the public and his own leadership allies.

To show why Gorbachev and others in his regime were so willing to consider and embrace far reaching, even revolutionary change within the Soviet Union and the outside world, that is, to illustrate their bias, it is necessary to examine what they believed before they came to power, and if possible why they differed from their predecessors. The Soviet leader was definitely reform-minded; he may have muted some of his views and even from time to time concealed some of his ideas but Gorbachev did not disguise his essential political philosophy. He was quite openly an undogmatic, rational thinker about whom Deng Xiao Ping's oft-quoted remark, "No matter whether the cat is black or white, if it catches mice, it's a good cat," is more appropriate than to Deng himself.[8]

Former Communist political prodigy Len Karpinsky told an American interviewer that when he met Gorbachev in 1963 the Soviet leader was already espousing reformist ideas.[9] In May 1978 Gorbachev, then First secretary of the Stavropol' province Party Committee wrote a memorandum to the Central Committee of the CPSU in which he argued for the need to overhaul the entire Soviet agricultural system. The highly heretical memorandum, which was kept confidential until the

arrival of *glasnost* years later, laid out all the basic economic ideas of what later came to be known as *perestroyka.*[10] Gorbachev himself said that his doubts about the *status quo* grew out of his experience as First secretary of the Stavropol' province during the 1970's. Like many others in the provinces he said he could observe "the true processes which were occurring in society and came to believe that it was impossible to continue this way."[11] Between 1982 and 1985 when he was the Central Committee member nominally charged with responsibility for overseeing the entire economy he asked for studies not only on previous Communist reforms but on the reforms carried out under Tsar Nicholas II's Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin.[12] Now a People's Deputy, Tatyana Zaslavskaya implied that Gorbachev long held radical views, but did not express them for political reasons.[13] In 1983 Gorbachev commissioned Zaslavskaya and Abel Agenbegyan, to write a study on the true state of the Soviet economy for him. The study, known as the Novosibirsk document earned Zaslavskaya a reprimand from local Party officials after someone gave a copy to Western correspondents.[14] Four months before Chernenko died Gorbachev spoke at a Central Committee meeting of the need for 'revolutionary decisions', and *'perestroyka* of economic management,' as well as competition, democratization, and *glasnost.*[15]

It seems quite logical that Gorbachev and his generation would be significantly more liberal and open-minded than previous generations. First, he was the first General secretary of the Communist Party to have starte 1 his career after Stalin's death. Gorbachev's career, unlike Chernenko's, Andropov's, Brezhnev's, and the rest of their generation, did not benefit from Stalin's purges. As Archie Brown wrote, "What can be fairly argued is that a Soviet citizen who began his full-time career in 1955 had a better chance of retaining or acquiring a relatively open mind than one who first set foot on the bottom rung of the ladder 20 years earlier."[16] Gorbachev was twenty-five years

old and in his first year of his full-time career with the Komsomol when the Twentieth Party Congress was held and Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his crimes. The first Congress which he attended was the Twenty-Second, in which Khrushchev openly expanded his denunciations of Stalin and Stalinism. Many of Gorbachev's current advisors were scholars and politicians who were profoundly influenced by the brief thaw which occurred after the Twentieth Party Congress, and who were also shunted aside by Brezhnev and Suslov following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.[17]

Georgi Smirnov, from 1985-1987 Gorbachev's personal aide for ideology, and since then the director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism said of Gorbachev's generation, "We are all children of the Twentieth Party Congress." Aleksandr Bovin, the foreign affairs columnist for *Izvestia* also used those words.[18] Smirnov confirmed that Gorbachev was known to favor change before he was selected to replace Chernenko, "When Gorbachev became [G]eneral secretary, he was determined to reopen all policy questions. There was a mood of renewal and great enthusiasm at the Central Committee."[19] Smirnov was not simply jumping on the band wagon; he could point to an article which he had written for the Party journal *Kommunist* in 1964 in which he advocated a decentralization of economic management, greater market-oriented production criteria, and mass participation in government.[20] Gorbachev, himself said before a gathering of cultural leaders in the Kremlin in November, 1990 that in discussions with Eduard Shevardnadze in April, 1985, before Chernenko's death, that he and his future foreign minister agreed that "everything was rotten," in the system and would have to be changed.[21]

It is possible that Gorbachev came to his position with a more open mind than any of his predecessors possibly because unlike the older generation he was able to enjoy a relatively broad university education where he was exposed to a wider range of ideas

than his predecessors. He received his law degree from full-time study at Moscow State University rather than having received an agronomy or technical degree as a result of correspondence courses while engaged in full-time Party work. Moreover, after taking his degree he returned to the provinces to live among the farmers in Stavropol' rather than with the bureaucrats in Moscow. The fact that he saw life as it it existed for the majority rather than through limousine windows in Moscow may also have contributed to his broad outlook.[22]

Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gorbachev's closest advisor, explained that Gorbachev learned before other leaders of the need to implement the ideas of thinkers like Smirnov, Zaslavskaya, and others. He explained also that Gorbachev and his allies learned once in office that that they would have to move even further than they had initially anticipated:

> Circumstances had been demanding changes. The time for change had already come, it was knocking at the door, but Gorbachev understood earlier than others that the door had to be opened. His special political abilities and education made things move faster. And you must understand that it wasn't until 1985 that we learned just how bad things really were, particularly in our economic and financial affairs.[23]

Indeed, Mikhail Gorbachev did not enter office with a **specific** plan for revamping the Soviet political and economic system, let alone for transforming Europe. Yakovlev wrote that when the new leaders took over they did not know which way to go because so much was wrong.[24] At the Central Committee plenum in January, 1987, Gorbachev admitted:

> We see that changes for the better are occurring slowly, that the task of restructuring has turned out to be more difficult than it had appeared to us earlier, and that the causes of the problems that have built up in

> society are more deeply rooted than we had believed. The deeper we move into the work of restructuring, the clearer its scale and significance become; more and more unsolved problems **inherited from the past** [author's emphasis] are coming to light....
>
> Superficial conceptions about Communism and different types of prophesies and abstractions achieved a certain currency. This consequently diminished the historical significance of socialism and weakened the influence of the socialist ideology.[25]

He told the Polish Sejm in July, 1988, after the 19th CPSU Conference, "I tell you frankly: we did not come to an understanding of the necessity and inevitability of [politcal reform] immediately. The lessons of the past, life itself, and the experience of the first stage of restructuring brought us here."[26] His speeches and actions in the immediate aftermath of assuming office contained as many similarities as differences to those of his predecessors. It was only after he saw that no less than a revolutionary transformation of the entire Soviet system would be necessary in order to revitalize the Soviet Union that he revised Soviet foreign policy toward Eastern Europe. Both the realization on the part of the regime that structural, radical reform was necessary within the Soviet Union, and that this degree of reform had strong implications for relations with Eastern Europe, reflected regime learning.

At the Central Committee Plenum in April 1985, the first since Chernenko's death, Gorbachev spoke in terms remarkably similar to those spoken by Leonid Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in 1981.[5] Both blamed the West, and above all the United States, exclusively for the arms race, for tensions between East and West, and for the violence and oppression which existed in the Third World. Neither admitted that problems existed in the relations among the states of the socialist commonwealth. Gorbachev mentioned nothing in his speech about revising or eliminating the two largest ideological impediments to the transformation of Soviet relations with Eastern Europe: Soviet belief in the class character of international relations, and socialist

internationalism, known in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine. That same month, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies extended the Warsaw Treaty for thirty years, a period considered much too long by all the allies except for Poland and Bulgaria.[27]

At the Tenth Polish United Workers' Party Congress in Warsaw on July 1, 1986 Gorbachev praised the decision to impose martial law and Jaruzelski's handling of the crisis, and he implied gratitude for sparing the USSR the necessity of invasion. He argued, "To threaten the socialist system, to try to undermine it from the outside and wrench a country away from the socialist community means to encroach not only on the will of the people, but also on the entire post-war arrangement, and, in the last analysis, on peace." He further claimed, "The Polish crisis was not a protest of workers against socialism, but a show of disagreement with the distortions of socialism that pained the working class. It was the adversaries of Poland inside the country and outside who managed to take advantage of this disagreement. We know what is sought by those in the West who hypocritically describe themselves as friends of the Polish people. They are not in the least concerned about the destinies of the Polish nation. Their intention is to dismantle socialism, to liquidate socialist gains...."[28]

The foreign policy plank of the Program of the 27th Party Congress was quite similar to its predecessor. On relations within the socialist community the Program emphasized unity over diversity, and solidarity in the face of a Western threat over cooperation and mutual interdependence:

> The CPSU considers it its international duty together with the other fraternal parties to strengthen the unity and increase the might and influence of the socialist community. The course of socialism's competition with capitalism and the future of world civilization depend to an enormous extent on the socialist community's stability, the successes of each country's creative activity, and the purposefulness and coordinated nature of their actions.

The Program further cautioned against the danger of imperialist subversion:

> The formation and development of the new society is occurring in a situation of sharp confrontation between the two world systems. In order to weaken socialism's positions and disrupt the reciprocal ties among the socialist states--and first and foremost the links with the Soviet Union--imperialism uses a whole system of various political, economic, and ideological measures, tries to speculate on problems that arise, and resorts to the use of nationalist sentiments for subversive ends. The CPSU proceeds on the basis that under these conditions the socialist countries' firm unity and class solidarity is of especially great importance.
>
> The experience of the USSR and world socialism shows that the most important factors of its successful forward movement are the loyalty of the ruling Communist and workers' parties to Marxist-Leninist teaching, the creative application of that teaching, the parties' firm ties with the broad masses of working people, the strengthening of their prestige and leading role in society, the strict attention to Leninist norms of party and state life, and the development of socialist people's power; sober consideration of the true situation and the timely and scientifically substantiated resolution of problems that arise; and the building of relations with the other fraternal countries on the foundation of the principles of socialist internationalism.
>
> Whatever the particular characteristics of each socialist country--its economic level, size, and historic and national traditions--**they all have the same interests** [author's emphasis]. What unites and rallies the socialist countries is the main thing and is immeasurably greater than what may divide them.[29]

Compare Gorbachev's warnings about imperialist subversion to Brezhnev's at the previous Party Congress:

> The imperialists and their accomplices are systematically conducting hostile campaigns against the socialist powers. They malign and distort everything that goes on in them. For them the main thing is to turn people against socialism.
>
> Recent events have shown again and again that our class opponents are learning from their defeats. Their actions against the socialist countries are increasingly refined and treacherous.
>
> And whenever in addition to imperialist subversive activity there are mistakes and miscalculations in home policy, there arise conditions that stimulate elements hostile to socialism. This is what has happened in fraternal Poland, where opponents of socialism supported by outside forces are, by stirring up anarchy, seeking to channel events into a counterrevolutionary course. As noted at the latest plenary meeting of the

> Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, the pillars of the socialist state in Poland are in jeopardy.[30]

It may be that Gorbachev's general agreement with Brezhnev on foreign policy stemmed from a lack of political confidence to effect change, but it is equally likely that his understanding of the need for foreign policy change resulted from cognitive changes. While he warned obliquely of conflict within the socialist community and the pernicious role of the class enemy, he also spoke of socialism's capacity to evolve:

> Generally speaking, one of the advantages of socialism is its ability to learn: to learn to solve the problems that life poses; to learn to avoid the crises which our class adversary tries to create and exploit; to learn to oppose attempts to divide the socialist world into layers and to pit countries against each other; to learn to obviate clashes of interest between different socialist states, to create a mutual harmony of those interests and to discover mutually acceptable solutions to even the most difficult problems.[31]

On the one hand he implied that any blame for problems between socialist states must rest with the West, and he emphasized the class, rather than state character of international relations by referring to the West as the "class adversary." On the other hand, he spoke of socialism's ability to learn. A strict Stalinist ideologue would argue that socialism did not need to learn anything because Marxism-Leninism was by definition a complete and revealed system for understanding events and guiding action. Gorbachev's recognition that socialism must learn implied that socialism required improvement, which in turn implied that socialism had failed in some of its endeavors.

The Turning Point

By the end of 1987 the Soviet leadership had reevaluated its foreign policy generally and toward Eastern Europe specifically. Ironically, Yegor Ligachev provided

one of the first indication of Moscow's new policy toward Eastern Europe. On a visit to Hungary in April, 1987, Ligachev, then the CPSU ideology chief, Second secretary, and the Kremlin's leading conservative, proclaimed, "Each individual country can act independently. In the past it used to be said that the orchestra was conducted by Moscow and that everybody else listened. That is no longer the case."[32] Given Ligachev's obvious opposition to the course of events in Eastern Europe which he expressed at the 28th Communist Party Congress shortly before his involuntary retirement in July, 1990, it is almost certain that the sentiments he delivered in Hungary were either insincere, or he had no idea how far Gorbachev and Eastern Europe were willing to go.

In response to questions from the editors of the Italian newspaper *L'Unita* in May of 1987 Gorbachev spoke of the lack of a need for a center for the Communist movement. In the context of discussions of the General secretary's recent visit to Czechoslovakia, and the Prague Spring, L'Unita posed the question, "Surmounting the old arrangements and forms of ties, how can one today understand the relations among the progressive forces of the entire world? How can internationalism be expressed today?" Gorbachev responded by arguing that international relations among Communists no longer required intervention (though he referred to that doctrine obliquely, calling it a "special mechanism"):

> Speaking of the Communist parties, each of them grew up on national soil. But, while expressing the fundamental interests of the working class and the working people of their countries, all of them have a common goal--peace and socialism. This is the main thing that unites them. At the same time internationalism is always concrete. Its effectiveness is determined by practical cooperation. To this end, in today's conditions any special mechanism, let alone a "center," is perfectly unnecessary and, more than that, contraindicated. I do not know any plans or proposals for its revival by any party. Not only does the determination of policy and forms of activity fall wholly within the jurisdiction of each individual party, cooperation itself is possible only on a voluntary and equal basis....

> If we are talking about relations among all progressive forces of today's world, then it is our belief that the problem of averting nuclear war is the foundation, the nucleus, and the core of relations among us. In our view, all other problems should be subordinated to this one....
>
> The world now is truly complex, contradictory and variegated--multicolored, so to speak. It can no longer be painted in just two colors: black and white or red and white....[33]

Gorbachev confirmed a definite reorientation of Kremlin policy in a speech to foreign delegates to the celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution's 70th anniversary on November 4. He volunteered that the Soviet Union needed to reexamine its reactions to the Prague Spring of 1968. He characterized Moscow's relationship with its East European neighbors as an "arrogance of omniscience," and he revealed, "We have satisfied ourselves that unity does not mean identity and uniformity. We have also become convinced of there being no 'model' of socialism to be emulated by everyone." Gorbachev also enumerated five principles which he said should characterize relations among the states of the Warsaw Treaty:

1) Unconditional and full equality;

2) The ruling party's responsibility for the state of affairs in the country;

3) Concern for the common cause of socialism;

4) Respect for one another, including voluntary and diverse cooperation; and

5) A strict observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence by all.[34]

Unfortunately, it was difficult for an East European leader like Poland's Wojtech Jaruzelski to act based upon those principles, because they were so ambiguous as to be useless as a guide to action, or even a basis for understanding the degree to which the Kremlin had altered its East European policy. For example, should Jaruzelski understand that Gorbachev, in arguing for "unconditional and full equality," meant that Poland had as

great a voice in determining CMEA and WTO policy as the USSR? Did the second principle indicate Moscow's belief that the PUWP should never share any of its power with with other elements of Polish society, or that the Party was accountable to Moscow for everything that occurred within the confines of Poland's borders, or that only the PUWP was free to determine policy within Poland, accepting interference from no one? Was "concern for the common cause of socialism" a kinder, gentler rehash of the Brezhnev Doctrine, or a suggestion for greater economic integration among CMEA countries in a period of economic deterioration and reform? Was the fourth principle more than a harmless platitude? Did "a strict observance of the principles peaceful coexistence by all," indicate that the USSR would no longer resort to armed force and intimidation in disputes within the bloc? These questions and others are impossible to answer without reference to the Soviet literature and an examination of Moscow's reaction to developments within Poland.

Further evidence supporting a sea change in Moscow's perspective on both transformations within and toward Eastern Europe came in the form of Oleg Bogomolov's article on the socialist world in transition which appeared in *Kommunist,* roughly coincident with Gorbachev's speech.[35] Recall from chapters 2 and 3 that Bogomolov articulated several reasons for the need to restructure the Soviet relationship with Eastern Europe. In his Report to the Central Committee at the 19th Party Conference on June 28, 1988 Gorbachev listed a series o' Soviet foreign policy initiatives which included: "our 'common European home',...defense sufficiency and the non-offensive doctrine, the scaling down of arms levels as a means of strengthening national and regional security, the recall of forces from foreign territories and dismantling of bases there, confidence-building measures, international economic security...." These

initiatives had obvious implications for Eastern Europe, and many indeed are coming to fruition. He continued:

> A key factor in the new thinking is the concept of freedom of choice. We are convinced that this is a universal principle for international relations at a time when the very survival of civilization has become the principal problem and common denominator of the world.
>
> This concept stems from the unprecedented and mounting diversity of the world. We are witnessing such a phenomenon as the active involvement in world history of millions upon millions of people who for centuries remained outside its pale. These millions are taking to the arena of independent history-making in entirely new conditions. In an environment of a universally growing national awareness they will yet have their say in taking the road of their own choice.
>
> In this situation the imposition of a social system, way of life, or policies from outside by any means, let alone military, are dangerous trappings of the past period. Sovereignty and independence, equal rights and non-interference are becoming universally recognized rules of international relations, which in itself is a major achievement of the 20th century. To oppose freedom of choice is to come out against the objective tide of history itself. That is why power politics in all their forms and manifestations are historically obsolescent.[36]

The first test of the sincerity of Gorbachev's new policy and its support within the Soviet Union occurred in Poland. Until, one of the bloc states actually tested Gorbachev's words and platitudes on relations within the bloc, none of Gorbachev's opponents would have any real reason for opposing him. After all, both Khrushchev and Brezhnev had issued proclamations about the right of each state to decide its own destiny, and Ligachev, who, as we shall see below, was quite hostile to the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, travelled to Hungary and made statements in support of East European independence. Clearly, it can be deduced that many people within the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, thought that Gorbachev's speeches on the subject were simply propaganda.

