A Combinatorial and Experimental Analysis of Nash Equilibria for Finite Common Payoff Games

By Richard Voepel


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First Uploaded: Oct. 19, 2017; This version: Oct. 19, 2017


Abstract: In this paper we build upon the work of Stanford in analyzing the distribution of the number of pure Nash equilibria in "random" two player finite common payoff games. By utilizing a combinatorial framework, complete distribution information for the cases of 2 by n games are found. Larger games can be analyzed in the same fashion, though the complexity is best handled through the use of compute algebra systems, such as Maple(TM). We also show the lack of need for this information for practical purposes by casting the problem into an experimental framework, collecting data on both two player and three player games with small strategy sets.


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