A wave of strikes in 1988 had again pushed the Polish regime to the point of confrontation with the country's workers. In 1989, in overwhelming contrast to virulently hostile coverage of Poland's first attempts at reform, and Gorbachev's own comments in July, 1986, the Soviet press encouraged the government's actions and the prospect of institutionalized pluralism within Poland. Following the 10th Plenum of the PUWP's Central Committee on January 18 in which Wojtech Jaruzelski pushed through several democratic reforms, *Izvestia* correspondent L. Toporkov commented enthusiastically:

> The process of renewal now coming to fruition in Poland can be succinctly described as one of "surmounting"--of surmounting schematic notions, dogmas and stereotypes, in a word, of surmounting the conservative mode of thought and action. It is no easy matter for people, particularly that segment of the Party and state administrative apparatus brought up on the "Polish variation" of the Short Course, to part with the old ways, with the ideology and the practice of the bureaucratic command system, nor is everyone prepared to understand what extensive democratization of life implies. Many people still consider themselves prisoners of the past. ...
>
> The document that sets forth the PUWP Central Committee position on the issue of political and trade union pluralism was published in today's newspapers. ...The PUWP Central Committee expresses its readiness to enter into a dialogue to seek forms of agreement with any constructive opposition force, provided it adheres to the Constitution. The Central Committee sees the need and the opportunity for the inclusion of constructive opposition forces in the political system, forces able to operate through such institutions as societies, political clubs, centers of social and political thought, and Deputy clubs affiliated with the new session of the Sejm.
>
> The PUWP Central Committee supports a strong and independent trade union-movement. It adheres to the principle that trade unions should be what the working people want them to be, There is reason to expect a great deal from the round-table discussion of these issues, including a determination of the organizational forms on which a broad national accord would be based....[37]

The Soviet press also reported on the Party-Solidarity agreement of April 5, 1989 dispassionately and objectively. *Izvestia* reported the constitutional changes in great detail, noting rather drily that the opposition was undertaking a greater role in

society. "Its representatives will take their place in Parliament where, incidentally, the Polish Communist Party will not have a majority." "Thus," continued the article "participation of the opposition in the official political life of the country has become fact. This inarguably has become the primary change that has occurred in society in recent months." *Izvestia* concluded by praising the Polish reforms, albeit faintly, for "putting to rest the myth that socialism cannot be subject to renewal."[38]

The Soviet press also reported Hungary's steps toward establishing a multi-party system in the same dispassionate manner.[39] It was impossible in the case of either Poland or Hungary to find any mention in the Soviet press of counterrevolution, imperialist subversion, anti-Sovietism, anti-socialism, or any the other negative monikers normally attached to East European experiments with pluralism. The strongest denunciation of either reform experiment came from Gorbachev himself. He responded to a question on Hungary's decision to allow opposition parties by calling the idea of doing the same **in the Soviet Union** [author's emphasis] "rubbish."[40] He did not, however, indicate that he believed such an approach was inappropriate for Hungary. Later, of course, he changed his mind about a multi-party system within the Soviet Union.

That the views of the General secretary and of the government as a whole evolved is beyond dispute, but the question remains as to why those views evolved? If Gorbachev in 1986 differed from his predecessors on the resolution of the Solidarity uprising, he did not say so. If his only fear regarding the disintegration of the Party's power in Poland was for disorder and anarchy, he could have based his support for the imposition of martial law on the ground that such a step was necessary to prevent the eruption of civil war, rather than phrase his reasoning in the ideological jargon of class conflict. Without the benefit of a personal interview, one can only speculate about the evolution of

the views of the General secretary or other leaders on the 1981 Polish events because they never explicitly articulated them.

There are several possible interpretations: (1) Gorbachev and his allies did not feel that they had enough power and authority in July, 1986 to disavow support for the crackdown; (2) they risked creating more instability in Poland through an even tacit condemnation of martial law; (3) they genuinely believed that Solidarity represented a threat to peace and order; (4) they had not yet come to believe that pluralism within Poland or any socialist state was ideologically acceptable; (5) or some combination of the above. Judging by factional political maneuvering and the substantial evidence of learning on the part of Gorbachev and his supporters with regard to the necessity for pluralism within the Soviet Union, the most likely explanation is that both the need to establish more power and an evolution of their views colored their actions. When the Gorbachev team did make decisions on policy directions it seems that it simply jettisoned personnel who either opposed or could not adapt to its unfolding foreign policy.

Leadership Politics, Personnel, and Foreign Policy

Gorbachev has exercised more control over personnel more quickly than any other Soviet leader, including Stalin (if one dates Stalin's leadership from 1924).[41] He began to secure his position immediately. In April, 1985 he added Viktor Chebrikov, Yegor Ligachev, and Nikolai Ryzhkov to full-membership of the Politburo. In June, Georgi Razumovskiy, a Gorbachev ally, succeeded Ligachev as head of the Central Committee department of organizational-party work, which oversees party personnel.[42] In July, Gorbachev sent Grigori Romanov into retirement and replaced Andrey Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were friends of thirty years, going back to their service in the

Komsomol.[43] In October, Gorbachev and his growing coterie replaced Nikolai Tikhonov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers with their own appointee, Nikolai Ryzhkov. In December they replaced Viktor Grishin as first secretary of the Moscow city party committee with Boris Yeltsin. They sent Grishin into retirement from the Politburo two months later.

In March, 1986 as a result of the election of a new Central Committee by the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, Anatoly Dobrynin displaced Boris Ponomarev as head of the International Department of the Central Committee and Vadim Medvedev took Konstantin Rusakov's former position as Secretary in charge of relations with other Communist countries. In addition to Dobrynin and Medvedev, Gorbachev appointed Aleksandr Yakovlev, Georgi Razumovskiy, and Aleksandra Biryukova Central Committee secretaries. He appointed Lev Zaykov to the Politburo and retired Ponomarev and Vasily Kuznetsov from their positions as Candidate members of the Politburo. On average Gorbachev's appointees were 18 and a half years younger than the personnel they replaced.

Between his July, 1986 speech in which he indirectly praised the 1981 crackdown in Poland, and a November, 1987 speech in which the General secretary outlined a new course in Moscow's policy toward Eastern Europe, he made changes in the high level leadership on three occasions: in January, 1987 at the Central Committee Plenum he promoted Anatoly Lukyanov and Nikolai Slyunkov to the Secretariat, and Aleksandr Yakovlev to Candidate on the Politburo; in May he used Mathias Rust's flight into Red Square as an excuse to sack Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov; and in a June meeting at which he harangued the Party for its poor economic management of the country he elevated to full membership in the Politburo three of his earlier appointees, Yakovlev, Slyunkov, and Viktor Nikonov.

Sokolov's replacement as Defense Minister was Dmitri Yazov, the relatively obscure Commander of the Far Eastern Military District; Gorbachev reached down past 240 more senior commanders in order to assure that the military would be compliant as an institution, if not supportive. In December, 1988 Gorbachev replaced Sergey Akhromeyev with Mikhail Moiseyev as Chief of the General Staff, though Akhromeyev remained a personal adviser to Gorbachev. Moiseyev was not even a full general when picked by Gorbachev. In February, 1989 Pyotr Lushev replaced V. G. Kulikov as Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact forces. By June, 1989 the civilian leadership had replaced 47 senior military commanders,[44] thus implying that the the civilian policy-makers were worried about military opposition to disarmament and other policies resulting in the diminution of the military's role and budgets.

By the fall of 1987, less than two and a half years after assuming leadership of the Party, Gorbachev was responsible for bringing in a majority of the full and candidate members of the Politburo, having removed Dinmukhamed Kunaev in December, 1986 and Geydar Aliyev in October, 1987. It was following this watershed in assuring his control over the leadership of the Party that the Soviet leader probably felt secure enough to make the anniversary speech calling for a reassessment of Soviet-East European relations.[45]

In 1988 Gorbachev hit the road in Eastern Europe, visiting Yugoslavia, Poland, and Rumania in an attempt to encourage his Warsaw Pact allies to adopt their own versions of *perestroyka.* Lest the speech that he gave to the foreign delegates to the 70th anniversary celebrations the previous November remain unclear, the wording of the joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration resulting from Gorbachev's trip in March unambiguously informed everyone of the marked change from previous Soviet policy. The declaration disavowed the legitimacy of interference by one country in another's

affairs "under any pretext whatsoever," including presumably, though left unstated, 'socialist internationalism.[46] Perhaps by not mentioning socialist internationalism (the Brezhnev Doctrine) explicitly, Gorbachev felt that he could avoid the accusation of having directly discredited allied regimes. If so, he failed. As he and *perestroyka* became more and more popular in Eastern Europe, the regimes approved and installed by his predecessors became less so. The declaration continued, "proceeding from the belief that no one possesses a monopoly on truth, the two sides state that they have no intention of imposing their own conceptions of social development on **anyone** [author's emphasis]."[47] Gorbachev made clear that he was speaking to the entire socialist world, not only in the wording of the declaration but in the fact that it was splashed in large type across the front pages of both *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* rather than on page 4 or 5 where such declarations and communiques usually found themselves.

Gorbachev, as a student of history, had to know that he was walking in Khrushchev's footsteps by not only tolerating diversity in the Communist world, but openly encouraging it. In June, his advisor Oleg Bogomolov was quoted as saying that steps taken by the Brezhnev leadership had become unthinkable under the Gorbachev regime.[48] If the Soviet leadership wanted to prevent deviation in Eastern Europe it was sending all the wrong signals because during the 19th Party Conference Gorbachev strongly reiterated the Party's opposition to interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The Party Conference was another political strategem on Gorbachev's part to assure his political position. He used it to stack the Party rules in his favor, specifically in order to permit even greater turnover of personnel.[49] In addition, it was at the Conference that the Soviet leader assured himself a base of political power independent of the Party by pushing through acceptance of his plan to hold competitive

elections to a new, true national legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies, and the Supreme Soviet. The population as a whole, though not perfectly represented by the new Soviet legislature, was represented better in that institution than in the Party, and the Soviet people were quite supportive of Gorbachev's foreign policy. They supported Gorbachev's intention to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the thaw in relations with the West, and Soviet foreign policy in general. This support was indicated by Shevardnadze's popularity in public opinion polls, his easy confirmation by the Supreme Soviet after the March, 1989 elections (compare Shevardnadze's cakewalk to Yazov's trial by fire), and anecdotal evidence.[50]

Following the Conference Gorbachev not only continued his frenetic pace of installing and removing personnel, but changed the structure of the existing foreign policy-making establishment as well. Before September, 1988 the Secretariat was the highest policy oversight body. After that date many of its responsibilities were taken over by commissions which report directly to the Politburo. Central Committee departments, which previously were powerful actors in the policy debates, became subordinated to the commissions[51].

Also in September, 1988, and directly relevant to foreign policy, Aleksandr Yakovlev became head of the International Policy Commission and Valentin Falin became chief of the International Department, replacing Anatoly Dobrynin. Gorbachev abolished the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties. Its functions were given to the International Department. Ligachev was shunted to the Agrarian Policy Commission.

Aleksandr Kapto became Chief of the Ideological Department subordinate to Vadim Medvedev. Earlier in the year, in February, Oleg Baklanov became the Central Committee Secretary with responsibility for Defense industries, replacing Lev Zaykov,

who kept his seat on the Politburo and remained First Secretary of the Moscow City Party. Gorbachev devalued the Defense industry's political power by removing its supervisor from the inner circle of policy-making; Baklanov was provided with neither a seat on the Politburo nor a Commission. While Viktor Chebrikov's position as Chairman of the KGB was not removed from the inner circle of foreign policy influence, he was. During the September reorganization Gorbachev made Chebrikov Chairman of the new Legal Policy Commission and in October replaced him as head of the KGB with Vladimir Kryuchkov.

The most revealing personnel shift during the reorganization was not Kryuchkov for Chebrikov, however; it was Medvedev for Ligachev. In all probability Gorbachev made this switch because Ligachev was not following Gorbachev's foreign policy line. Despite repeated statements by Evgeniy Primakov and Shevardnadze that peaceful coexistence between East and West was not subordinate to class confrontation, Ligachev publicly disagreed. In a speech to Gorkiy oblast Party activists, he argued that economic reforms based on the market and international relations not based on class confrontation were ideologically unacceptable.[52] The next month he held a different job, and his replacement as Party Secretary, Medvedev dispelled the confusion in a speech on television and published in *Pravda,* in which he contradicted Ligachev.[53] Ligachev's story exemplifies what Gorbachev and his allies did to the opposition. They steamrolled it.

Later, after Ligachev was forced out of the leadership into retirement he gave an interview to a Western journalist in which he said that the leadership had decided (presumably by consensus) on its policy of noninterference in Eastern Europe in late 1985 and 1986. "We always thought we would not allow any military interference. We had the example of Afghanistan and we finally started taking lessons from history."[54]

Ligachev's claim that the decision not to intervene in Eastern Europe occurred so early in the regime seems unlikely considering the following. First, none of the leaders were giving any signals of a policy change toward any individual Warsaw Pact countries or the region as a whole. Gorbachev gave no clear indication until 1987 of a major shift in the direction of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. Second, in 1985 and 1986 the leadership still contained many holdovers from the previous regimes, and they were unlikely to agree to a policy change even had one been suggested. Finally, Ligachev's ideological squabble with Gorbachev's allies and his subsequent condemnation the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe specifically, and Soviet foreign policy generally, betrayed his opposition to Gorbachev's foreign policies. At a speech to the Constituent Congress of the Russian Communist Party on June 20, 1990 Ligachev complained that he and others were left out of the decision-making process on events in Eastern Europe:

> Up to now no analysis has been made at Central Committee level of the events in Eastern Europe. The German question has not been examined. And this is also major politics. For the socialist community has disintegrated and the positions of imperialism have grown incredibly stronger. The question inevitably arises: did I raise these problems in the politburo? Yes I did, and more than once. I wrote memos to the Politburo giving grounds to the question of the current moment, the market economy, and the integrity of the state at a plenum of the Central Committee.
>
> My proposals are not what is at issue. Many such proposals were made, by the Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, and other party organizations of Russia. But no plenum was held on these important questions. I would like to ask: is this democratic....
>
> Speaking about the collective nature of the leadership, I would like to expand the framework of the concept. It is important to put every communist in the center of party life so that his voice and the opinion of the primary party organization should not only be heard at all levels of the party, including in the Central Committee, but what is important its not only to hear it, what is important is for it to be heeded.[55]

Ligachev was by no means alone in his criticism of Gorbachev's conduct of foreign policy. At the same Congress General Albert Makashov, Commander of the Volga-Urals Military District, and Aleksandr Melnikov, First secretary of the Kemerovo Oblast Party Committee, both scored Gorbachev for the substance of his foreign policy and the methods by which it was developed. Melnikov in particular bemoaned the Party's loss of power in the policy-making process:

> Recently we, the members of the Central Committee and the party, have witnessed how certain political forces in a planned and consistent way have separated the general secretary, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet and now the president of the country from the Central Committee of the party and the Politburo; split the Politburo itself, defaming its most capable members....
>
> ...I get the impression that with the purposeful cooperation of the General secretary's closest entourage we are gradually slipping into a new--maybe an unusual and democratic form of it--but still the cult of an individual....
>
> The fact that its destructive virus is operating today in the party is evident from such characteristic features which are historically evident in any cult. These include the gradual displacement of the Central Committee and the Party itself from taking decisions on very important questions: these include the monopoly on taking decisions by a narrow circle of people, increasing claims by the leadership to possessing the final truth, the combining of many posts with frequent statements in response to criticism of readiness to quit work in the Politburo and the Central Committee, and the resulting passivity in the party; these include carefully measured amounts of *glasnost* about the work of the Central Committee and increasing misinformation in the official press about the true position in the Party, society and the country.[56]

Criticisms like Melnikov's were mostly true, but the problem for those like him who believed that the leadership had conceded too much and arrived at its policy in an undemocratic fashion (a valid though extremely ironic point), was that it was too little, too late. Ligachev's ill-fated contradiction of the new conception of peaceful coexistence in 1988 was the first open attempt by a high-ranking official to question openly the

direction of Soviet foreign policy, and Gorbachev consequently slapped him down for it with no discussion or debate. The next open discussion of the leadership's conduct of foreign affairs came with Shevardnadze's confirmation hearing before the Supreme Soviet in April, 1989. The Foreign Minister received nothing but accolades.

The first confrontation over foreign policy did not come until the February, 1990 Party Central Committee plenum. There, Eduard Shevardnadze, under attack by conservatives, including Ligachev, said "Perestroyka should not be blamed for the destruction of the political structure of Europe. It has been destroyed by the will of peoples no longer willing to put up with violence. The undermining of faith in Socialism based on suppression and violence began in the 1940's, not in 1985." He said the reason for the policy of non-interference is that "it is easier to change our policies than their people." Ligachev argued, "It would be unforgivable shortsightedness and error not to see that a Germany with huge economic and military potential is looming on the world horizon [interrupted by ovations three times]. I think it is time to recognize this danger and proclaim it to the Party and the people."[57]

Ligachev's call to action was like closing the bloc door after Eastern Europe had gone. The time for opponents of the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze foreign policy to act was earlier, in 1988, before the reformers' success in reshuffling personnel and establishing a base for their political power independent of the Communist Party. Had the conservatives spoken up then, they may have been able to prevent the personnel and constitutional changes which Gorbachev pushed through following the 19th Party Conference. As it was, the following October, Gorbachev managed to effect those changes, including making himself Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the body he was to invest 5 months later with some real power.

Unlike Khrushchev, Gorbachev demonstrated a remarkable ability to preempt and frustrate real and potential opposition. First, like Stalin he moved swiftly once in office to stack the apparat in his favor by means of the circular flow of power. Second, he capitalized on the overwhelming desire of the country for change. He was, after all selected to be Party leader in order to reform the system. Among the new generation, even conservatives like Ligachev supported some degree of *perestroyka.* Finally, unlike Khrushchev who often appealed over the heads of the apparat and his opponents to the Soviet people in order to get his way, ultimately without success, Gorbachev successfully managed to use the discontent of the Soviet people to bludgeon the apparat into accepting his policies. Once in control of the Party rules and the top leadership, he used the public's clamor for change to frighten the apparat into accepting his plan for greater citizen participation, thus assuring himself of an alternative base of political power. Once his opponents realized that Gorbachev had transferred power from the Party to the government, it was too late for them to act. In reference to this transfer, Melnikov, at the Russian Congress noted, "At two Central Committee plenums I drew attention to this negative phenomenon. I asked myself and the other members of the Central Committee and the Politburo the question: Who benefits from this. But I did not receive a reply and I admit in a self-critical manner that I did not demand a reply. I did not keep insisting."[58] It was only natural that orthodox Communists like Melnikov, conditioned by years of adhering to previous formulae of Party discipline, learned the ropes of democracy too late to change the outcome. In fact Melnikov was the exception. Most of the slow learners went gently into their good retirement, without a squawk. Habit and psychological conditioning prevented the bulk of Gorbachev's would-be opponents from ever using the very tools, *glasnost* and democratic discourse, which they had spent their lives combating.

To be fair, Gorbachev used other tactics to obscure his strategy to conservatives. First, despite Melnikov's lament at the Russian Congress that "...the recent statement and address by Mikhail Sergeyevich, President of the country, General secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on Central Television, on such a most acute question as the change-over to the regulated market economy did not contain one mention of the words party and communists,"[59] Gorbachev until late in 1989 and 1990 was usually quite scrupulous about maintaining that his plans included a preeminent place for the Communist Party and its ideology, probably because he had convinced himself that there was no inconsistency between democratic reform and Marxism-Leninism.

At the 19th Party Conference Gorbachev pushed through the reform of the political system on the ground that "Many of the ideas of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin previously treated one-sidedly, or totally hushed up, are being rethought. The creative nature of scientific and humane socialism is being revived in the struggle against dogmatism."[60] While Gorbachev and his spokesmen often couched their support for change in Eastern Europe as support for "universal human values," they also claimed that the changes reversed years of "bureaucratism," "dogmatism," and other ideological deviations which proved deleterious to the interests of East European peoples.[61] Second, the Soviet leader made a pattern of appearing to side with conservatives but usually sided with liberals. As Arkady Murashev, executive secretary of the Inter-Regional group in the Supreme Soviet said after Gorbachev allowed the mass demonstration before the February, 1990 plenum, "He speaks negatively of us, but never impedes us... We have many examples of his sympathy."[62] Another example where Gorbachev thundered over the left but struck the right was his handling of Vyacheslav Starkov's control of *Argumenty i Fakty.* Gorbachev complained about Starkov going too far and threatened to fire him after Starkov published a political popularity poll in October, 1989. (Though

not directly employed by Gorbachev, Starkov was the editor of a Communist Party publication, and Gorbachev was still General secretary of the CPSU). Gorbachev then, however turned around 180 degrees and replaced Viktor Afanasyev with the more liberal Ivan Frolov at *Pravda*, forgetting all about his threats against Starkov.[63]

1989 was the year that Moscow gave its blessing to the Polish Communists' roundtable negotiations with Solidarity; it was the year that the Soviet Union held its first competitive, if not wholly free, elections for a national legislature (in which non-Communists were represented); it was the year that the Polish people voted the Communists out; and in the beginning of that year there was no one left on the Gorbachev Politburo or Secretariat, or the foreign policy establishment, especially with possible concern to Eastern Europe (with the one exception of Konstantin Katushev) who did not owe their office to Gorbachev.[64] Of the following officials: the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the KGB, the Minister of Defense, the Chairman of the International Policy Commission of the Central Committee, the Head of the International Department of the Central Committee, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chairman of the Ideological Commission, the Head of the Ideological Department, the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Eastern Europe, the Chief of the Socialist Countries of Europe Administration, the Chief of the Economic Relations Administration, the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, and the foreign affairs advisors to Gorbachev in his capacities as both General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; all owed their positions to Gorbachev.[65] Moreover, as insurance against the unlikely possibility of opposition within the Party or governmental apparatus he had the new national legislature to back him up. Going into

the year of the East European Communist collapse Gorbachev had more of a foreign policy mandate than any previous leader in Soviet history.

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[1]For the dynamics of leadership succession and the political machinations of contenders for power, both before and succession, see George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London and Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1982); Archie Brown, "Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 43, No. 3 (May-June, 1985); and Dusko Doder, *Shadows and Whispers* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988).

[2]Interview in Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel, *Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers,* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company), p. 122. Aleksandr Yakovlev said the same thing in another interview contained in this book, p. 41

[3]The views of the Soviet population on Gorbachev's foreign policy are extrapolated from the popularity of Eduard Shevardnadze, the Foreign Ministry, and leaders such as Andrei Sakharov who applauded Gorbachev's foreign policy. See for example *Argumenty i fakty,* No. 40 (469) (7-13 October, 1989), p. 1; and David Remnick, *The Washington Post,* September 3, 1990, p. A10.

[4]Bill Keller, *The New York Times,* February 7, 1990, p. A12.

[5]Sergei Karaganov, "The Year of Europe: A Soviet View," *Survival,* Vol. 32, No. 2 (March-April, 1990), p. 121.

[6]See *Pravda,* June 24, 1990, p. 2; also see Bill Keller, *The New York Times,* June 24, 1990, section I, p. 8.

[7]See Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Politics." *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 69. No. 1 (Winter, 1989/1990), pp. 26-41.

[8]Cited in Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 58.

[9]Cohen and Vanden Heuvel, *op. cit.,* p. 288.

[10]M. S. Gorbachev, "O Nekotorykh Merakh Posledovatel'nogo Osushchestvleniya Agrarnoy Politiki KPSS na Sovremennom Etape," from notes to the Central Committee of the CPSU, May, 1978, in M.S. Gorbachev, *Izbrannie Rechi i Stat'i,* Tome 1, (Moscow: Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the CPSU, Political Literature Publishing, 1987), pp. 180-200

[11] *Pravda,* May 20, 1987, p. 1.

[12] David Remnick, *The Washington Post,* September 13, 1990, p. A30.

[13] Cohen and Vanden Heuvel, *op. cit.,* p. 119.

[14] Remnick, *op. cit.*

[15] Remnick, *op. cit.*

[16] Brown, *op. cit.,* p. 5.

[17] *Ibid.,* especially p. 144. Also see Archie Brown, "Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 43, No. 3 (May-June, 1985), pp. 4-5; and Dusko Doder, *Shadows and Whispers* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), pp. 281-291.

[18] Cohen and Vanden Heuvel, *op. cit.,* pp. 77 and 215.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 80.

[20] Georgi Smirnov, "Ob'ektivnye zakony i tvorchestvo novogo mira," *Kommunist,* No. 16, 1964, pp. 17-29.

[21] *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* December 1, 1990, p. 4.

[22] Doder, *op. cit.*

[23] Cohen and Vanden Heuvel, *op. cit.,* p. 42.

[24] Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Dostizheniye kachestvenno novogo sostoyaniya sovetskogo obshchestva i ibshchestvennyye nauki," *Kommunist,* No. 8, 1987, p. 4.
[25] *Pravda,* January 28, 1987. p. 1

[26] *Pravda,* July 13, 1988, p. 2.
[27] Ian Mather, *Sunday Times* (London), April 14, 1985, p. 9

[28] Michael T. Kaufman, *The New York Times,* July 2, 1986, p. A6.

[29] *Pravda,* March 6, 1986, pp. 3-8.

[30] Leonid I. Brezhnev. *Report of the Central Committe of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy,* Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1981, p. 14.

[31] *Pravda,* February 26, 1986, p. 8.

[32]Philip Taubman, *The New York Times,* November 5, 1987, pp. A1, A14.

[33]*Pravda,* May 20, 1987, pp. 1, 3-4.

[34]Philip Taubman, *The New York Times,* November 5, 1987, pp. A1, A14.

[35]Oleg Bogomolov, "Mir sotsializma na puti perestroiki," *Kommunist,* 1987, no. 16, pp. 92-102.

[36]Mikhail Gorbachev, "On Progress in Implementing the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks of Promoting Perestroika,
Report at the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU," June 28, 1988, in Documents and Materials of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, *Soviet Life* (Special Supplementary Issue), p. 34.

[37]L. Toporkov, *Izvestia,* January 20, 1989, p. 5.

[38]*Izvestia,* April 6, 1989, p. 5.

[39]F. Lukyanov, *Izvestia,* February 13, 1989, p. 5.

[40]Francis X. Clines, The New York Times, April 7, 1989, p. A6.

[41]See Hough, "Gorbachev's Politics," *op. cit;* "The Politics of the 19th Party Conference," *Soviet Economy,* Vol. 4, No. 2 (April-June, 1988), pp. 137-143; and "The Politics of Succesful Economic Reform," *Soviet Economy,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan-March, 1989) pp. 3-47.

[42]Unless otherwise noted all information regarding personnel comes from US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations,* LDA 87-12090, June, 1987; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations,* LDA 89-10149, February, 1989; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials,* LDA 87-12484, July, 1987, US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo and Secretariat,* LDA 88-15861, November, 1988; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo and Secretariat,* LDA 89-15139, October, 1989; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Executive and Administrative Apparatus,* LDA 89-12344, May, 1989; US Central Intelligence Agency, *The USSR Foreign Ministry Organizational Structure,* LDA 89-10850, March, 1989; US Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR Council of Ministers,* LDA 89-16190, December, 1989; and US Central Intelligence Agency, *The USSR Presidency,* LDA 90-12598, April, 1990.

[43]Thomas L. Friedman, *The New York Times,* March 5, 1989, p. E3.

[44]Richard H. P. Sia, *Baltimore Sun,* April 14, 1990, p. 2A.

[45]See note number 30.

[46]*Pravda,* and *Izvestia,* March 19, 1988, p. 1.

[47]*Ibid.*

[48]Quentin Peel, *Financial Times,* June 27, 1988.

[49]See Jerry F. Hough, "The Politics of the 19th Party Conference," *Soviet Economy,* Vol. 4, No. 2 (April-June, 1988), pp. 137-143.

[50]See note 2; also consider Boris Yeltsin's election to the Presidency of the Russian Republic. Yeltsin differed with Gorbachev over many domestic issues but was and remains a strong supporter of the Soviet leader's foreign policy.

[51]For a different view, see Mark Kramer, "The Role of CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security Policy," *Soviet Studies,* Vol. 42, No. 3 (July, 1990), pp. 429-446.

[52]Yegor Ligachev, *Pravda,* August 6, 1988, p. 2.

[53]*Pravda,* October 5, 1988, p. 4.

[54]David Remnick interview with Yegor Ligachev, *The Washington Post,* October 15, 1990, pp. A1, A22.

[55]Yegor Ligachev on Moscow Television Service in Russian, 2023 GMT, June 20, 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-120, June 21, 1990, p. 90.

[56]Aleksandr Melnikov on Moscow Television Service in Russian, 2042 GMT, June 20, 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-121, June 22, 1990, p. 97.

[57]Bill Keller, *The New York Times,* February 7, 1990, p. A12.

[58]Aleksandr Melnikov, *op. cit.*

[59]*Ibid.*

[60]Mikhail Gorbachev, "On Progress...*op. cit.* p. 5.

[61]See for example, Oleg Bogomolov, "Mir sotsializma...*op. cit.*

[62]*The Washington Post,* February 6, 1990, p. A21.

[63]Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Vesti otkrytiy..., *op. cit.*

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[64]Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 109-113. The idea to apply Hough's list to Gorbachev's appointees comes from Colton, *The Dilemma..., op, cit.*, p. 180.

[65]By name respectively they are: Nikolai Ryzhkov, Eduard Shevardnadze, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Dmitri Yazov, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Valentin Falin, Mikhail Moiseyev, Vadim Medvedev, Aleksandr Kapto, Anatoly Luk'yanov, Ivan Aboimov, Goral'd Gorinovich, Ernest Obminski, Konstantin Katushev, Georgi Shakhnazarov, Anatoly Chernyayev, Anatoly Dobrynin, Vadim Zagladin, and Sergey Akhromeyev.

Chapter 5: Framing the Options: Internal Ideological Change

Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power as General secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 11, 1985 marked a change in the Kremlin's policy of accepting no formal challenge to Communist power. Gorbachev and other Party leaders in his generation were willing to consider new means for legitimating their rule, including multi-candidate elections which preceded those in Poland. The political-ideological revisions introduced by Gorbachev allowed the Soviet leaders to judge the costs and benefits of the relationship with Eastern Europe in a new light and the regime's efforts to legitimize its rule domestically led to its partial abandonment of Marxism-Leninism as its ideological guide. Soviet internal political transformation in turn vitiated the need to legitimize Marxism-Leninism through its forcible export and maintenance abroad. First i nplicitly, and later explicitly, Moscow put to rest the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.[1] Thus the Soviet leadership destroyed the logical, as well as ideological foundations for Moscow's tight grip on Eastern Europe. Once the Soviet Union's reluctant allies in Eastern Europe, led by Poland, discovered that Moscow no longer possessed the will to exert its previously onerous level of internal and external control, they asserted their independence. Therefore, to understand Moscow's release of its satellites in the context of rational behavior it is necessary to understand the sources and character of the Soviet Union's internal ideological transformation.

The catalyst for the Gorbachev's policy of non-interference in East European domestic political developments was the need for a stable international environment in which the Soviet Union could devote its energies and resources to finding solutions to its overwhelming domestic problems. As Gorbachev said at the 27th Party Congress, less than a year after assuming power, "...the acceleration of the country's social and

economic development is the key to all of our problems, near and long-term, economic and social, political and ideological, internal and external. Only by such a path can and must a new qualitative condition of Soviet society be reached."[2] His foreign minister emphasized, "The [19th Party] Conference underlined our main priority: using political means for ensuring conditions that are favorable in all respects for the execution of the internal transformation of the country."[3] The Kremlin's tactical need for peace and quiet internationally caused in part a strategic change in outlook produced by an internal transformation. The internal transformation, though by no means complete, led to the recognition that adherence to the ideological prescriptions developed by Marx and Lenin, and interpreted by Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, failed to provide for the economic and political development of the Soviet state.

In order to show how internal change precipitated a foreign policy revolution, three subordinate goals have to be achieved first: one, to find a workable definition of ideology; two, to demonstrate the necessity of understanding ideology as a prerequisite for comprehending foreign policy; and three, to establish ideology's causal relationship to policy. The question of why Soviet ideology changed is answered partially in the previous chapter, and partially in the next chapter. This chapter also places recent Soviet foreign policy in two theoretical debates. First, it supports reductionism, the type of theory best explained by Kenneth Waltz's second image of international politics, which argues that the internal structure of states, rather than characteristics of the international system or human nature determine state behavior.[4] Second, in the larger context of the dissertation, it demonstrates how the internal ideological climate of a nation frames the the range of possible options for rational decision-making.

Arriving at a universally acceptable definition of a word as laden with meaning and controversy as 'ideology' is an impossible task. As Michael Howard wrote:

> The correct usage of the term 'ideology' bears as much relation to that normally employed as does the *mentalite* of a professing member of the Church of England to the Thirty-nine Articles, or the Athanasian Creed, or any of the other documents where the fundamentals of Christian belief are set out with embarrassing clarity. But to those standing outside our culture, this confused accumulation of inherited or acquired beliefs, attitudes and values, which lose all their essence if we try to codify and define them, may appear more systematic, more logically interconnected, more finite and definable, than we ourselves realize.[5]

Attempting to codify the usage here is necessary because an effort to discuss Soviet ideology's impact on Soviet policy, without at least trying to define the terms of discussion, is to sow a field full of ambiguity. One author, Francis Fukuyama, finds a synonym for ideology in "consciousness." Thomas Schelling defines it as "an explicit and internally consistent value system." John Plamenatz labels it "a set of closely-related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community."[6] Adam Ulam provides a method for wrapping these concepts together.[7] Discussing Marxism-Leninism, Ulam understands ideology as a concept that can be divided into three interconnected strains, broadly representing the "is," "ought," and "because" in human thought.

'Is', is the analytical and psychological strain. It is the political prism through which individuals view and order the world, the schema described in the first chapter. People grow up with certain preconceptions and assumptions which help digest and organize incoming information. Fukuyama's 'consciousness' fits here. The second strain, "ought," is philosophical and prescriptive. Individuals act and live based on prescriptions implied in their world view. For example, a witness to a murder who knows that murder "is" wrong also knows that he "ought" to report the event to the

police, though for various other reasons he may not. This is Howard's 'logically connected, inherited or acquired belief'. Third, there is a rationalizing or legitimizing strain in ideology, the "because." People need to know that their actions are consistent with their belief systems, else they feel uncomfortable. This strain covers Schelling's description of a belief system which is 'internally consistent'. The witness reports the crime "because" he knows that murder "is" morally wrong and that morally wrong acts "ought" to be punished. He knows that the report is justified.

Two other clarifications are required. First, in order for a political value or belief system to qualify as an ideology, it must be widely shared. Second, it should be noted that the concept of ideology, as employed here, is an indispensable tool of thinking, and like thought, is value-neutral. No individual, state, or society can possibly function without at least an implicit value system. Thus, to argue as some scholars do that ideology *per se* is harmful or evil, is to argue that thought, or speech is inherently evil.[8]

Some scholars believe that only the rationalizing element of ideology is relevant. Regardless of the intricacies of definition, politics is a struggle for power, and that ideology serves only to conceal the naked struggle in "justifications and rationalizations."[9] This view is only partially true. Even the cooly pragmatic *realpolitik* analyses of Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, cannot exist in a realm apart from ideology. In their work, the "national interest" and the "struggle for power" determine policy. But power is not an end in itself; it is a means for pursuing interests. Morgenthau and his disciples emphasized the systemic determinants of national interest and regarded the ideological underpinnings of interest formation or interpretation to be relatively insignificant. National interests cannot be developed in a vacuum. States form and define their interests in the medium of values and assumptions of the leaders who

interpret national needs and wants. That some choices are less consistent with doctrinal prescription than others does not indicate that they are not grounded in some principle. If they were not, no attempt at justification would be necessary. States do not define their interests according to some universally applicable formula; they operate according to a national set of values which we call an ideology. When those values change, state behavior changes as well. Even what many historians and political scientists consider to be the golden age of the balance of power, 19th century Europe, was undergirded by nationalist and imperialist doctrines which colored, prescribed, and justified state policy.

Pragmatism, defined as a loose, or lack of adherence to principle in favor of the pursuit of "selfish interest" is not unideological. The practice of politics is the art of choice. Even choice considered to be purely rational is ideological. Thomas Schelling, defines rational behavior as, "behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on **an explicit and internally consistent value system.**"[10] The fact that some choices are less consistent with doctrinal prescription than others does not indicate that they are not grounded in some principle. Action or policy is not measured against an ideal as an absolute, but by degree.

Events, of course also influence ideology; while it is true "that society's political priorities...are determined in the realm of consciousness," Fukuyama concedes, consciousness is influenced by material reality as well.[11] Thought is a powerful stimulant to action, but action is the food for thought. The reason that legitimacy and authority in Communist states evaporate relatively rapidly can be found in the chasm separating ideological claims from reality. Knowledge of real, material events,

conditions, and developments outside the Eastern bloc undoubtedly contributed to the dissatisfaction of the Soviet and East European peoples. Absolute control of the media and travel is critical to the success of authoritarian regimes, but that control became increasingly difficult for the Soviets and their allies to achieve as time went by due to the globalization of commerce and a shrinking world.

While it is clear that the accumulating political, military, and economic burdens of Moscow's East European empire contributed to a rethinking of the bloc's value, it is important to understand that the Soviet leaders could only make assessments of cost and benefit in the context of an existing set of values. How those values, or ideology changed and determined policy is crucial to explaining both why and when Moscow changed its policy.

Ideology can determine policy even when it is used only to justify it. So long as an ideology can legitimize policy, it maintains some relevance in its analytical and prescriptive functions as well, because in order to justify policy in ideological terms, those terms cannot possibly spring into existence like Athena from the head of Zeus; logically they must preexist as a common analytical frame of reference. Where no analytic framework exists, ideological justification and prescription would float out of context, devoid of meaning. Furthermore, where analytical frameworks operate, they most likely (though not always) frame prescriptions for action which are internally consistent. If, for example, an individual sees the world strictly through a black and white filter and has always seen that way, his mind is unlikely to prescribe actions or reactions to given situations which involve yellow, red, or other colors.

The reverse holds true as well; the unraveling of one strand of doctrine leads to the unraveling of the entire doctrine. The fact that a particular aspect of ideology no longer serves to legitimize, prescribe, or describe policy for a given population signals

the demise of the entire ideology. During the 16th century, the Roman Catholic Church operated on a secular, as well as spiritual level, and its doctrine met the requirements of our definition of an ideology. The distance which grew between the loftiness of Rome's professed values and the corruption of its everyday actions led to disillusionment among the faithful. The Church no longer was able to justify its policies to its flock. As a result, the age of faith ended; and the reformation and the age of enlightenment ensued. As Adam Ulam asked about Marxism, "When specific points of a religious creed lose their veracity or relevance for people, can they long retain a general religious outlook and belief in the doctrine as a whole? Similarly, if the Marxian doctrine loses its specific relevance, can the frame of mind engendered by it and the belief itself endure?"[12]

Ulam, nevertheless contradicted the implications of his own reasoning by professing a belief in the ability of Soviet ideology to survive. George Kennan wrote in 1947 that the Soviet system would collapse upon its own internal deficiencies, aided by comparison with the moral and material superiority of the Western system.[13] Ulam regarded Kennan to be overly optimistic, "If the rulers of this system see in the ideology, as we have seen, not only the rationale of their absolute power but a source of their inner security and effectiveness, then the doctrine will not be soon or easily repudiated just because the West increases its material welfare."[14]

As it turned out, events have shown Ulam to have been too pessimistic. Marxism-Leninism is in critical condition today precisely **because** it was no longer sufficient to guarantee the leadership's 'inner security and effectiveness', in other words, the regime's legitimacy.[15] It might be useful here to examine the sources of the regime's legitimacy.

According to Ted Robert Gurr, "...regimes are said to be *legitimate* to the extent that their citizens regard them as proper and deserving of support. *Regime* is used in a general sense to mean the political unit itself, its governing institutions (regime in the narrow sense), and their incumbents."[16] In his investigation of the theoretical literature, Gurr discovered that the underlying theme running through this work was that "...positive perspectives on politics make men good subjects--willing to support and obey, unwilling to attack the political system."[17] More specifically, legitimacy is associated with the positive, rather than negative reasons for citizen compliance with the directives of the regime. While coercion does induce compliance, it does not induce support. A regime cannot be considered legitimate if coercion is the primary means for ensuring compliance, for compliance is likely to deteriorate whenever coercion is relaxed or reduced.[18] As Rousseau put it, "The strongest man is never strong enough to be master all the time, unless he transforms force into right and obedience into duty."[19]

The various means which governments use to win popular support, for the system in general, and regimes in particular, constitute the sources of legitimacy, though some sources are beyond regimes' control. A distillation of Gurr's analysis yields three basic sources. First is participation. Citizens are more likely to identify with, and support regimes that provide them with the means for choosing their leaders, and the opportunity for leading themselves. Most often this occurs through elections. As the freedom and scope of the means of participation increase, so does the legitimacy of he regime concerned, i.e. the United States government increased its legitimacy when it abolished slavery, when it gave women the right to vote, and when it provided legal guarantees for minority voting in the South.

A second component of legitimacy can be described as 'adherence to political myth.'[20] Political myth refers to the collection of beliefs, doctrines, symbols, stories,

and assumptions which inspire acceptance and even respect for the existing distribution of political power. Religion, nationalism, ideology, history, and tradition are all included in this means of legitimation. The political myth contains factual and fictional elements but its purpose is not to inform, but rather to inspire and inculcate.[21] For example, Louis XIV could not prove his divine right to rule France but his subjects accepted it. It did not matter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the Bolshevik Revolution was not a spontaneous popular uprising; it was important only that the popular belief sustained and contributed to the perception of the Bolshevik right to rule. Similarly, the fact that the United States intentionally denied the rights of full citizenship to women and blacks before World War I had no impact on the government's call to fight for democracy. All three examples were useful legitimating political myths.

A final component of legitimacy can be described as performance.[22] Performance comprises the regime's management of traditional functions: e.g. direction of the economy, maintenance of law and order, and national defense. Citizens often judge their regime's performance by reference to their standard of living: for example, one of Ronald Reagan's most effective campaign advertisements in the 1980 United States presidential election consisted of a voice asking television viewers and radio listeners if they were better off in 1980 than they were four years previously. With regard to the Soviet Union, one point of view holds that the popular demand for political change begins because popular expectations rise faster than the regime's ability to satisfy those demands.[23]

It should be noted also that these three sources are highly interrelated: on the one hand, success in one area can add to the others; on the other, the failure in one area can detract from success in others. For example, the ability of the Soviet regime to ensure high economic growth rates and increasing living standards for its population over the

course of many years enhanced the claims that Communism was the path to economic success and security. Similarly, the regime's many international achievements (i.e., the defeat of Hitler, the development of nuclear weapons, the establishment of a successful and an impressive space program) contributed to the myth of its authority. The other edge of the coin detracted from Soviet legitimacy. The failure to perform up to popular expectations eroded the myth. Declining economic performance; a stagnating standard of living; a lowering of life-expectancy and a rise in infant mortality all contributed to a diminution in belief in the regime's ideological claims.

For example, popular exaggerations regarding the high and effective degree of popular participation in the American political system has contributed to the myth of the classless, perfectly egalitarian society in the United States where all individuals, regardless of wealth or race, are presented with equal opportunities. The very existence of a relatively open electoral system--a useful means of participation--no doubt reinforces the myth. Similarly, for many years the success of the Soviet system in providing continually rising living standards reinforced popular belief in the myth of Marxism-Leninism.

The crisis which confronted Gorbachev in 1985 was that both the mythic (especially ideological) and performance sources of legitimacy for the Communist regime had largely dried up. Gorbachev's efforts to reform the system constituted an attempt to revive faith in the myth of Bolshevik authority by improving the performance of the regime; his efforts toward improving the regime's performance in turn (especially in the economy) led Gorbachev to democratization (participation) as both a means to outflank and mobilize the apparat, and to restore and even strengthen popular support for, and identification with the Communist regime. Certainly, democratization was not the regime's only option: had more orthodox leaders won the

struggle for succession after Chernenko's death, they probably would have chosen to implement more authoritarian measures to achieve the desired result. Because of the generational disposition toward reform, and Gorbachev's confidence in his ability to manipulate the Soviet public, however, the regime as a whole opted for the former direction.

There were obviously problems in Bolshevik myth from the very beginning of the Revolution, despite Gorbachev's assertions that abuses and popular dissatisfaction stemmed only from Stalinist and Brezhnevian distortions. The disparity between ideological precepts began with the Bolsheviks' betrayal of some of Marx's fundamental prescriptions and the empirical incorrectness of his analyses: revolution was not supposed to occur in backward, agrarian Russia, but in industrial Germany. Further, the NEP; the development of a large bureaucratic state; Stalin's dictatorship; the tolerance of private farming plots; the success of capitalism; the inequities which grew out of Party privilege and corruption; and the stubborn persistence of nationalism and the nation-state all deviated from ideological prescriptions and predictions.

Inconsistencies in Marxism-Leninism began to eat away at the Communist Party's authority more when the potential horrors of nuclear war invalidated the prescription for violent world revolution (though the possibility of peaceful revolution existed and was promoted by the CPSU at various times in its history). The prospect of nuclear confrontation simply became too dangerous to be thinkable.[24] World revolution, however, remained a useful tool for legitimating CPSU rule; it placed the Party on the side of historical progress and validated Marxist-Leninist ideological predictions that Communism was universal in its appeal, and eventually would be in

scope as well. The need to avoid nuclear holocaust in the pursuit of ideological expansion, however, had become the prime systemic, or international determinant of Moscow's foreign policy since 1945. As Gorbachev said at the 27th Party Congress, "The condition of nuclear confrontation creates the necessity for new approaches, methods, and types of relationships among different social systems, states, and regions."[25] The Kremlin could never promote world revolution, however, without demonstrating the superiority of the Soviet model at home, because few regimes will develop or thrive by choosing as a model a system doomed to failure, and with no record of success.

The failure of Marxist-Leninist policies to develop the Soviet Union was the domestic, and primary cause of the change in Soviet foreign policy, because popular cynicism and disregard of regime claims about the superiority of the Soviet system threatened not only the regime's ability to motivate the Soviet citizenry, but the essence of the regime-society social contract as well. Attempts to compensate for domestic failures of regime legitimation internationally were extremely problematic. First, nuclear weapons rendered violent world revolution too dangerous, and second, attempts to convert the world country-by-country failed, because of indigenous and Western opposition. Moreover, the area of the world that Soviet power was able to subdue for Communism before the advent of nuclear weapons--Eastern Europe--proved to be quite resistant to its harmonious application. Four bloc states, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, required direct Soviet intervention to prevent anti-Communist revolutions. All six bloc countries required levels of coercion to maintain regime power not found in more legitimate states.

In the long run, however, it was the spectacular economic mediocrity of the Soviet, East European, and other states which had adopted the Soviet system, more than their political illegitimacy (though the two reasons are related) that showed the world

that the U.S.S.R. was not a model to be emulated. The Soviet model's appeal was never universal, and it diminished significantly by the early 1980's. The fact of diminished support for Communism outside the Soviet Union--used by the leadership to legitimate their rule in their own country--eroded the mythic appeal of Communist rule within the Soviet Union. The reformers within the Kremlin saw their efforts as the method of for restoring the Communist Party's legitimacy.[26]

In effect, the combination of international and domestic determinants led to a change in domestic ideology which in turn led to a change in foreign policy: the Kremlin's search for new sources of legitimacy in the realm of real, popular participation in government. After Gorbachev took power on March 11, 1985 he looked for ways to to compensate for the deficits of legitimacy provided by myth and performance; he found his compensation in participation. The Kremlin's ideological revisions and embrace of some degree of political democratization at home undermined its previous opposition to attempts to establish these same processes in Eastern Europe. After the people of Poland recognized the new Soviet attitude they took advantage and the rest of the bloc followed.

The ability of the regime to perform had suffered significant damage over the course of the 1970's and early 1980's, and because the Party controlled and assumed responsib' ity for all the political, economic, and social functions of the state and society, society held only the Party accountable when the state did not fulfill its political and economic responsibilities up to popular expectations. Centralization of power inevitably led to centralization of blame.[27] In the past the regime pointed to its performance with pride as a means of winning support: its domestic accomplishments: the economic development of the Soviet state; a guarantee of ever increasing living

standards; and a cradle-to-grave welfare system. The Party's reign saw the transformation of a backward, agrarian country into an educated, urbanized, industrial power--boasting the second highest GNP in the world.[28] Second, the Party pointed to its achievements in the international arena, chiefly: the defeat of Hitler; the successful advocacy of decolonization and national liberation; the triumphs of the Soviet space program; and the spread of Communism to a significant portion of the planet's surface.

By the time Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982 the regime's performance was dismal. Participation in the second, or shadow economy, heavy drinking, and overwhelming political apathy and hopelessness reflected the inability of the regime to motivate its people. Estimates on the size of the shadow economy range from 10-40 percent of the Soviet GNP;[29] Soviet authorities, normally very tight-lipped before the *glasnost* era about internal difficulties, complained publicly about the damaging effect of alcoholism on labor productivity;[30] and while political apathy and spiritual hopelessness are difficult phenomena to measure, especially in a society where rituals of public participation and enthusiasm were carefully stage-managed by the regime, the very fact of the Party's selection of Mikhail Gorbachev and his calls for spiritual renewal, as well as Western assessments of stagnation and decay among the population, attest to its existence and growth.[31]

Economically, the expansion of the Soviet economy slowed tremendously after 1970 from a percentage increase of almost five percent from the five-year plan, 1966-1970 to an average of 2.5 percent over the next three five-year plans.[32] Moreover, recent examinations of the data upon which Soviet statistics are derived reveal that the Soviets, as well as Western analysts consistently overestimated Soviet economic growth indicators.[33] Technologically, the USSR never moved into the qualitatively and quantitatively new era enjoyed by the West; corruption pervaded the

Party and state apparata. Some technological achievements remained, such as the Soviet space program, but the value of prestigious accomplishments for many Soviets diminished as mundane needs become harder and harder to satisfy.

The implicit Soviet social contract which permitted Bolshevik rule, guaranteed relative equality, but at the price of economic and social mediocrity. The regime required a degree of docility from society in order to rule.[34] In return for that docility society was not asked to work very hard, and was guaranteed increasing standards of living and an extensive social welfare system. The inconsistency which inspired the regime's recognition of a need to seek out new areas of support was that the economic system which it imposed on society could not satisfy the population enough to keep it docile. Leonid Brezhnev warned of this danger at the November plenum of the Central Committee in 1978. He said of the disparity between Party promises and results, "this question is not only economic. It is for the most part a political problem, and it exerts a direct influence on the Soviet people's mood and will to work."[35] Further along these lines he said at the 26th Party Congress:

> I would like to move beyond the framework of economic problems as such and to treat the question more broadly. That which we are discussing--food products, consumer goods, the service sphere--is a question for the everyday lives of millions and millions of people. People frequent shops, eateries, laundries, and cleaners every day. What can they buy? How are they welcomed? How are they spoken to? How much time do they devote to all kinds of household chores? It is on the basis of how these problems are solved that the people largely judge our work. They judge strictly and exactingly. And this, comrades, shou'd be remembered.[36]

The failure to satisfy the Soviet consumer may not have been so damaging to regime support if the regime could have balanced a lack of domestic success with success abroad, but it could not. The Socialist model had discredited itself in the rest of the world, as well as in the Soviet Union. In the 1970's and early 1980's the thrill of

decolonization wore off in the Third World; and the Soviets began to realize that the necessity to govern, rather than simply rebel, found fewer and fewer countries discovering anything useful or valid in the Soviet experience.[37] The war in Afghanistan, which had generated significant public dissatisfaction by the time Gorbachev took power, showed that even force could not sustain an unviable, illegitimate regime. Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Vietnam, whose revolutions Moscow hailed and supported as validation of the Soviet model when they occurred originally, all demonstrated the unqualified failure of the Soviet model over time. Even China, which had raised its living standards impressively by junking counterproductive ideological prescriptions in the economic sphere, could not compare its standard of living to Western countries, and its billion people continued to suffer the repressions of a corrupt, unpopular regime. The relative prosperity of the capitalist, newly industrializing countries (the NICs included South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Singapore) embarrassed the Communist leadership. No better luck could be found in Eastern Europe: in Poland the PUWP found itself in the ideologically embarrassing, and ultimately lethal position of being challenged by a genuine, democratic workers' movement.[38]

The rapidly evaporating source of legitimacy in the performance area adversely affected the mythic sources of Bolshevik authority. It is likely that diminished performance hit the Soviet regime harder than it would have hit regimes based on different myths because the scientific claim of superior economic performance is a fundamental tenet of the Marxist-Leninist myth. Once the utopian fervor of the Revolution passed, the CPSU derived legitimacy in the mythic area by identifying many of its achievements with Marxism-Leninism in a constant ideological mobilization of the Soviet population. Moscow's mythic appeals also often mixed the two elements of the

Party-State myth, Marxism-Leninism, and nationalism, in different measure, depending on the need.

Typical ideological appeals, like those of the early Catholic Church were based on promises of a better life in the Communist future in reward for hard work in the Socialist present, and claims about the historically verifiable superiority of the Socialist system. Nationalist exhortations reminded Soviet citizens that the Soviet Union was the Motherland of Socialism as well as first among equals in the Socialist world. Khrushchev was famous for such exhortations. Unfortunately for him, his approach increased popular expectations without proportionally increasing living standards, thus decreasing his regime's legitimacy.[39] During World War II Stalin based his appeals for support on patriotic and national themes because the Soviet Union's main ally was bourgeois and imperialist, and because the ability of the regime to induce loyalty to Stalinism was dubious, as initial reactions among the Soviet population to Hitler's invasion demonstrated.

The Rising Expectations of the Soviet Public

In another sense the regime was a victim of its own success in creating a largely urban, educated society. The Soviet Union of 1980 consisted of a large, well-informed middle class and naturally expected more from its government than the Soviet Union of 1917 or even 1945, which comprised mostly mostly illiterate peasants. Ir 1964 there were only twenty-five million high school graduates in the Soviet Union, whereas in 1989 there were 125 million, a six-fold increase in a time span in which the population had not even doubled.[40] In 1959 43.3 percent of the Soviet work force had completed at least some high school; in 1979 80.5 percent had.[41] In 1959 there were 3.8 million Soviets with post-secondary degrees; in 1979 there were 14.8 million.[42]

Between 1965 and 1978 the output of graduates from professional-technical institutes more than doubled.[43]

The success of the Party in educating the population, in combination with the accumulation of greater access to outside sources of information over time (i.e. Radio Free Europe and other Western broadcasts, letters from emigrés, contact with Western travelers within the Soviet Union and during visits to Eastern Europe, and stories from the selected few allowed to travel to the West) brought Soviet citizens more frequent and accurate glimpses of the West which they used to better scrutinize their own society.[44] A population with a clear knowledge of the higher level of material satisfaction and comfort in the West could only accept the performance of its leaders only so long before demanding something better.

Along with a lower tolerance for top-down consensus formation and higher expectations, the more educated Soviet populace displayed a greater willingness to dissent and a reduced effort to comply with the regime's efforts at popular mobilization. Yuri Andropov's anti-corruption campaign and limited reform program managed to reignite some degree of popular enthusiasm for the Party but his efforts were limited and he ran out of time. Konstantin Chernenko's succession and return to the less than mediocre torpor of Brezhnevian stagnation once again drained the Soviet people of their enthusiasm for their leaders.[45]

Gorbachev and his colleagues began their mission with two related goals: first, to stem the erosion of the Party's authority, and to enhance the legitimacy of the Party's rule in the eyes of an increasingly disaffected and apathetic populace; and second, to make

the Soviet Union a country that the CPSU would want to rule, instead of the new sick man of Europe.[46]

In order to achieve the first goal the new Soviet leaders needed to accomplish the second, which, in turn, would prove difficult without achieving the first. In order to reestablish that legitimacy and to provide for the development of the Soviet state, Mikhail Gorbachev embarked on a process of renewal, described by the now-familiar Russian words: *perestroyka*, *glasnost*, *democratizatsiia*, and *novoe myshlenie*.[47] Each one of these processes, 'restructuring', 'openness', 'democratization', and 'new thinking', was an effect of dramatic, revolutionary, ideological revision.

In his report at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev made clear that no area of the regime's realm was immune to ideological reformulation:

> Leninist theses on socialism were treated in an oversimplified manner, and often their theoretical profundity and importance were emasculated. This also applied to such important problems as public ownership, relations among classes and nationalities, the measures of labor and consumption, cooperatives, methods of economic management, people's power and self-management, the struggle against bureaucratic abnormalities, the revolutionary-transformational essence of socialist ideology, the principles of education and upbringing, and the guarantees of a healthy development of the Party and society.[48]

Gorbachev intended to strengthen the Party's authority by increasing the level of democracy in the country. The task, given his country's past was Herculean. Because the ideological, as well as other mythic components of the Communist Party's rapidly dwindling legitimacy excluded many aspects of public participation, the the Bolsheviks had not relied on participation as a source of legitimacy in the past. They never permitted society any institutionalized mechanisms for expressing dissatisfaction: they denied their citizens competitive electoral process in which to choose representative leaders; they denied them the right to form interest groups outside of the Communist

Party, even on relatively nonsensitive issues; they denied them the right to protest in an organized fashion; and they denied them the ability to form factions or parties in order to change specific leaders and policies.[49]

Gorbachev, between 1985 and 1990, moved to change all that. Though the result of his efforts was a sweeping ideological change that further eroded the authority of the CPSU, it seems that his motivation was a sincere desire to buttress the Party's authority. Though the reformers' means eventually undermined their goals, they had very four practical powerful, and interrelated reasons for democratizing the Soviet government. First, like Yuri Andropov before him, Gorbachev wanted to eliminate the corruption that permeated the CPSU. As Lord Acton noted, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Gorbachev's closest political ally during this period, Aleksandr Yakovlev echoed Acton's sentiments when he said of those resisting change, "Imagine a person who for forty years has been serving his ideal and who has grown accustomed to his position, his lifestyle, his living standards, who has grown used to wielding power--history's most corrupting habit. Now that the change has come, they find it difficult in their human way, to accept it."[50]

A second reason for promoting democracy was a desire to expand the range of the possible solutions to the country's problems. The Communist Party's insistence on delegitimizing any opinion which did not result from the consensus of its top leaders, enforced an artificial range of choice on the country's policy-makers, thus automatically precluding certain policy options, that while practical, were deemed ideologically unacceptable. The release of the Soviet stranglehold on Eastern Europe was a perfect example.

A third reason for democratization lay in the fact that the Soviet system, like most ideologically narrow political systems, tended toward political stagnation because

regimes have tended to remain loyal to the ideas which brought them power, in spite of any technological, economic, or social developments which may have undermined the validity of their founding ideas.

While Communist reformers have been reluctant to criticize Lenin, and have attributed the flaws in the system to Stalinist deformations, it is clear that the system Gorbachev inherited owed as much, if not more, to Marxist-Leninist thinking as it did to Stalin. The reformers' desire to justify their actions in terms of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, and conversely to deride the objections of more orthodox opponents of reform as Stalinist deformations, was a tactic in the constant conflict for political power between advocates and opponents of radical reform. Democratization aided the reformers in this struggle because the Soviet population, as a whole, hungered for change, and sided with those who promoted change.[51] (Judging from the manifest unpopularity of Mikhail Gorbachev and corresponding popularity of anti-Communists, following the regime's hesitancy to proceed with further democratization in the Fall of 1990, it is apparent that Gorbachev misjudged the ability to which he could control public dissatisfaction with the rule of the CPSU under **any** circumstances).

Nevertheless, the Gorbachev regime had recognized that the reliance of the CPSU on performance and myth robbed the regime of the ability to measure regularly and accurately popular feedback. As Gorbachev's leadership team opened up the system to that feedback, it reluctantly recognized the need to renounce its institutional monopoly on power. Aleksandr Yakovlev explained, "Society itself will decide whether it wishes to adopt our politics."[52]

The renunciation the power monopoly was an important step in the process of democratization, but that process began long before February 6, 1990. At the January, 1987 Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev was not yet ready or able to admit that a

multiparty system was the necessary cure for the Soviet stagnation, but he evidently believed that democracy was not only possible, but required within the old system. Speaking of the country's malaise, he said:

> The causes of this situation go far back into the past and are rooted in that specific historical condition in which, because of certain well-known circumstances, lively discussion and creative thinking disappeared from theory and the social sciences, and authoritarian evaluations and judgments became incontestable truths, subject only to commentary.

The improvement of economic and social conditions could only occur, he added, "based on the participation of society's members in all areas."[53] The changes that Gorbachev initiated reflected the practical realization that economic success comes not from viewing man as a means to an end, but as the end of policy. The idea that the collective could benefit from the freedom of the individual was a revision of not just Leninism, but centuries of Russian political practice as well.[54]

Oleg Bogomolov, an advisor to Gorbachev on Eastern Europe and the director of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, elaborated on the impossibility of improving economic conditions without changing the political relationship of the individual and society to the state:

> Now, many socialist countries sense the need for restructuring of political mechanisms and social relations, without which changes in technology and the economy will remain nothing more than a good intention. This, incidentally, has occurred more than once in the past. Changes in the sphere of the superstructure under way, and declared by these countries, indicate the birth of a new approach to political life. The paramount role in it belongs not only to the collectives, but to the individual as well, to his self-realization, and to his rights and liberties. The main orientations of this approach are not simply administrative authority; they are self-management principles, public consent, conscious discipline, and an increase in the moral authority of policy.
>
> The impulse derives from a national economy that requires rapid decision-making, flexible adaptation to changing conditions, and the effective selection of able and knowledgeable leaders. The economy is rebelling against bureaucratism, arbitrariness, collective irresponsibility, and incompetence, which for a long time have been

> anything but rare in the work of departments. It requires democratic procedures for making the most important decisions, personal responsibility, and the strengthening of public control over managerial action, which alone can truly protect us from mistakes and miscalculations. It is noteworthy as well that when the political atmosphere in a society is favorable to innovation, to the creation of bold ideas, to the birth of talent, when it rewards enterprise and the readiness to take risks and punishes the lack of initiative, and conservatism, then the rhythm of economic and scientific-technological progress accelerates.
>
> ...it is impossible to manage an economy by methods which are alien to it by constantly building up the bureaucratic apparatus and strengthening administrative coercion. It is intolerable to transform the superstructure into a braking mechanism. Its most important economic function is the widening of the full potential of the main productive force--man--and to ensure the continuous perfection of all organizational relations.[55]

The Nature of Soviet Internal Change

All of Gorbachev's ideological heresies, from the death of the Brezhnev Doctrine to the end of the Party's monopoly on power, stemmed from his promotion of *glasnost* and democracy. In order to accomplish its goal of economic reform the leadership required greater access to the market place of ideas. To this end Gorbachev and his colleagues set about to change the operational definition of democratic centralism. Past interpretations of the concept heavily favored the 'centralism' at the expense of the 'democratic', in order to muzzle dissent. Gorbachev constantly urged greater adherence to the principle of democracy: the April plenum in 1985; the 27th Party Congress; the celebration of 70th Anniversary of the Revolution in November 1987; the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988; as well as on other occasions. Perhaps the clearest formulation was at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum. Following that meeting, the Central Committee passed a resolution approving greater attention to the implementation of democratic mechanisms, including a truly competitive electoral system, within both the CPSU and the government as a whole.[56]

Party journals began filling with articles praising Western political systems, but perhaps more importantly, the U.S. Constitution became the object of study for Soviet law students, and the requirement to pass a course in Marxism-Leninism was dropped for all university students.[57] Further, Vadim Medvedev, a Gorbachev ally, Politburo member, and Central Committee Secretary with responsibility for ideology, spoke to a conference of scholars about socialism's failures in October, 1988. He argued that socialism improved itself by borrowing from capitalism:

> ...in elaborating the socialist perspective and creating an up-to-date conception of socialism, we cannot remove ourselves from the experience of mankind as a whole, including experience in the nonsocialist part of the world. After all, socialism, as V.I. Lenin taught, is a logical step in the development of human civilization. What is involved here is giving consideration not only to the scientific and technological achievements of the opposing system, but also to the many forms of the organization of public life and the economic process, including large-scale and small-scale production, cooperative forms of economic activity, and international integration, etc. It seems that we will have to put some serious effort into comprehending the practice of contemporary Social Democracy and its specific activity, including that in defense of the social and general democratic achievements of the workers.[58]

Gorbachev himself made clear the international effects of the Soviet Union's continuing ideological reappraisal at his speech before the United Nations on December 7, 1988. He explained that relations between states should be based on "universal human values," rather than state ideologies.[59] Universal human values bear a striking resemblance to Western liberal democratic values.

The leadership's desire to increase popular participation in the government and identification with the regime manifested itself in the institution of competitive elections; the creation of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet; and especially the renunciation of the Party's monopoly on power. By no means is it suggested that Gorbachev possessed a clear, settled plan of change or that he did not face

opposition to some of his policies; the conservative reaction of Autumn 1990 and the resignation of leading reformers such as Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Yakovlev was clear enough evidence of powerful opposition. Gorbachev, did however, possess a mandate for reform; it was the scope and pace that were the contentious issues.[60] Though the transfer of power from the Party to the state certainly benefited Gorbachev in his personal power struggle with the apparat, an interpretation which discounts the reformist impulses behind democratization, the relaxation of censorship, the opening up of cultural activities, and other liberalizing actions during the period, 1985-1990 ignores significant and unmistakable signs of the direction of the regime's thinking.[61]

Incomplete and uneven as the process may have been, the acceptance of genuine, institutionalized public participation in government signified a reduction of the importance of class, and thus Marxism-Leninism, as the alpha and omega of human social and political conduct in Soviet thinking. Marx rendered systems based on his thinking incompatible with democracy because his philosophy grounded itself on the belief that utopia could only be achieved if every element of society except the working class and enlightened bourgeoisie (e.g. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other Bolsheviks) were destroyed. Destruction at the very least implied exclusion from the fair competition for political power. While it may be argued that Marx and his followers foresaw democracy to be possible within the proletarian movement, institutionalized exclusion of a class from political participation was problematic for two reasons. First, the matter of defining class and class affiliation was ambiguous and lent itself to abuse as the early Bolshevik period demonstrated. Second, the automatic, institutionalized exclusion of any group is inherently undemocratic; to argue that democracy within the proletarian movement in the Soviet Union makes the USSR democratic is as absurd as arguing that democracy among whites in South Africa makes that country democratic.

In any case, proletarian democracy floundered in the Soviet Union when Lenin insisted that a dictatorial vanguard represent the working class. The imposition of the anti-factionalism rule and enforcement of democratic centralism at the Tenth Party Congress ensured that a relatively small group of conspirators, accountable only to themselves, would impose their policies on the working class, further limiting the scope of political decision-making.[62]

The Kremlin reformers came to recognize (at least until the rejection of the Shatalin plan and conservative reaction of 1991) that
the capitalist managers and entrepreneurs who the Bolsheviks referred to with nauseating frequency as the bourgeoisie, and excluded from the political process, were necessary for economic and technological growth of their society. Their exclusion precluded Western levels of economic growth, social welfare, and governmental legitimacy.[63]

On the level of official Soviet doctrine, the fundamental incompatibility of democracy and Leninism led to the authoritative, fundamental redefinition of democratic centralism. It has now become a synonym for majority rule.[64] The reformulation of this concept, both operationally and declaratively, implied ideological changes for foreign as well as domestic policy. Stalin used Lenin's definition of democratic centralism as the doctrinal justification for his dictatorial rule, internationally, as well as within the USSR. By installing leaders of his choosing in the fraternal East European Parties, Stalin assured his control of those Parties, because democratic centralism provided the doctrinal justification for preventing the challenge of unwelcome ideas and personnel into East European positions of power. Brezhnev cited the laxity of internal Party control in reference to both Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1981. The revision of democratic centralism under Gorbachev undercut one of the pillars of

socialist internationalism, the doctrine which justified Soviet military intervention into the internal affairs of other Socialist states.

This central revision caused an avalanche of more revision in Moscow, which changed the world. First, because most points of view became legitimate contenders for acceptance and implementation, there was no need for Moscow to intervene to prevent the spread of dangerous ideas. Officially, at least, ideas could no longer be considered dangerous. Second, the Kremlin made the belated discovery that national, ethnic, and religious differences were as important, if not more so, than class differences as determinants of state conduct.[65] Third, the recognition that class played a smaller part on the international stage than nationalism led to the revision of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence; no longer would it serve as a description of the international class struggle. Peaceful coexistence became more the goal of Soviet foreign policy, and less a means to an end.[66] Finally, the revision of peaceful coexistence acted symbiotically with the death of the Brezhnev Doctrine to obviate the need for an East European shield against ideological or physical intrusions from the West.[67] The obverse held true as well: because the Soviet Union no longer could or would make an effort to legitimize the Marxist-Leninist model in Europe, the United States lost the premier reason for hostility to the Soviet Union. The Soviet acceptance of what Moscow refers to as universal human values, vitiated the rationale for the Cold War.

The authoritarian backlash that occurred after Gorbachev's rejection in October 1990 of the Shatalin plan for a 500-day transition to a market economy did not include a leadership repudiation of the Soviet foreign policy line, either regarding cooperation with the West, or noninterference in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe. As the Soviet Union's economic decline and fissiparous tendencies became even more serious during the Winter of 1990-1991, calls in the government for order and discipline

drowned out calls for adherence to Communist ideological principles. Officially, the Gorbachev regime maintained fealty to both Communism and democracy, though it impossible to reconcile one with the other.

Conclusion

Gorbachev no doubt intended to strengthen the authority of the Party by allowing the public some say in how the country was run, but he unintentionally released a force that he could not easily control. Though public anger and resentment helped the Soviet leader to remove old guard impediments to his own reform plans, the Soviet populace, unshackled from previous ideological restrictions and taboos, evinced no fondness for Gorbachev's goal of strengthening Communism, even in a revised form. The doctrine survives in the U.S.S.R. today only for three related reasons. The first is inertia: much like an engine that continues to sputter long after its power is gone, elements within the Soviet government continues to sputter the words and symbols of a familiar, but lifeless ideology.

The second reason is that Soviet reformers within the Communist Party must justify their heresies to themselves; it is no doubt psychologically difficult to tear at the roots of a system which propelled them to the apex of power. Witness Gorbachev's justification for market-based reforms: "The market came with the dawn of civilization and is not the invention of capitalism. If the market leads to the improvement of people's daily lives, then there is no contradiction with socialism."[68] The Soviet leader defined socialism quite simply as that which works. Many policies of his administration may have been indistinguishable from Western policies but they had different names.

Similarly, Gorbachev and his allies needed also to justify some of their very unMarxist-Leninist policies to a relatively small, but insitutionally powerful group of

officials and conservatives, including military and KGB officers whose ideological commitment is rooted in the fear of losing the careers and advantages built on years of professed belief. They are the few remaining believers who have the interest and power to slow his policies. Their interests in supporting reform up to a point came from a sincere desire to increase the authority of the regime. Their desire to hinder the continuation of reform came from their motivated biases; their careers depend on the continuation of Communist Party rule.

The Marxist rationalizations and vocabulary that the world continued to see were aimed at what can be loosely described as the conservative, or orthodox opposition, though it should be noted that many of the opponents of reform object to Gorbachev's policies not on the basis of a betrayal of Marxism, but on the grounds that they have led to "disorder and anarchy." These opponents might better be described as nationalistic rather than orthodox Marxist.[69] Many of the conservatives likely opposed further reform on the basis of the rapidity and certainty of the revolutions which occurred in Eastern Europe following the regime's indications that it would not intervene. The fragility of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe shocked even Gorbachev and his advisors.[70] Nevertheless, the Gorbachev regime was committed to the policy of noninterference in Eastern Europe and opponents' objections were heard too little, and too late.

[1]For an explication of what came to be known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Sergei Kovalev, "Suverenitet i international'nye obyazannosti sotsialisticheskikh stran," *Pravda*, September 26, 1968, p. 1.

[2]M.S. Gorbachev, *Politicheskiy Doklad Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS XXVII Syezdu Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovietskogo Soyuza* (Moscow: *Izadatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury*, 1986), p. 27.

[3]Eduard Shevardnadze's report to USSR Foreign Ministry Conference, June 1988, "Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiia MID SSSR", *Vestnik MID SSSR*, No. 15 (August 15), 1988, p. 27.

[4]Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[5]Michael Howard, "Ideology and International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January, 1989), pp. 1-2. For a detailed discussion of the difficulties involved in defining ideology, see Maurice Cranston and Peter Mair, eds., *Ideology and Politics* [Four Publishers]: (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff; Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta; Brussells: Bruylant; and Firenze: Le Monnier, 1980).

[6]Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Vol. 16, Summer, (1989), p. 7; Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 4; and John Plamenatz, *Ideology* (London: Praeger Press, 1970), p. 15.

[7]Adam Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy,"*World Politics*, Vol 11, No. 2 (January, 1959), p. 158.

[8]Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology Revisited--Part II," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summmer, 1988), p. 331.

[9]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: Knopf, 1978), p. 92. For similar views of international politics see also E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939* (New York: Harper and Row, 1946).

[10]Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[11]*Ibid.*

[12]Adam Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (January, 1959), p. 158.

[13]George Kennan [writing as 'X'], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July, 1947), pp. 566-582.

[14]Ulam, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[15]While understanding that the concept of legitimacy is not uncontroversial, I am using it to mean the degree of compliance freely given by the governed to the government which permits effective government. See T. H. Rigby, "A Conceptual Approach to Authority, Power, and Policy in the Soviet Union," in T.H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway, eds., *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1980), pp. 9-31.

[16]Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 185.

[17]*Ibid.*

[18]*Ibid.*

[19]Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Translated by Maurice Cranston (New York: Penguin, 1981), Book I, Chapter 3, p. 52.

[20]*Ibid.*

[21]Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 119-120.

[22]See Gurr's decription of 'output effect,' *op. cit.,* p. 184.

[23]Timothy J. Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union,* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), pp. 32-67.

[24]See Khrushchev's speech to the Central Committee at the Twentieth Party Congress, *Pravda,* February 15, 1956. Also see Gorbachev's statement on how the threat of nuclear war changed Soviet foreign policy at the 27th Party Congress, *Pravda,* February 26, 1986, p. 2.

[25]Gorbachev implied this in his speech at the 27th Party Congress, *Pravda,* February 26, 1986, p. 2.

[26]The Soviets admitted this logic. See Shevardnadze, *op. cit.,* especially pp. 39-40; and Evgeniy Primakov, Vladlen Martynov, and Herman Diligenskiy, "Nekotorie problemy novogo myshleniia," *Meimo,* No. 6, 1989, p. 6.

[27]Mieczkowski, *op. cit.*; Alec Nove, "Socialism, State Planning, and the One Party State," in T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway, *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1980), pp. 77-97; and George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), pp. 147-148.

[28]For the relationship between popular consumption and regime legitimacy in socialist systems see Bogdan Mieczkowski, "The Relationship between Changes in Consumption and Politics in Poland," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (April, 1978), pp. 262-269.

[29]Marshall Goldman, *The USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System* (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983). pp. 55, 98.

[30]*Pravda,* April 8, 1981, pp. 2-3.

[31]See for example L. Toporkov, *Izvestia,* January 20, 1989, p. 5; and Dusko Doder, *Shadows and Whispers* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), pp. 24-72.

[32]Figures are taken from CIA measures, according to 1982 prices, in *The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader,* Paper submitted to the Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress (March 19, 1986) as cited in Timothy J. Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union,* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), p. 34.

[33]See Treml, *op. cit.*; and Orlov, *op. cit.,* note 93, previous chapter.

[34]Vera Dunham applied to Stalin's post-war regime the idea of a government trade-off of welfare for docility, though the concept seems applicable to successive regimes as well, *In Stalin's Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 187

[35]*Pravda*, November 28, 1978, p. 2.

[36]Leonid Brezhnev, *Otchetniy Doklad Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS XXVI Syezdu Kommunisticheskoy Partii i Ocherednye Zadachi Partii v Oblasti Vnutrenney i Vneshney Politiki* (Moscow: *Izdatel'stvo Krasnsaya Zvezda,* 1981), pp. 58-59.

[37]See Shevardnadze and Primakov, Diligenskii, and Martinov, *op. cit.;* also G. Mirski, "K voprosu o puti i orientatsii razvivayushchikhsya stran" *Meimo*, No. 5, 1987, pp. 70-80; and P. Avakov, "Novoe myshlenie i problema izucheniya razvivayushchikhsya stran," *Meimo*, No. 11, 1987, pp. 48-62.

[38]For the argument that the Solidarity upheaval in Poland influenced Soviet change, see Diplomaticheskaya Akademiya MID SSSR, *Vneshnaya politika i diplomatiya sotsialisticheskikh stran* (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1981), p. 93; and Elizabeth Teague, "Perestoika: the Polish Influence," *Survey*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (October, 1988), pp. 39-58.

[39]For a more detailed discussion of the sources of popular discontent and economic decline see Colton, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-67.

[40]Hough, "Gorbachev's Politics," *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[41]Tomim, V. P., *Uroven' obrazovanniya naseleniya SSSR,* (Moscow: *Finansy i statistika,* 1981), p. 71.

[42]Tomim, *op. cit.,* p. 56.

[43]Tomim, *op. cit.,* p. 113.

[44]See Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, *Media and the Russian Public* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 132-149; S. Frederick Starr, "Soviet Union: A Civil Society," *Foreign Policy*, No. 70, (Spring, 1988), p. 180. Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), p. 236, and Blair Ruble, *op. cit.*

[45]See Dusko Doder, *op. cit.,* p. 208.

[46]Colton, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-67.

[47]There exists some confusion as to the meaning of these words because of variations in usage. While Gorbachev introduced the term *perestroyka* in reference to his intended restructuring of the economy, it has been broadly used within both the Soviet Union and the West as a synonym for reform across political, economic, domestic, and international lines. Similarly, in the West, *glasnost* is used as a broad synonym for the range of reforms within the Soviet Union, although the Soviets use it only to mean openness. *Novoe myshlenie* signifies foreign policy change and *democratizatsiia* explains itself.

[48]*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January 28, 1987, p. 1.

[49]Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979). p. 314. In spite of Hough's listing of Western democratic institutions and processes missing in the USSR, he possessed a greater belief in the extent and value of citizen participation to government in the USSR than did most scholars, including Fainsod. See also T.H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway, eds., *Authority, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1980), especially chapters 2, 3, and 5; and George W. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London and Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1982).

[50]Quoted by David Remnick, *The Washington Post,* June 22, 1990, p. A32.

[51]See note 2, chapter 4 for evidence of the reformist and democratic sympathies of the Soviet population as a whole.

[52]Quoted by Francis X. Clines, *The New York Times*, February 8, 1990, p. A1.

[53]*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January 28, 1987, pp. 1-2; see also Andranik M. Migranyan, "Vzaimootnosheniia individa obshchestva i gosudarstva v politicheskoi teorii marksizma

i problemy demokratizatsii sotsialsticheskogo obshchestva," *Voprosy filosofii*, 1987, No. 8.

[54]Andranik M. Migranyan, *op. cit.*, and Mikhail Gorbachev, *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1989, pp.

[55]Oleg Bogomolov, "Mir sotsializma na puti perestoiki," *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1987, pp. 97-98.

[56]*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January, 28, 1987, pp. 2-3 (section II of Gorbachev's report).

[57]See for example, Nina Simakova and Igor Usachev, "Chem polezen ikh opyt," *Kommunist*, No. 10, 1989; Vadim Medvedev, "K poznaniyu sotsializma," *Kommunist*, No. 17, 1988; and Yuri Borko and Boris Orlov, "Razmyshleniya o sud'bakh Yevropu," *Meimo*, No. 9, 1988. Also see Attorney General Richard Thornburgh's account of his participation in the Soviet attempt to establish a law-based state, "The Soviet Union and the Rule of Law," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Spring, 1990).

[58]*Pravda*, October 5, 1988. Another formulation of convergence between the two systems, including admission of the "unpleasant discovery" that the market worked better than bureaucratic compulsion, can be found in the panel discussion of L.I. Abalkin, O. T. Bogomolov, A.P. Butenko, A.A. Galkin, V. Ye. Guliyev, T. I. Zaslavskaya, and other scholars in *Pravda*, July 14, 1989, p. 2.

[59]*Izvestia,* December 8, 1988.

[60]Bialer, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

[61]See Michael Dobbs' article on the physical transfer of power from the Party to the State, *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1990, p. A18

[62]For explanations of democratic centralism and the implications of the anti-factionalism rule on internal Party, and popular democratic participation in the USSR, see Hough and Fainsod, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-109, and 277-319.

[63]See Georgi Arbatov and Eduard Batalov for the argument that political reform toward greater democracy is a necessity for economic growth, "Politicheskaya reforma i evolyutsiia sovetskogo gosudarstva," *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1989; also see Oleg Bogomolov, "*Mir sotsializma*," *op. cit.*, p. 98.

[64]V. Skvirskiy, A. Butakov, and A. Gorenkov, in a discussion, "Demokraticheskiy tsentralizm: suzhdeniya i predlozheniya," *Kommunist,* No. 18, 1989, pp. 21-27, and V. Pshennikov, "Ot tsentralizma burokraticheskogo -- k demokraticheskomy," *Partiynaya Zhizn'*, No. 1, 1990.

[65]The following authors all asserted or argued this point: Shevardnadze, *op. cit.*; Mirski, *op. cit.*; Avakov, *op. cit.*; Oleg Bogomolov, "Mir sotsializma na puti perestroiki,"

Kommunist, No. 16, 1987; Oleg Bogomolov, "Menyayushchiisya oblik sotsializma," *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1989; Igor Usachev, "Obshchechelovecheskoe i klassovoe v mirovoy politike," *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1988; and Georgi Shakhnazarov, "Vostok-Zapad: k voprosu o deideologizatsii mezhgosudarstvenykh otnosheniy," *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1989.

[66]Shevardnadze, *op. cit.*, p. 34; Shakhnazarov, *op. cit.*, p. 67; and Usachev, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

[67]See Ligachev in Hungary in April, 1987, Philip Taubman, *The New York Times*, November 5, 1987, p. A1, A14; Gorbachev's interview with *L'Unita* in May, 1987, *Pravda*, May 20, 1987; his speech to the 70th Anniversary of the Revolution celebration, *Pravda*, November 3, 1987, pp. 2-5, and Bogomolov's article in *Kommunist*, *op. cit.*, which appeared at the same time.

[68]Quoted by David Remnick, *The Washington Post*, June 20, 1990, p. A31.

[69]See David Remnick stories on Soviet nationalist hardliners in *The Washington Post*, February 8, 1991, pp. A1, A14-A15; and February 11, 1991, pp. A11-A12.

[70]See Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the CPSU, "The Collapse of Eastern Europe: Moscow's View, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), p. 22.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

The previous five chapters demonstrated the following: (1) in terms of cost and benefit, the value of the Soviet Union's postwar arrangement in Eastern Europe declined over the course of time, politically, economically, and militarily; (2) the Gorbachev regime represented a new generation of leaders which was more willing to consider a wider range of solutions to the many difficult tasks of governing the Soviet Union than its more ideologically rigid predecessors; (3) the ideological revisions that resulted from the reformers' desire to implement their domestic programs and outflank their more conservative political adversaries resulted in structural political changes that undermined the ideological rationale for opposition to the institution of political pluralism in Eastern Europe. This chapter shows how the Gorbachev regime calculated the costs and benefits of the Soviet-East European relationship in light of the domestic political transformation of the Soviet Union. This chapter also summarizes the general utility of the model and addresses the implications of the 1990-1991 conservative reaction within the Soviet Union for the thesis.

Gorbachev Takes a Fresh Look at an Old Problem

In a speech given to a conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June, 1988, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze argued that nuclear and chemical arms races were irrational because the Soviet Union stood to lose more than it could possibly gain. He continued:

> Now let us touch on another, though no less important question of national security, the economic cost of political decisions: the economic profitability of foreign policy. In foreign policy every step has its own cost which either adds to, or subtracts from the budget of the nation's well being. At times too much is subtracted. The gross, ill-considered casting of weights on the scale of political influences frequently deflects the indications to the negative.[1]

The Soviet Union which Gorbachev took over on March 11, 1985 was suffering through a deficit of national well being, thanks in some measure to the burden of Eastern Europe. Ignoring the cost of mobilizing troops for an extended period of time along the Polish frontier from 1980-1982 and focusing only on the subsidies to the CMEA six, it should be possible to estimate an approximate economic cost of the burden by referring to Marrese and Vanous' earlier calculations and fluctuations in the world market prices of oil (the main export component in bloc trade).

Remember that the CMEA calculated commodity prices based on annually adjusted five-year averages of world market prices. Because the prices of oil and other non-food raw materials which made up the bulk of Soviet exports tended to rise over time while the prices of machinery and technology which constituted the bulk of their imports tended to fall, the Soviets lost money by trading with its East European partners rather than with the West. Though the world market price of oil declined modestly (about six dollars/barrel) between 1980 and 1985, Moscow still had to figure the relatively low prices of 1977-1980 in its average during 1981-1984, and even though the price of oil began to fall in February 1981, it did not drop precipitously enough to reach 1980 levels until 1986.[2] (That the opportunity cost of the intra-bloc exports bothered the Soviets is evinced by their behavior in 1982, when they reduced deliveries to Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary by ten percent in order to sell to Western Europe).[3] Given the pattern of oil price fluctuations and the CMEA method of calculating its prices, then the subsidy level of 55 billion dollars for the period 1975-1980 serves as a *conservative* estimate for the period 1980-1985. That figure was approximately one percent of the GNP for the same period (a figure greater than the growth estimates for 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1985), and it ignored the costs of the

special military mobilization along the Polish border and normal military operations, which are difficult to compute, as well as the incalculable political costs.[4]

While it would be an exaggeration to argue that Moscow's East European empire was at the root of the Soviet crisis in the mid-1980's, it is not an exaggeration to argue that the Soviet-East European relationship was symptomatic of that crisis, which was based mainly on popular dissatisfaction with the regime, the refusal of the top leadership to consider structural economic reform, and the power of corrupt and ossified bureaucracies to choke the life out of any imaginative idea which challenged established authority. The changing Soviet approach to its internal problems led the Kremlin to consider previously unthinkable foreign policy options to help solve those problems.

The Political, Economic, and Military Benefits of Change

The three major political costs to the Soviet Union of the relationship with the Warsaw Treaty states when Gorbachev took power in 1985 had changed very little since Stalin decided to keep the Red Army in Eastern and Central Europe at the conclusion of World War II. First, Polish society's most recent attempt to free itself from Communist rule in 1980-1981 was particularly damaging to Moscow's political legitimacy because the Kremlin was forced to justify crushing a peaceful workers' movement. Few, if any observers continued to believe that the Soviet Union had liberated Eastern Europe and continued its presence there at the invitation of the local populations. The ideological justification for the Soviet presence was long since dead. Even the GDR, the most ideologically orthodox of the six bloc states, needed a wall to keep its population in, and subsidies from the FRG to be economically successful.

Second, Poland again being the best example, the Kremlin's insistence on maintaining the right to approve the highest ranking rulers of the Pact states meant that those governments were legitimate in Moscow's eyes only, and would therefore never possess enough authority with their own peoples to escape the threat of further revolts. Finally, Reagan Administration comments attested to the view that Soviet dominance of the region was still a symbol of Communist aggression in the West, and more intensely than in any other period since the conclusion of World War II, poisoned its relations with Washington, especially in view of the role of Soviet military intimidation of Poland in 1980-1981.[5] Thus, in every aspect, for Moscow to continue relations with Eastern Europe according to the old methods and formulae made as much sense as a drowning man clutching an anchor.

The price of the Soviet-East European economic relationship during the Brezhnev era far exceeded the value received in return by the USSR. Early attempts of the Gorbachev leadership to encourage closer economic integration along the same lines as the 1961 and 1971 CMEA integration polices produced little result.[6] Following the regime's decision to reform radically the country's entire spectrum of internal and external policies the Kremlin found three principal ways in which change could redound to Soviet advantage: (1) by improving the quality of the manufactures imported from Eastern Europe; (2) by encouraging reform in Eastern Europe for the purposes of studying its implications for the Soviet Union; and (3) by taking advantage of better trading opportunities with the West.

Because the Soviet Union desired higher quality products for its money, the Soviet leader encouraged innovation and reform within the stagnant East European

economies. This could be achieved only by relaxing Soviet political control and reducing the practice of rewarding poor economic performance. Despite the efforts of the Brezhnev regime, the Soviet-East European relationship during the Brezhnev era could still only be characterized as a perverted colonial relationship; Moscow provided the CMEA states with valuable resources, such as oil and gas, and in return received poor quality goods which Soviet consumers did not want to buy. At a CMEA meeting on July 6, 1988, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov explained why the CMEA was not serving Soviet interests. First, he complained that the exchange of Soviet raw materials for East European manufactures was not a good deal: "It has been noted repeatedly already that the previously instituted model for the division of labor, which was based chiefly on the exchange of Soviet fuel and raw materials, has exhausted its capacity for giving trade a dynamic character."

Second, Ryzhkov acknowledged that the policy of borrowing from the West which was begun in the Brezhnev years produced more harm than good. The bloc debt to the West, he argued:

> ...reduces imports from the West, which affects the replacement and expansion of production potential and forces us to make scarce resources available for export. We have not really succeeded yet in combining our efforts to establish the production of those kinds of products whose import is not economical for CMEA countries.[7]

Vladimir Shastitko, Deputy Director of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist system lamented in October, 1987 that the Soviet Union's dependence on resources for its trade, "We have turned into a single-product country. A paradoxical condition has developed: a country with an advanced scientific sector and powerful industry plays the role in international economic relations of a 'raw materials limb' of

the developed states!"[8] The Soviet dependence on oil and gas had profound domestic and foreign economic implications. First, the only way for Moscow to rescue itself from dependence on fluctuating energy prices was to improve the quality its manufactured goods in order to increase the desirability of its products among world importers. Second, it made more sense to export raw materials exclusively to those countries which could afford to pay market prices, the West. Exports of raw materials to its CMEA partners represented a tremendous opportunity cost to the Soviets.

Indeed, it became increasingly evident that Moscow wanted to concentrate its trade in the world market, meaning the West, rather than the CMEA, or at least to the detriment to the CMEA. The pursuit of normalized economic integration into the world, or rather Western economy was one of the tenets of the Soviet Union's reforms. As Andranik Migranyan, a senior scholar in the same institute as Shastitko, wrote in the summer of 1989:

> No longer regarding ourselves as an alternative model of development for the whole world community, and having realized the fundamental weak points of our own economic and political system, we are deliberately trying not to hinder Western-style international economic contacts. On the contrary, we would like to integrate with that system and adapt ourselves to its already existing structures. Significant in this respect is the change in our attitude to the integration processes going on in Europe and in the West as a whole. Recent Soviet foreign policy gives us ground to outline the general road towards the single, transcontinental community.[9]

Migranyan's further comments suggest that Moscow understood that a prerequisite to their desired integration with the West was a change in their relationship with the Warsaw Treaty states. He noted that, "...it is perfectly clear that without deep-going internal changes in the economic and political spheres of East European countries and without a correct understanding of this process in Moscow, the

Soviet Union will not be able to achieve its own limited integration with the Western system of world economic contacts."[10] Western business managers and entrepreneurs were reluctant to trade with centrally planned economies, be they East European or Soviet, for purely economic reasons, and Western governments were reluctant to permit Soviet political integration so long as Moscow forcibly denied Eastern Europe its political and economic independence.

Second, a relaxation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe made laboratories out of reformist states where Moscow could study the effects of certain economic reforms on centrally planned economies. Hungary's New Economic Mechanism served as one example for Moscow even before Gorbachev took power. More recently Moscow has been able to view how the Polish government is handling their economic crisis. Migranyan's superior, the Director of IEWSS, who was also one of Gorbachev's closest advisors on Eastern Europe, Oleg Bogomolov, implied that the Soviet Union could learn from other socialist countries. He endorsed many of the types of activity approved at Poland's Ninth Party Congress, for example, the PUWP's introduction of self-management principles and market mechanisms. Bogomolov's wording recalls the NEP in that he does not dismiss state ownership but recognizes the productive superiority of private ownership in some cases:

> Major changes in property relations, also permit us to speak of a new model of the socialist economy. Property relations are being freed of bureaucratic deformations and are being made to correspond to the actual level of socialization of productive forces. The practice of many socialist countries [Hungary, Poland, and China] suggests the expedience of combining various forms of public ownership of the tools and means of production with individual, family, and small-group ownership, and the acceptability of mixed forms of ownership--state cooperative, state-private, state capitalist (with foreign capital), and others--while preserving the leading role of public ownership.[11]

Bogomolov argued that the system designed by previous Soviet rulers and applied in Eastern Europe was clearly obsolete in 1987 because of its inability to meet economic needs of those governed by the system. Bogomolov's view of the need to revamp the political and economic systems within the socialist countries fit in perfectly with Eduard Shevardnadze's rationalist view that the foreign policies of the state should serve the 'budget of national well-being'.

> The road travelled by the socialist world has not been straight and easy. During the postwar years, the countries belonging to the socialist world substantially strengthened their economic and scientific-technological potential, instituted vast social programs, and achieved persuasive results in confirming the socialist way of life. Together with this, their social development included complexities and difficulties (and in some instances stagnant phenomena [a reference to the Brezhnev leadership]), which even produced crises in some cases. Management mechanisms proved to be insufficiently flexible and receptive to the requirements of scientific-technological progress, and slowed down society's self-reform. All this demanded the restructuring and modernization of social relations. Today socialist countries find themselves in a critical period in their search for new solutions.

Bogomolov noted further that leaders and citizens needed to extend reform, not just to the economic sphere, but to politics and government, and to international relations as well: "It is no exaggeration to state that a collective search is going on for a new model of socialist society which fits the modern age, with its revolutionary changes in technology, culture, and the extent to which people are informed, with the need for new political thinking, with the need to democratize public life and international intercourse." Here was the reductionist explanation for the revolution in Eastern Europe.

Bogomolov made clear that the rationale for openness and democratization in the political sphere lay in the economic backwardness of the Soviet state:

> Now, many socialist countries are feeling the need to restructure political mechanisms and social relations, without which technological and economic reforms will remain nothing more than a good intention. This, incidentally, has been the case on more than one occasion in the past. Current and declared reforms by these countries in the sphere of the superstructure indicate the birth of a new approach to political life. The paramount role in it belongs not only to the collectives, but to the individual as well, to his self-realization, and to his rights and liberties. The main reference points are more than simply administrative authority; they are self-management principles, public consent, conscious discipline, and the greater moral authority of policy.

Bogomolov noted also that the impetus for political and social restructuring came from the general realization that the old political system inhibited the flexibility and responsibility required for a modern economy. Economic and technological progress, he said, depends greatly on a political atmosphere that rewards risk, experimentation, and innovation, and that reliance on bureaucratic and coercive methods economic management stifled performance.

Another Soviet advantage derived from a relaxation of political control in Eastern Europe would be an improved East-West relationship. As Migranyan wrote:

> In conditions of global confrontation, Soviet-US opposition mainly manifested itself in the Third World and East European countries and, naturally, these zones were spheres where the global interests of both countries clashed. Within the new thinking and new global aims of the Soviet Union, when the USSR instead of confrontation and spreading its own model is carrying out internal modernization and is taking steps toward direct constructive cooperation and exchange of know-how in the economic, as well as the socio-cultural, spheres with the West, especially with the United States, the role and the place of these countries and regions radically changes in global Soviet-US and East West relations. After taking the initiative away from the USA, as well as from the reform-minded forces in those countries (Poland, Hungary), the USSR may support their transformation. Such a policy will in practice confirm the seriousness of our global aims for entering into the world economic contacts. The changing nature of relations with the Warsaw Treaty states will create a more favorable image of the USSR among the public both in those countries and throughout the world. Such conduct by the USSR will induce the USA, too, to make serious corrections in its foreign policy regarding Eastern Europe.[12]

Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the same desire for integration at the February 1990 plenum in which the Communist Party renounced its monopoly on political power (though he probably would have liked to maintain his Party's unilateral hold on power). Previous deformations in the Soviet political and economic system, Gorbachev argued, "...led to the isolation of the socialist countries in the general current of world civilization, and from an understanding of progress in the form of permanent confrontation with the other social system in the world."[13] Such calls for integration, however, were already common in the theoretical literature long before they began appearing in leadership statements in the popular press.

Recall that during the early 1970's there appeared a number of articles which advocated entering into the world division of labor with the West. (Interestingly, one of the authors quoted above, Nikolai Shmelev, worked briefly for Aleksandr Yakovlev in the Central Committee's International Department and is a leading advocate of radical reform today. Yakovlev later became Gorbachev's closest advisor). Brezhnev pursued an economic relationship with the West, but trade between East West remained of the reverse colonial kind which Ryzhkov and others later bemoaned. There were two main reasons for the failure of the original opening to the West. First was the refusal of Moscow to consider structural internal economic reform. The Kremlin tried to benefit from trade while maintaining what was still essentially an autarkic economy. Because none of its own industries were forced to compete against each other, or foreign industry, there was no impetus to manufacture quality goods, and as a result there was no demand for Soviet goods abroad; the lack of demand for Soviet goods in the West produced no incentive for the West to sell the high technology that Moscow desired.

Less significantly, the confrontational character of the US-Soviet relationship which developed late in the 1970's impeded the development of a 'normal' trade

relationship. Export controls on the part of the West because of national security and human rights considerations, and extremely restrictive operating requirements for Western companies operating within the Soviet Union assured that the level of trade would remain low even had there existed an economic logic.

Along with the same economic motives for expanding trade mentioned during the Brezhnev years, the theoretical literature in the Gorbachev period took account of the improvement in East-West political ties as well as the beneficial effects anticipated as a result of internal reform within the Soviet Union. A. I. Semenov and S. V. Kalyuzhnyy argued that the one of the goals of reform was to create industries in which the West would want to invest. They also believed that the improvement in political ties would eliminate the pervasive trade discrimination which hampered economic development in the Soviet Union.[14] Yuri Shiraev, in *Kommunist* two months later argued explicitly that the Kremlin's policy of protecting its manufacturing industries became enshrined as dogma, thus pushing the Soviet Union into its present economic predicament.[15] In April, 1989 Margarita Maksimova argued essentially that the CMEA had failed completely and that it should be either completely overhauled or scrapped altogether because it was an unworkable grouping of economically immature states. Among her complaints was that the CMEA lacked an adequate conceptual foundation; it was obsolete in a world market which could not tolerate centrally planned economies; and that it would never look as attractive to any of its member countries as the neighboring EC. Past harping on the need for better coordination missed the point, for no amount of strategic trade coordination could take the place of real economic growth in the individual member countries.[16] By 1990 Moscow gave up hope that the CMEA could provide any benefits to the Soviet Union.

The new political relationship with Eastern Europe and the resulting new relationship with the West has already paid economic dividends for Moscow. First, West Germany already took over the Soviet Union's previous job as chief financial benefactor of Poland. When Tadeusz Mazowiecki went to Moscow to ask for money in November, 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev congratulated him on his job as Prime Minister and told him there were no rubles left for Warsaw.[17] Funds which previously might have gone to troubled bloc regimes are now kept in the Soviet economy. Second, the post-Cold War relationship with the West allows the Kremlin to pursue capital investment and technological assistance without worry of political interference, as occurred in the celebrated case of the gas pipeline project in 1982. Finally the Kremlin can channel funds into economic development which previously might have gone toward military expenditures. Diverting money from military programs toward more productive sectors of the economy is not a new idea. Khrushchev wrote:

> If we try to compete with America in any but the most essential areas of military preparedness, we will be doing two harmful things. First, we will be further enriching wealthy aggressive capitalist circles in the United States who use our own military buildups as a pretext for overloading their own country's arms budget. Second, we will be exhausting our material resources without raising the living standard of our people. We must remember that the fewer people we have in the army, the more people we will have available for other, more productive kinds of work. This realization would be a good common point of departure for the progressive forces of the world in their struggle for peaceful coexistence. If one side were to curtail its accumulation of military means, it would be easier for the other side to do the same. We must be prepared to strike back against our enemy, but we must also ask, 'Where is the end to this spiraling competition?'[18]

The Military/Security Dimension

Aside from a simple desire to save money and improve the living standards of the Soviet people, Gorbachev has moved well beyond Khrushchev on the issue of Soviet

security. Reasonable sufficiency and defensive sufficiency are the monikers for the Soviet Union's new defense policies, and like new thinking on political and economic arrangements with Eastern Europe, they are based on a cost-benefit analysis of previous arrangements. There are several components to this analysis.

First, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev recognized, like Khrushchev, that the accumulation of vast amounts of arms (particularly nuclear) was counterproductive. The result of arms stockpiling was not greater security for the USSR, but greater insecurity, because an arms race with the West ensued. As the arms race progressed, it created its own instability in the central relationship, and at a significantly higher level of financial expenditure than if it had not taken place at all.

Second, these defense analysts also recognized that in the age of weapons of mass destruction, and very fast, accurate missiles, territory and numbers of men no longer held the same significance which they held at the conclusion of World War II. Finally, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan convinced Moscow that military force had lost much of its utility for achieving foreign policy goals[19]

Probably because of the aforementioned reasons, as well to discourage the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, the 27th CPSU Congress Program contained the idea that the utility of military force became devalued in an interdependent world with weapons of mass destruction: "...the character of present-day weapons leaves any country no hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means, for example, by building up a defense system, even the most powerful one. The task of ensuring security is increasingly seen as a political problem, and it can only be resolved by political means."[20] Igor Malashenko wrote, "...in an interdependent world attempts by even the most powerful nations to resort to the force of arms on a limited scale in order to meet their selfish interests can boomerang against themselves. These facts account for a

certain depreciation of military force, moving to the fore other, non-military means of building security."[21] Stanislaw Kondrashov, a commentator for *Izvestia* noted the reduction in the importance of territory, "Do the Americans covet our territory? No, because they ascribe [sic] to ideas of maintaining their influence in the world by means other than seizure of territory."[22] Among the trends which Gorbachev cited at the 19th Party Conference was, "a gradual demilitarization and humanization of international relations, with reason, knowledge, and moral principles, rather than selfish ambitions and prejudices, at long last motivating states in resolving numerous contradictions in the world and achieving a balance of interests, with the right of each to freedom of choice being recognized..."[23]

It would be easy to dismiss such musings as propaganda, especially the obvious attempts to limit the United States' development of SDI. There are three problems, however, with that interpretation. First, the amount written on the subject was overwhelming. Had it been propaganda the Soviet leadership would have found reversing itself very difficult because of the confusion such a reversal would have engendered. Second, the replacement of forty-seven senior military commanders can be interpreted as the dismissal of those officers incapable of accepting new thinking.[24] Third, the Kremlin matched its words with deeds: the INF Treaty of November, 1987 resulted in the first ever reduction in nuclear missile stockpiles; Gorbachev announced a 500,000 man, unilateral Soviet troop reduction at the United Nations in December of 1988; the Soviet Union pulled all of its forces out of Afghanistan in February, 1989. Moscow has already revised upward its planned withdrawal of a half-million troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 aircraft from Europe, as well as thirty billion rubles from military spending in the 1986 five-year plan.[25] According to the CIA and DIA Soviet defense spending dropped 6-7% from 1988-1989, with the largest chunk of the

cut coming from general purpose forces, particularly in ground equipment. 200,000 troops have already been cut and the pace continues on or ahead of schedule. In addition the Soviets have cut production of tanks, fighter aircraft and fighter-bombers as well.[26]

Moreover the Red Army is leaving Eastern Europe. It has already withdrawn most of their forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary; and in what used to be East Germany the Soviets have promised to remove their troops by 1994. Despite Red Army intransigence over the conditions of the withdrawal of the Group of Northern Forces, Moscow has shown no objection to withdrawal from Poland in principle. One reason for the delay in beginning the negotiations with the Soviet Union was Warsaw's fear of a united Germany.[27] Similarly, the lack of available housing and jobs for demobilizing Soviet soldiers and officers have more to do with the continued presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe than do geopolitical or ideological forces.[28]

As both a cause and effect of the Cold War, Moscow's military reaction to its insecurity in Eastern Europe fed upon itself. The Brezhnev Politburo concerned itself so intensely with events in Poland in 1980 and 1981 partly because of the dangerously high level of tension in Soviet-American relations. References to "imperialist subversion" and the possibilities of Western exploitation were common in Moscow's attacks on the Polish events and adduced to Soviet anxiety about US-Soviet relations. Soviet perceptions of a deteriorating relationship were not unfounded: President Carter had significantly increased US defense spending during his last two years in office; NATO approved the dual-track decision on the modernization of intermediate nuclear missiles in 1979 in response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan killed the already slim chances for ratification of SALT II; and the American

people elected President a man who built his party's platform on a plank of military superiority.

The Soviet desire to end the arms race decelerated the spiral. Reasonable sufficiency, the term used by the Soviets to describe their growing confidence in the U.S.S.R.'s power to deter and rebuff attack at a lower level of men, money, and material, and their growing skepticism about the very existence of the Western threat, led the Soviets to decrease their military forces. The Kremlin's actions gave the West reason to reduce its own forces. The Western response to the Soviet military reduction demonstrated that the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe had become more of a security liability than an asset. By the summer of 1990 the momentum of military reductions in Europe, had rendered the force ceilings which were agreed upon in Malta in December, 1989 irrelevant, and it became apparent that Moscow and Washington found themselves more eager to disarm than at any other period in the history of US-Soviet relations. Certainly fiscal stringency in both countries fueled the drive to pull troops and materiel out of Europe, but the real issue behind the mutual withdrawal was the absence of need for a continued presence (evidence to the contrary will be addressed below).

Summary and Theoretical Implications

The six countries, which as a unit formed the East European bloc within the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, constituted a region of great political, economic, and military area of interest for Russia long before the Russian Revolution. Following the Revolution, the Soviet Union continued to pursue its interests in the region. At the conclusion of the Second World War, Moscow achieved physical control of all six

countries with all the attendant political, ideological, and economic benefits described above.

Most of the benefits of the Soviet-East European relationship began to decline in relation to costs over time. Yet, despite Moscow's realization of this declining value, however, the rational actor model did not fully explain the Kremlin's change in policy because the existence of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe served an important legitimating function for the CPSU's internal rule.

The application of a cognitive/ideological change model showed that by the time Gorbachev took power, however, Communist ideology, as well as most other mythic, and performance aspects of Soviet regime legitimation were failing; the combination of a more demanding and discerning Soviet population and a new, more open-minded generation of leaders led to a reevaluation of regime and national interests in the U.S.S.R. The result of the regime reappraisal of values was the decision to rely more on popular participation for regime legitimation. This decision to permit political pluralism within the Soviet Union undermined the long-standing policy of forcibly denying the right to popular participation within the bloc states.

Internal ideological change, however, did not introduce the change of policy. It could explain why the policy changes but not how. There remained within the U.S.S.R. opponents to internal and external change. The bureaucratic politics model was useful in explaining how reformers within the Soviet Union convinced or outmaneuvered the opponents to ending Moscow's East European hegemony to accept a policy of withdrawal.

The rapidity with which the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe fell confirmed the inauthenticity and illegitimacy of those regimes. As Moscow's new policy took shape, Poland became the first of the Warsaw Pact six to test Moscow's sincerity. As the anti-Communists in Poland during the course of 1989 found no discouragement from Moscow,

opposition movements gained momentum in the other bloc countries. Hungary, quite smoothly, then East Germany and Czechoslovakia, with more drama and resistance, followed in Poland's wake. Finally, Bulgaria, with some trepidation, and Rumania, in a bloody conclusion to the year, completed the embarrassment of Communism in Eastern Europe and the end of a key component of the postwar world order.

While it is clear that Moscow's policy change toward Eastern Europe was the result of a confluence of all the variables identified within the study, not all were immediate factors, and not all were equally significant. The weightiest factors can be determined by systematically removing different factors from the equation and testing the validity of assertions that the absence of these factors would have immediately altered the outcome.

First, Moscow's East European policy would not have changed markedly between 1985 and 1990 if the Soviet Union had been in more robust economic condition at the time. Undoubtedly the financial strain represented by Moscow's domination of the region would not have been so onerous, and would not have contributed to a rethinking of the relationship that occurred, but Eastern Europe represented an economic burden during the 1970's, and yet precipitated no reconsideration of Kremlin policy then, either directly, or in the desire for greater interdependence with the West. The most that can be said for the explanatory power of the Soviet Union's dire economic performance is that it facilitated domestic reform. It was an underlying, but not an immediate cause.

Second, the Western military rearmament program of the late 1970's and early 1980's helps to explain the outcome. Western responses to perceived Soviet threats occurred in the years following World War II and during the early 1960's. In turn,

however, the Soviets tightened, rather than loosened their grip on Eastern Europe. Moreover, though it would seem that Moscow relinquished its control of the region on the heels of the Carter-Reagan military build-up, the first indications of a change in policy did not occur until 1987, *after* U.S. military spending began to decrease in real terms and *after* the East-West thaw following the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Kremlin learned over time that attempts to achieve unilateral security were dysfunctional. That being the case, Western responses might also be considered an underlying factor.

Third, the refusal of Solidarity in Poland to retreat from its demands on the Polish United Workers' Party emphasized Communism's inability to eliminate opposition to its rule. The inability of Moscow, or any of its agents, to suppress permanently nationalist, anti-Soviet movements in Eastern Europe caused the Kremlin to reevaluate its policy. Again the problem with this factor as a complete basis for explanation is timing. Nationalist rebellions against Communist rule in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland during the previous forty years invalidate the immediacy of anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism as causal agents. Moreover, at the Kremlin's urging the Polish Communists successfully suppressed Solidarity. Indeed, Mikhail Gorbachev applauded this when he came to power. On the other hand, it can be concluded that the persistence of anti-Communist nationalism in Eastern Europe taught Moscow that only a fundamental change in policy would eliminate such rebellions.

A fourth hypothesis is that Mikhail Gorbachev and the new generation of Soviet leaders did not possess the temperament and inclination to rule Eastern Europe by force. The problem with a strict leadership explanation of the outcome is that Gorbachev himself assumed his position with a vague plan for internal and foreign policy reform but evinced no desire to change the basic relationship with any of the six bloc states, as

his initial support for the suppression of Solidarity indicated. Second, strict opposition to the use of coercive means for keeping the bloc together seems unlikely given the Soviet leadership's authorization to use force against its own rebellious republics.

Furthermore, the leadership was by no means united in favor of relinquishing control over Eastern Europe. Though reformers had great success in removing personnel who opposed altering the Soviet relationship with Eastern Europe, it is difficult to prove that these politicians, soldiers, and diplomats were removed directly *because* of their opposition to change vis a' vis Eastern Europe or whether there existed other reasons. Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Medvedev, Ligachev *et. al.* did not so much change the policy as they let it change. Collectively they were an important cause, but not the most important.

Finally, by process of elimination, the main cause of the radical transformation of Soviet-East European relations was the redefinition of the regime-society relationship within the Soviet Union that occurred as a result of the new leadership's search for new means of legitimation. The democratization of the Soviet Union, albeit limited, undermined the rationale for opposing democratization abroad, i.e. in Eastern Europe. Moreover, once the Soviet public was able to voice its opinions on the the priorities of the state, solving the Soviet Union's economic problems and raising the population's standard of living pushed aside any thought within the leadership of using Soviet troops abroad for any purpose.

The question remains as to the general applicability of the conclusions of this study and the integrated model used in it. First, the conclusions here cannot be generalized for foreign policy or even Soviet foreign policy in particular. Though this

case study supports a second image view of world politics, it is highly doubtful that an empirical analysis of Soviet foreign policy will reveal that internal political and ideological factors are always, or even generally the most significant determinants of Moscow's foreign policy decision-making. That such second-image explanations for state behavior are more likely to obtain during periods of internal convulsion and change is already evident. The success of the model in isolating the significant independent variables in the development of foreign policy, however, indicates that it may have some utility beyond the confines of this particular case, both for the Soviet Union and foreign policy in general.

The conservative backlash which occurred in the Soviet Union in late 1990 does not undermine the argument of this study. For the most part, the authoritarian reaction was caused by the inability of some actors, especially Gorbachev himself, the military, the KGB, and the Communist apparat, to comprehend and accept the forces unleashed by the first five years of reform and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. The apparently undiminished pace of some Soviet advanced weapons' systems construction, Moscow's tougher attitude toward the ongoing talks on reduction of conventional forces in Europe [CFE], and the reluctance of the Soviet military to accelerate its withdrawal from Poland can be explained by Gorbachev's reliance on the military as one of the three institutional actors committed to the preservation of the Soviet Union.

While reformers like Eduard Shevardnadze could not reconcile the forced preservation of union with the continuation of democratic reforms, Gorbachev has tried to marry these contradictory goals. The military, the KGB, and the orthodox wing of the CPSU are the strongest institutional supporters of union, and Gorbachev has had to make political and budgetary concessions to those actors to ensure their support of his

leadership. The military's institutional interest is in preserving its budgets and political influence. None of these developments, however, undermined Moscow's East European policy. Complaints from the military about having lost Eastern Europe were too little, too late; any attempt to reverse the process would bring a catastrophic reaction from the West which the Soviet Union could ill afford, politically or economically. Moreover, just as there exists no ideological basis for preserving the Soviet Union, there remained no ideological basis which could justify a reversal of the process of East European independence, because the Kremlin itself had already accepted the legitimacy of non-Communist competitors for political power.

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[1]Eduard A. Shevardnadze's report, "Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiia MID. SSSR.," *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, August 15, 1988, 1988, p. 37.

[2]Oil prices come from U.S. Department of the Interior Office of Policy Analysis, *Managing Oil and Gas Resources in an Era of Price Instability* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1, 1988), exhibits 1.a and 1.b.

[3]David Brand and Steve Mufson, *Wall Street Journal,* May 11, 1982, pp. 1, 20.

[4]Calculations are the author's and are based on the same figures as contained in note 99, chapter 3

[5]See note 120, chapter 3.

[6]See "Kompleksnaya programma nauchno-tekhnicheskogo pregressa stran chlenov SEV do 2000 goda: Osnova polozhniya," *Izvestia,* December 19, 1985, pp. 1-2; and Vladimir Sobell, "Mikhail Gorbachev Takes Charge of the CMEA," *Radio Free Europe Research,* RAD Background Report No. 146, December 20, 1985.

[7]*Pravda,* July 7, 1988, p. 4.

[8]*Izvestia,* October 10, 1987, p. 6.

[9]Andranik Migranyan, "For Discussion: An Epitaph to the Brezhnev Doctrine: The USSR and Other Socialist Countries in the Context of East-West Relations," *Moscow News* in English, No. 34 (August 27-September 3, 1989), p. 6 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service,* September 20, 1989, p. 20.

[10]*Ibid.*

[11]Oleg Bogomolov, "Mir sotsializma na puti perestroiki," *Kommunist,* 1987, no. 16, pp. 92-102.

[12]*Ibid.* pp. 21-22.

[13]*Izvestia,* February 6, 1990, p. 1.

[14]A. I. Semenov and S. V. Kalyuzhnyy, "Vzaimoe Sotrudnichestvo Stran SEV i Delovye Svyazi S Zapodom," *Seria Ekonomicheskaya,* No. 4, 1988, pp. 104-113.

[15]Yuri S. Shiraev, "Strany SEV: Novaya Kontseptsiya Sotrudnichestva," *Kommunist,* No. 6, 1988, p. 88.

[16]Margarita Maksimova, "Razdum'ya o Perestroyke SEV," *Meimo,* No. 4, 1989, pp. 65-77.

[17]Bill Keller, *The New York Times,* November 26, 1989, Section I, p. 11.

[18]Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers,* (Trans. by Strobe Talbott) Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. p. 518.

[19]See for example A.A. Kokoshin, A.V. Kortunov, "Stabilinost i peremenyi v mezhdunarodnikh otnosheniakh: razmyshleniya o doklade professore John Gaddis," *SSHA,* no. 7 (1987); A.A. Kokoshin, "Razvitiye voennogo dela i sokrascheniye vooruzhennnikh sil i obichnikh voooruzhenii," *MEiMO,* no. 1 (1988); V.V. Zhurkin, S.A. Karaganov, A.V. Kortunov, "O razumnoi dostatochnosti," *SSHA,* no. 12 (1987); and Alexander Bovin, "Vneshnaya Politika..., *op. cit.*

[20]*Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress,* cited in Igor Malashenko, "Non-military Aspects of Security," *International Affairs,* no. 1, 1989, p, 40.

[21]Maleshenko, *op. cit.,* p. 40.

[22]Stanislaw Kondrashov, "Vpechatleniya i razmyshleniya posle odnoy poezdki," *Izvestia,* April 2, 1988, p. 6.

[23]M.S. Gorbachev, *9th All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Documents and Materials: Report by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,* and *Resolutions,* in *Soviet Life,* special supplementary issue, 1988, p. 35.

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[24]See note 43, chapter 5.

[25]*Pravda,* September 9, 1989, p. 4. Paul Mann, "U. S. Predicts Further Cuts in Soviet Defense Spending," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* Vol. 132, No. 19 (May 7, 1990), p. 69.

[26]Mann, *op. cit.;* Testimony of Barry Blechman, president Defense Forecasts, Inc., Phillip Karber, senior vice president and general manager, BDM International, Inc., Andrey A. Kokoshin, deputy director, Institute for the USA and Canada, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, and Edward L. Warner, III, Ph. D., senior defense analyst, The Rand Corporation for the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, "Gorbachev's Force Reductions and the Restructuring of Soviet Forces," Hearings before the Defense Policy Panel, March 10 and 14, 1989; and Testimony of Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense for the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, "US Defense Budgets in a Changing Threat Environment," Hearings before the Defense Policy Panel, May 17, 1989, pp. 88-139.

[27]See Polish Prime Minister Tadeuscz Mazowiecki's call for Soviet troops to stay in Poland until Germany guaranteed Poland's western border, *Associated Press,* February 21, 1990.

[28]See the interview with Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitri Yazov in which he says the biggest problem in withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe is finding housing for them within the Soviet Union, *Izvestia,* July 1, 1990, p. 2; see also Jonathan C. Randal, *The Washington Post,* February 27, 1990, p. A12.

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